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The European Rail Trac Management System (ERTMS) is a new signalling scheme that is
being implemented worldwide with the aim of improving interoperability and cross-border
operation. It is also an example of an Industrial Control System, a safety-critical system which,
in recent years, has been subject to a number of attacks and threats. In these systems, safety
is the primary concern of the system designers, whilst security is sometimes an afterthought.
It is therefore prudent to assure the security for current and future threats, which could aect
the safe operation of the railway.
In this thesis, we present a systematic security analysis of parts of the ERTMS standard,
rstly reviewing the security oered by the protocols used in ERTMS using the ProVerif tool.
We will then assess the custom MAC algorithm used by the platform and identify issues that
exist in each of the ERTMS protocol layers, and aim to propose solutions to those issues. We
also identify a challenge presented by the introduction of ERTMS to National Infrastructure
Managers surrounding key management, where we also propose a novel key management
scheme, TRAKS, which reduces its complexity. We then dene a holistic process for asset
owners to carry out their own security assessments for their architectures and consider the
unique challenges that are presented by Industrial Control Systems and how these can be
mitigated to ensure security of these systems.
Drawing conclusions from these analyses, we introduce the notion of a ‘secure architec-
ture’ and review the current compliance of ERTMS against this denition, identifying the
changes required in order for it to have a secure architecture, both now and also in the future.
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The United Kingdom (UK) rail network is undergoing a major transformation from legacy
systems, some of which date back to the Victorian rail ‘revolution’, to the digitisation of more
components from the track to the train itself. The objective of this transformation is to increase
line capacity, improve punctuality, simplify maintenance and improve reliability whilst further
developing interoperability to allow cross-border operations.
The new solution, which is in the process of being implemented, is the European Rail
Trac Management System (ERTMS). This platform comprises the European Train Control
System (ETCS), a suite of protocols and standardised applications for in-cab signalling and the
Global System for Mobile Communications for Railway (GSM-R) wireless communications
protocol for train to trackside messaging.
With the increased digitisation of our railways, we must ask the question: “what threats
may exist to the railway and what are the future risks that could arise?”. ERTMS is a standard
born out of a European Union (EU) Directive which has roots as early as 1997 [22]. We see, in
other sectors, such as telecommunications that, if the security of a system is not continuously
reviewed (for example, GSM’s primary encryption cipher, A5/1 is now considered to be broken
[100]), or the attack model is not evolved to consider today’s attacker capabilities [41], it is
1
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possible for attacks to have a higher likelihood of success. When we consider the rail network,
systems are designed to fail safe. If an attacker had the ability to compromise a train, they
have won the game where the safety of the train and rail network could also be subsequently
compromised.
We therefore need to carry out a detailed analysis of the rail network from a security per-
spective to understand where lapses may have occurred and consider a factor that aects all
Industrial Control System (ICS) environments – their inherent lifespan. ICS systems, com-
pared to typical commodity equipment, have a much longer lifespan – in the order of decades,
rather than years. This presents a problem to ICS owners when considering the security of
their systems, where there is a gap between what was previously considered secure compared
to what may now be insecure. It is also important to look at the future of these systems.
Specically, security decisions should be modular, so that if a vulnerability arises, there is an
opportunity to address the exposure. This is where safety and security meet and are intrinsi-
cally linked.
The ERTMS standards have been developed by a large number of parties representing rail
equipment vendors, Infrastructure Managers and the European Rail Agency (ERA). The stan-
dards are spread over 50 separate specication documents, totalling over 1,000 pages, with a
particular focus on backwards compatibility and interoperability. With this volume of docu-
mentation, there is the risk of ambiguity in the specication, signicant complexity and critical
details (particularly for the security community) to become hidden in other technical details.
1.1 The Need for Assurance
As we have seen in widely-used code libraries, e.g. OpenSSL [149], for a stack of safety-critical
protocols and applications, it is possible that any implementation of a new system could have
inherent errors or weaknesses. Conversely, what if it was the underlying standard that con-
tained and introduced those weaknesses? Any implementations of the standard would there-
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fore be insecure. It is therefore essential that the standards and specications which drive
implementation by vendors provide a security assurance and any potential weaknesses are
identied and addressed prior to implementation. In this section, we will highlight the con-
tributions of this thesis to the development of a framework to formally analyse the standards
and their relative security.
For protocols, techniques such as formal verication using mathematical modelling can
be employed to verify the correctness of a protocol and ensure that there are no security
weaknesses. In this thesis, we will show how formal verication can be used to analyse the
compositional security of the EuroRadio and Application Layer train to trackside protocols
against a given set of security properties. These properties should hold, especially for a safety-
critical system where any potential exposure must be addressed.
However, having a protocol shown to be secure is only part of the assurance process. For
example, whilst a protocol may be secure against replay attacks or prevents cryptographic keys
from being leaked, it may be the case that the cryptography ultimately fails the security of the
system. For systems with a long operational lifespan such as those used in Critical National In-
frastructure (CNI) applications, cryptography may be used to provide message authentication.
However, if the cipher itself is weak, the attacker has another, new, way of compromising the
system itself. Cryptanalysis is an established means of assessing the security of ciphers and
is used in this thesis to highlight weaknesses in the custom-dened Message Authentication
Code (MAC) cipher used in the EuroRadio protocol.
Finding attack vectors and vulnerabilities in standards and specications provides a level
of assurance to owners, operators, vendors and regulatory bodies, enabling them to address
any security issues. However, in some cases, whilst a viable threat may not be conceivable
today, it is essential that the potential future exposure is also assessed and consideration given
to the future security of the system. This thesis will analyse the way that cryptographic keys
are handled in ERTMS and propose a new scheme that considers and addresses future threats
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to the platform, in particular from attackers with quantum computing capabilities. As an
example, which we will review in detail later in this thesis, post-quantum resistance is critical
for new deployments of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, due to
their long operational lifespan. Whilst today, an attacker could intercept trac without having
the quantum ability to break certain public-key schemes, in a post-quantum world, they would
be able to recover keys with relative ease.
Conversely, we must assess the process used to install these cryptographic keys on equip-
ment and its relative security. As mentioned previously, there are subtle dierences between
when ERTMS was initially ratied and subsequently adopted. The current oine ERTMS
scheme is currently in the process of being replaced with an online, Public Key Infrastruc-
ture (PKI)-based scheme. However, as previously discussed, we need to ensure that it remains
secure for the future by analysing and assessing potential areas of exposure including human
factors in key management. Unlike protocols and cryptography, where implementation er-
rors may occur, key management may also involve a human element, e.g. to transport keys,
or carry out an authorisation. This element, therefore, needs to be equally assessed and im-
provements identied which minimise the possibility of poor practices becoming the norm or
prevent social engineering attacks which are similarly of concern [101].
Finally, we should also consider the asset owners and determine ways that they can im-
prove the security of their systems. One of the biggest threats to any architecture is where the
asset owner simply does not have a comprehensive understanding of their system. There may
be some knowledge siloed in the organisation or, through organisational change, the knowl-
edge may no longer be held. For an adversary, this means that they could look for potential
entry points which the asset owner is either unaware of, or the level of interconnectivity in
the system has not been appraised. Again, if the adversary is able to gain a foothold into
the system, they may be able to follow these unrealised connections between systems. With
the introduction of the EU Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive, it is essential
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for system owners to condently assure the security of their systems, especially where the
security models and adversary capabilities are constantly evolving.
All of these points pose the question: how can we condently assure the security of our
systems? Using Denition 1.1 below, we will try to answer this question in the forthcoming
chapters of this thesis and demonstrate how vulnerabilities found in each part of the ERTMS
stack mean that this denition does not hold. Through analysis, proposed improvements and
mitigations, we are, however, able to demonstrate that we can provide a secure architecture for
ERTMS. This Denition primarily concerns itself with the security of individual components
but also considers the compositional security of an architecture.
Denition 1.1 (Secure Architecture of an Industrial Control System) We consider an In-
dustrial Control System (e.g. ERTMS) as having a ‘secure architecture’ if it has the following
properties:
• Each component is veried for its security posture.
• Critical components (e.g. SIL3/SIL4) have a clearly dened security prole and measures
have been taken to minimise the risk of exploitation.
• Protocols and cryptographic proposals are veried and the security assured for the lifespan
of the platform.
• Messages and data are provided sucient protection such that an attempt by an active
attacker is always detected and the presence of a passive attacker does not compromise the
security or safety of the system.
Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) dene risk thresholds for a given system, and the condence
placed in the safety performance of that system. SIL levels are extensively used in safety-
critical applications, where four SIL Levels (further explained in Chapter 2) specify the likeli-
hood of failure for a system.
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1.2 Thesis Overview
In this thesis, we will ‘dive down’ the ERTMS stack from the perspective of the train and the
Radio Block Centre (RBC), before returning back up the stack, reviewing the security of the
standards from a holistic viewpoint and considering the existing and potential future threats
to the platform. This thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 Here, we outline the necessary technical background for ERTMS, its underlying
protocols and architecture and the evaluation methods and tools that will be applied in this
thesis. We will also review the EU Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive, its impact
on system owners and the interplay between safety and security.
Chapter 3 From the overview of ERTMS and analysis techniques, we will review the existing
literature, including previous and related work in this area of research and discuss the key
challenges and considerations that exist in ICS and the rail sector. Whilst ERTMS security
research is an evolving area, we will also look at related ICS sectors for inspiration and touch
on real-world applications of analysis techniques, for example, in the nancial sector.
Chapter 4 Building on the work from the previous chapter, we will start to ‘dive down’ the
ERTMS stack, rstly analysing the protocols that are used for ERTMS train to trackside com-
munications. The work presented in this chapter is an extension to a previously-submitted
MSc. Thesis to the University of Birmingham, and is based on the publication:
A Formal Analysis of ERTMS Train to Trackside Communications, by the author, Tom Chothia
and Joeri de Ruiter [51], presented at RSSRail in 2016.
The extensions to the MSc. Thesis include further analysis of the high-priority messages
that are used within EuroRadio and a thorough analysis of the Application Layer protocol,
including its use of timestamps.
Chapter 5 Chapter 4 only considers attacks against the EuroRadio and Application Layer
protocols, where ProVerif assumes the use of cryptography to be perfect (i.e. it is implemented
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correctly and has no vulnerabilities). However, this is not sucient, as the assurance of the
underlying cryptography must be established. In this chapter, we will review the EuroRadio
MAC algorithm in detail and show how an attacker can leverage aws in each of the train to
trackside protocol layers to forge their own messages which would be accepted by the train.
This chapter is based on the publication:
An Attack Against Message Authentication in the ERTMS Train to Trackside Communication
Protocols by the author, Tom Chothia, Mihai Ordean and Joeri de Ruiter [41], presented at
AsiaCCS 2017.
Chapter 6 What is subtly highlighted in Chapters 4 and 5 is that key management in ERTMS,
required for the EuroRadio MAC and protocol to authenticate trains and RBCs, is also a chal-
lenge, with new proposals coming forward, as we observe from Chapter 3. In this chapter, we
will review the existing ERTMS key management scheme, an oine, country-specic system
and its proposed online successor, identifying potential improvements that could be made and
relating these to Denition 1.1 by introducing the EuroBalise into the secure architecture. The
work presented in this chapter is based on the publication:
TRAKS: A Universal Key Management Scheme for ERTMS by the author, Tom Chothia, Mihai
Ordean and Joeri de Ruiter [133], presented at ACSAC 2017.
Chapter 7 Looking forward, given the issues identied in the previous chapters, we are now
in a position to dene a framework that allows asset owners to assess the overall security of
their own systems. By using a model-based approach and the Common Vulnerability Scoring
System (CVSS) framework, ICS operators can rationalise and reason about the security of their
systems and identify potential weaknesses and opportunities for improvement. This chapter
is based on the publication (currently under submission):
The SCEPTICS Tool for Threat Analysis in Industrial Control Systems by the author, Tom Chothia
and Mihai Ordean.
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Chapter 8 When considering the security of ICS, there are a number of obstacles which do
not exist in other settings, specically the design lifespan of systems and the requirement
for continuous availability. In this chapter, we will look back at the marriage of security and
safety and the future threats that could become possible in the lifetime of ERTMS. We will
then consider one important, perhaps unique, challenge that ICS and widely-deployed systems
present, namely where recommendations need to work alongside the existing standards before
looking at future areas of work that can be explored.
Chapter 9 We will look back at Denition 1.1 and review how each chapter contributes to
the development of a secure architecture for ERTMS and conclude this thesis.
Chapter 2
Background and Preliminaries
In this chapter, we will review, at a high level, the necessary technical details required for the
remainder of this thesis, including a background of the current signalling system deployed in
Great Britain, followed by an overview of ERTMS, its associated protocols and standards and
the methods we can use to to assure the security of these components. For the purposes of
this thesis and to directly relate to the standards, the United Kingdom refers to the scope of
the Department for Transport (DfT), whilst Great Britain (GB) refers to England, Scotland and
Wales only.
2.1 Existing Signalling in Great Britain
Currently, with the exception of sections of the Great Western main line, running from Lon-
don to Wales and sections of Thameslink, the rail network signalling system in Great Britain is
largely standardised to allow both passenger and freight services to operate on the same infras-
tructure. The Great Western main line operates a dierent system, known as Automatic Train
Protection (ATP), an advanced system which supervises the train to ensure it does not pass a
signal ‘at danger’ or exceed the permitted line speed. This system was introduced following
the Hateld rail accident, resulting in 4 fatalities and 70 casualties. Thameslink operates on a
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combination of the European Rail Trac Management System (ERTMS) in its ‘core’ and the
conventional signalling system, track circuit block signalling, deployed throughout the rest of
Great Britain.
In block signalling, the rail line is split into a number of blocks. A train cannot enter a
block that is already occupied by another train, as a safety envelope is specied to ensure that
a train is able to stop before it overruns into the next block when given a ‘warning’ aspect.
These blocks are typically of variable length, dependent on a number of factors including line
speed, proximity to stations, and other operational considerations. In Great Britain, a number
of interconnected components are used to provide signalling and deliver a fully-managed and
safe rail network.
2.1.1 Architecture
Compared to some deployments in Europe, the Great Britain signalling system has largely re-
mained unchanged with lineside signals and other physical infrastructure providing ‘on sight’
signalling authorities. In contrast, for example in France and Germany, in-cab alternatives
exist which allow for increased line speeds.
Figure 2.1: Example four-aspect signal, deployed in the Great Britain rail network, progressing
from a ‘proceed at line speed’ (green) to a ‘danger’ (red) aspect.
Lineside signals are typically located to the side of the rail lines (shown in Figure 2.1) or
mounted on gantries to display signalling ‘aspects’ to the driver, providing permission to pro-
ceed into the next supervised block. These signals can be supplemented with ‘route indicators’,
informing the driver of the rail line or platform to which the train will be directed. Other as-
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pect signals exist (e.g. three, two and single-aspect), which may be deployed on less utilised
lines.
All signals of this type are connected to a xed cable network through to a lineside cabinet,
receiving information from a central control system or signal box determining which aspect
to display.
As a train proceeds from one block to the next, it is considered to occupy that block and
have cleared the previous block. In Great Britain, train occupancy can be determined in one
of two ways, using track circuit detection or axle counters. Track circuit detection works
by passing an electrical signal down one rail, where the train wheels will transfer the signal
(due to their conductive nature) to the opposite rail. This signal is detected by a relay placed
alongside the track, showing whether or not a section of track is occupied. It should be noted
that whilst a line can be shown to be occupied, there is no way to identify where in the block a
train is located, as only a positive or negative response is returned. Axle counters are devices
directly attached to one of the rails, counting the number of axles passing through them. The
way this technique works is that when a train moves into a new, unoccupied block, the number
of axles on the train are counted in, and as it leaves a block, they are counted out. If the number
of axles counted out equals the number of axles counted in, then the block is no longer deemed
occupied, where another train may enter that section of track. In some areas of the UK, a
combination of track circuit detection and axle counters are deployed, where both detection
systems are complementary to each other.
2.1.2 Issues with the Existing Signalling System
As previously identied, the current signalling system deployed in Great Britain has remained
largely unchanged in recent decades. Reliability, capacity and maintenance overheads are
now a motivation to move to in-cab signalling solutions, including the European Rail Trac
Management System (ERTMS).
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One of the main issues with lineside signals is the requirement for a driver to be able to
see and process a signal aspect at speed. The West Coast Main Line (WCML) is considered
to be one of the busiest and most congested rail lines in Europe [34], but relies on ageing
infrastructure. The reliance on being able to ‘read’ signals at speed, limits the possible speed
that trains can operate, restricting the capacity of the line. Another issue is associated with
the required safety envelope to ensure that any train can stop safely within a block, leading
to the term ‘chasing signals’, where drivers move from one red aspect to the next, introducing
delays.
The reliability of this infrastructure is also another consideration where signal failures
are a common occurrence.The replacement of this infrastructure with digital, in-cab solutions
would not only reduce maintenance cost, but also improve the reliability of the signalling
system due to the reduced number of components and exposed infrastructure.
2.2 European Rail Trac Management System (ERTMS)
The European Rail Trac Management System (ERTMS) is a European standard for ‘next-
generation’ train trac management and signalling, composed of the European Train Control
System (ETCS) and GSM-R. Its primary aim is to improve interoperability for cross-border
operation and optimise railway operations. A prime case-study for the benets delivered by
this standard is the Thalys PBKA train which has seven dierent signalling systems onboard
to handle operations on dierent lines and country standards. Where ERTMS has not been
deployed, existing signalling systems are used, including AWS/TPWS (Automatic Warning
System/Train Protection Warning System) in Great Britain and KVM (Contrôle de Vitesse par
Balises (Speed Control by Beacons)) in France.
ERTMS is currently being rolled out across Europe and, whilst it is a European standard, it
is being actively deployed on high-speed lines across the world. At the end of 2014, over half
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of some 80,000km of railways equipped with ERTMS were located in Asia 1. One potential
way to deploy ERTMS is through ‘national deployment’ where rolling stock and trackside
infrastructure are upgraded on a large scale. An example of this is the pending East Coast
Mainline deployment of ERTMS in Great Britain within the next decade.
In addition to the ratied standards, ‘baseline’ standards are ‘controlled evolutions’ 2 to
the standards which are undergoing operational testing and, once ratied, become the new
version of the standard.
2.2.1 Architecture
ERTMS has three operational levels, where ETCS Level 1 is the lowest, most basic level and
ERTMS acts as an overlay to the national signalling system. Within this level, EuroBalises
are responsible for delivering the signalling ‘Movement Authority’ issued by the Radio Block
Centre (RBC) to the train (allowing it to proceed on the line).
A EuroBalise (EB) (also known as a balise) is a RFID-like device which is placed between the
rails. In ETCS Levels 2 and 3, they are responsible for providing absolute location references
to the train, in addition to track information, e.g. line speed and gradients. Optional messages,
known as ‘Packet 44’, allow for national customisations e.g. default speeds and, in the UK,
is being used for Tilting Authorisation and Speed Supervision (TASS), used on the Class 390
‘Pendolino’ and Class 221 ‘Super Voyager’ to govern safe tilting actions on the West Coast Main
Line (WCML). Balises are typically grouped into pairs (known as a ‘balise group’). When a
train passes over a ‘balise group’ it is able to determine its direction of travel and report its
position to the RBC.
In ETCS Level 2, EuroBalises are used as location beacons, which inform the train of its cur-
rent location. Movement Authorities (MA) are given via a train to trackside link and existing
signals are now optional in this operational level. Finally, ETCS Level 3 is the most advanced
1http://www.ertms.net
2https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/rail/ertms/general-information/faq_ertms_en
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operational level, removing the requirement for safety integrity monitoring through track-
side circuitry and enabling moving block operation (i.e. a virtual block is created between
trains based on the braking distance capabilities, rather than the xed blocks between signals
currently used in the UK rail network).
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Figure 2.2: High-Level ERTMS System Architecture
Trains communicate with one or more RBCs during their journey, where the RBCs are
responsible for issuing command and control messages to the train. RBCs typically cover a
specic geographical area of approximately 70 kilometres [3]. RBCs acknowledge train loca-
tion reports, verify the safe operation of the railway and also issue commands, known as a
Movement Authority (MA) to the train, which denes the safe distance the train may travel
and its maximum permissible speed. Each RBC is connected to a xed network to hand over
trains to the next RBC when a train leaves its area of responsibility.
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RBCs may also be connected to a regional control centre (or Rail Operation Centre (ROC)),
operated by the National Infrastructure Manager, where manual intervention actions may
be taken, for example, in the event a train unit has failed. RBCs interface with the lineside
signalling equipment in ETCS Levels 1 and 2 to cater for trains which are not ERTMS-ready
and trackside circuitry, for example axle counters, to ensure that a block of line is truly clear
and allows informed safety-critical decisions to be made by the RBC. In ETCS Level 3, however,
train ‘integrity’ is managed solely onboard the train, where the RBC trusts the train’s reported
position with no external validation [71].
Finally, the Key Management Centre (KMC) is a nationally-operated system, handling
cryptographic keys which are used to negotiate secure keys between trains and trackside
equipment. Trains and RBCs are ‘homed’ to a specic country and each KMC will inter-
face with peer country KMCs to obtain cryptographic keys to enable trains to operate across
borders.
A high-level architecture of ERTMS is given in Figure 2.2 which shows how systems are
interconnected, in addition to their respective roles and responsibilities.
2.2.2 Protocols
ERTMS relies on several protocol layers for communications between the train and trackside
(Figure 2.3), where each layer provides some level of service and security features to the upper
layers. As previously mentioned, ERTMS is formed of ETCS (the EuroRadio and Application
Layers) and GSM-R, as shown in Figure 2.3.
Global System for Mobile Communications for Railway (GSM-R) This is the lowest
layer for communications between trains and the trackside infrastructure specied in ERTMS
[72, 73] and is an extended variant of the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM)
standard, operating internationally on a common frequency band. It includes enhanced func-
tionality allowing, for example, emergency group calls, pre-emption and pre-dened short
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Figure 2.3: Overview of the dierent communication layers in ERTMS.
messages to be sent between the driver and signaller, e.g. ‘standing at signal’ [122]. An ad-
ditional feature that GSM-R supports are ‘shortcodes’ which use location-based functions to
route the call to the appropriate destination. An example of this is a shortcode which contacts
the local signaller or RBC. Black-spots in the network may, however, arise from poor network
coverage. Inside tunnels, radiating cables, known as ‘leaky feeders’, can be used to ensure that
the train is continuously connected to the network.
EuroRadio This layer is situated above GSM-R, providing additional authentication and
integrity protection for messages between the train and trackside [140] through the use of a
Message Authentication Code (MAC). It also ensures that the train and trackside entities are
genuine through a handshake protocol that takes place for every connection. Messages sent
to the train are one of two priorities - ‘normal’ and ‘emergency’. Normal-priority messages are
sent with a MAC which provides an authenticity and integrity guarantee whilst emergency
messages bypass authentication checks. The cipher used by EuroRadio is negotiated during the
handshake as a Safety Feature (SaF). Currently, only one SaF is supported, based on the ISO-
9797 specied MAC Algorithm 3 [140]. However, there have been reports of other ‘ciphers’, e.g.
Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC), being used [121] which only provide integrity checksums.
Application Layer This operational layer interfaces the European Vital Computer (EVC),
located onboard the train which supervises its safe movement, with the lower layers (GSM-R
and EuroRadio) and has additional checks for the timeliness of messages received and mes-
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sage ordering, using relative timestamps. Pre-dened messages are specied in the structure,
allowing system intercompatibility between vendors.
2.2.3 EuroRadio MAC
‘Normal-priority’ messages are authenticated by having a MAC appended to the end of the
message. This cryptographically veries the integrity and authenticity of the message. In
ERTMS, the EuroRadio MAC is a Triple DES (3DES)-based scheme, loosely derived from ISO-
9797 MAC Algorithm 3 [31]. The keys used for this MAC are negotiated by the train and RBC
as part of the handshake process of the EuroRadio protocol.
2.2.4 Key Management
Cryptographic keys are managed and distributed by a national body (the KMC), typically the
National Infrastructure Manager (e.g. Network Rail for Great Britain, ProRail in the Nether-
lands and ÖBB-Infrastruktur in Austria). KMCs interact with each other to submit and process
key management requests for cross-border operation in addition to managing the keying es-
tate in their home domain.
2.3 Analysis and Assurance Methods
Dierent analysis methods are applied, depending on the component or system being evalu-
ated. In this section, we will explore some of these methods and how they provide security
assurance. What is important to note is that these methods are complementary and should
not be considered or used in isolation.
2.3.1 Formal Verication of Protocols
When protocols are being designed, especially those which have some critical function, whether
it is to convey data between two given endpoints over a common interface (e.g. UDP) or to
guarantee condentiality of data for web-based services (e.g. TLS), it is important to verify
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that the protocols are designed and implemented correctly. During the design stage, formal
verication can highlight the unexpected behaviour of the protocol which, if implemented,
could become an exploitable vector by a malicious adversary. These adversaries could model
the Dolev-Yao attacker. For the purposes of this thesis, we will dene the attacker as one who
is active and is able to intercept, inject a new message, or replay an existing, possibly modied
message into a communications channel between two or more participants. The Dolev-Yao
attacker, however, cannot guess keys where encryption is used if the probability is negligible.
They can only use keys they learn from a protocol run.
Formal analysis captures the protocol as a mathematical model, where it is for automated
‘provers’ such as ProVerif [16] and Tamarin [104] to prove some condition, for example, that
a malicious adversary cannot interfere with a critical part of the protocol. Common aws that
may be identied during formal analysis can be determining sources of leakage where data,
which should have been condential, is leaked to the adversary which could have signicant
consequences. It should be noted that, whilst a protocol may be proven to be secure against a
dened adversary, its implementation and cryptography (if present) may include errors which
renders the assurance of the protocol null and void. Various techniques may be used to validate
the implementation of the protocols from standards, ranging from verifying the code to fuzzing
the implementation to determine if it maintains conformance to a given standard.
An example application of the formal verication of protocols can be observed in the rat-
ication of the TLS 1.3 standard [46], which found a number of design aws in the proposed
standard using the Tamarin verier. This work was further developed in 2017 to demonstrate
a direct relationship between the Tamarin model and the specications [45], highlighting how
it is possible to map the protocol into a formal model.
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2.3.2 Cryptographic Analysis
As previously identied, formal analysis of protocols assures only that the protocol behaves in
an expected way and that it meets specic guarantees of security. What this type of analysis
does not consider is the cryptographic design and how it might place the protocol at risk
if it has known weaknesses. Cryptographic analyses concern themselves with the design of
the algorithm and how it is used, where game-based approaches may be used to assure their
design. That said, cryptographic algorithms may be proven secure against a current adversary
but, with advances in computational capabilities, may allow the cryptography to be broken at a
later time. However, unlike automated symbolic protocol verication, cryptographic analyses
are typically manual processes.
Dowling et al., as an example of the application of cryptanalysis, carried out an analysis
of the TLS 1.3 Handshake Protocol candidates, showing them to be cryptographically secure
[53].
2.3.3 Modelling Complex Systems
Another complementary technique to assure the security of systems is achieved through mod-
elling. Here, an abstracted architecture is created where we can explore the interconnected
nature of these systems. We can then determine the data dependencies that exist in the system,
following them to identify the ows of data and, of interest to a system owner, where attacks
may take place and their impact on the system.
Yearworth et al., for example, model a corporate IT system, using system availability as a
metric to determine the impact of attacks against the system [148].
2.4 Threat Models and Regulation
In the rail sector, an emphasis is placed on validating safety cases, which can include mod-
elling the systems to identify the risks and hazards that may exist. This allows system owners
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to be certain that they will not introduce something which can aect the safe operation of
the railway. In security, whilst we can also model threats to our systems, we place an em-
phasis on what a malicious adversary could do, whereas the safety model considers all other
eventualities.
The threat model is able to consider one or more attackers, each with their own individual
set of capabilities, for example, intercepting trac between the train and trackside or one
who has a quantum computer with the ability to break public key cryptography. Within their
‘arsenal’, the adversaries are able to use attack paths, paths through the system they can take
to reach their desired goal. These are typically used as part of cyber kill chains which includes
the stages from reconnaissance to exploitation, to leverage weaknesses and vulnerabilities
in connected systems to reach systems which may be externally isolated and not normally
accessible by an external adversary. By following this ‘chain’, the attacker can use each system
as a pivot point to traverse through the entire system until they reach their desired endpoint.
Using these models, the asset owner can determine whether the risk is acceptable in the
context of other factors (i.e. their risk appetite, which may be inuenced by their risk budget,
which may specify a nancial threshold at which the risk is acceptable) or whether mitigations
should be made to reduce the level of risk to one that is acceptable, depending upon the type
of risk and the likelihood of a risk occurring versus the cost to compensate or mitigate it.
Anderson outlines a step-by-step process for modelling such systems, the approaches to
managing risk and provides a number of real-world worked examples for the various method-
ologies that can be applied [2].
2.4.1 TheEuropeanNetwork and Information Security (NIS)Directive
The Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive in the European Union came into force
in May 2018, aiming to improve the security of critical infrastructure. In this Directive, an
Operator of Essential Service (OES) is required to report incidents to their respective National
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Technical Authority (e.g. the National Cyber Security Centre for UK-based incidents) if certain
thresholds are met. In the United Kingdom, the Department for Transport set out the NIS
thresholds for the transport sector [52], where, for rail, all incidents must be reported when
services are degraded and breach the dened threshold, regardless of the root cause.
2.4.2 Safety and Security Levels
Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) are used in safety-critical applications to dene the risk thresh-
olds that exist in a system and the condence in the safety performance of that system [55].
These levels are extensively used in ICS deployments where safety-critical systems may be
deemed SIL4 (the highest level of safety concern) and SIL0/1 is the lowest level (no safety con-
cern) [61]. Each level has probability metrics based on the likelihood of failure. Security Levels
(SL) can be seen as a security-focused evolution of SIL levels [23] where SL1, the lowest level,
considers a casual attacker and SL4 captures a sophisticated attacker with high motivation
and a comprehensive skillset. As Braband notes in [23], as there is no direct mapping between
SIL and Security Levels, there may be disparity between the assigned levels. Bloomeld et
al. consider ‘capability levels’ [19], similar to Braband’s proposal, but try to map these levels
directly to the SIL Levels.
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Chapter 3
Related and Previous Work
As identied in Chapter 2, safety-critical systems, for example, those used in railway applica-
tions, are subjected to rigorous validation processes to assure that the system and its associated
components are safe and, if an issue is identied, it is addressed to ensure that it does not have
potentially serious implications. Whilst this assures the safe operation of the railway, it does
not necessarily guarantee the security of that system and its components.
In this chapter, we will review the literature related to the assurance of the security of
systems and the emerging research, specically within the rail sector. As we focus on the
safety-critical aspects of ERTMS and the implications of an attack, we will rst review the
existing tools and techniques that are applied to verify the safe operation of rail systems. We
will then evaluate the existing techniques applied to assure the security of such systems, for
example, formal protocol and cryptographic analysis of MAC algorithms.
Key management is a particular, perhaps, separate area, although intrinsically linked, that
could have a signicant impact if compromised. A number of proposals for its improvement
have been suggested, which are used as inspiration in the development of TRAKS in Chapter 6.
In Chapter 2, we also noted that for both safety and security, there is an overlap in some
of the techniques that can provide assurance, specically risk and threat modelling. We will
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also consider the security-focused aspects of modelling, used in Chapter 7, to overcome some
of the gaps which were identied.
What is clear within this chapter is that security research within the rail sector and ERTMS
is very new. In other sectors, however, the techniques that will be presented in this chapter
are already well-established and extensively used in alternative security research elds.
3.1 Safety Verication and Modelling
As previously noted, the rail sector has a very mature verication process to assure its safe
operation. In 2013, Fantechi surveys the past twenty-ve years of the application of formal
methods to verify rail systems [61], with one particular case study identied as ‘one of the most
fruitful’ for formal methods – that of signalling. In this study, the B Method was applied to the
Paris Metro Line 14, which identied a number of issues which were later addressed. This spe-
cic verication method now forms part of the EN50128 standard. In Fantechi’s chronology,
he assesses the evolution of formal modelling to include SAT-based checking. The benet of
this technique overcomes the issue of state explosion, a problem which arose when verifying
interlocking systems and is now widely used in other industrial settings. Fantechi proceeds to
consider the future of signalling, with ERTMS as a case study, noting the dierent eorts to
validate the standards and principles (e.g. braking curves) and their interface with interlocking
systems.
Another example of the use of formal verication was studied by Peterson in 1998 [111]
on the Danish rail network. Previously, there was no way to verify the STERNOL-based inter-
locking system used by DSB, the national operator. The aim of Peterson’s thesis was to assess
how formal methods could be applied to verify the safety of the interlocking system, although
various performance issues were also encountered which have subsequently been addressed.
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3.1.1 Challenges of Safety Verication
Today, model-based checking continues to be used, both in the safety and security domain.
With the increased digitisation of the rail network, the question of maintaining its safe op-
eration now presents signicant challenges in its verication, as Fantechi later identies in
2016 [62]. In this work, Fantechi notes that, given the signicant cost incurred in assessing
safety requirements, assurance work is typically focused on components which are to conform
to the highest SIL Level, Level 4, rather than a holistic approach which should cover all SIL
Levels. However, due to the close interconnectivity of systems today, it is harder to segregate
these components and, therefore, conduct independent analyses of these systems. For safety
certication and simplicity, these components are now grouped under a common SIL Level,
requiring signicant development eort and cost for certication. Fantechi also oers a spe-
cic viewpoint on data-driven safety design methodologies which aim to simplify compliance
with CENELEC EN50159, a communications safety standard used in rail applications. What
Fantechi importantly notes is that security is an aspect which should now be considered to
ensure safety, where safety and security are, today, intrinsically linked.
3.1.2 Safety Verication Today
The verication that components in a system work as designed and do not allow transitions
into a potentially unsafe state is also well-established. Venit-Anunchai, for example, uses
coloured petri nets to verify and formally prove nine properties, modelling the Thai signalling
system [146]. In this work, issues were identied with this approach, specically the risk of
state explosion (an issue that Fantechi also notes [61]) and the time taken to generate the
model state space. As we will observe in the following section, there is often an overlap be-
tween verication methodologies.
System designers, such as the RATP Group, have over twenty-ve years of experience
in verifying the safety of their systems [12], with the rst verication of its automatic train
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protection system of the RER A line in Paris. In this analysis, Benaissa et al. explore the PERF
(Proof Executed over a Retro-engineered Formal model) approach, combining model-checking
and induction proof techniques in a common tool. This approach allows formal verication of
software (based on the code or a formal model), assumptions of the environment and safety
requirements. This provides either a ‘proof certicate’, conrming the software meets the
formal specication, or gives counter examples if a property does not hold. We will observe
in the following section how various protocol verication tools can provide similar output in
a dierent setting. Later work by Halchin et al. uses the PERF approach and applies it to the
B method, a formal method based on logic and set theory [74]. The authors demonstrate how
the B model is translated into a high-level language model which can then be veried. Another
case study outlined by Comptier et al. applies Atelier B (a commercial implementation of the
B method) to verify the Octys Communication Based Train Control (CBTC) system used by



























Figure 3.1: The PERF Approach Workow [12].
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An alternative verication tool is Systerel S3 prover, which takes a similar approach to
PERF in how the safety specication and software developed are assessed, as noted by Breton
and Fonteneau [27]. However, unlike PERF, where the software needs to be translated into
a formal model, the S3 toolchain is able to translate code into the high-level language input
required for the solver, providing a similar workow to Halchin et al.
Moller et al. [106] develop their own modelling and verication approach, working from
experience in Computer Science formal methods. Here, they apply a combination of the B
Method and CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes) process algebra to specify commu-
nicating systems, creating the CSP||B approach. In their work, they consider the information
ow of a signalling system to model the control table (determining how the interlocking sys-
tem sets signals and routes), tracks and release tables, followed by safety verication of their
model. In their analysis, they demonstrate how CSP||B only allows ‘safe’ movements of trains,
using an external tool to verify this. What this work demonstrates is a union in formal methods
between safety and Computer Science, which will be explored in the next section.
Finally, Song et al. apply ‘reliability theory’ in their analysis of ETCS Level 2 and highlight
the implementation challenges that Infrastructure Managers and operators will face when the
ETCS Level 3 standard is ratied [130]. The authors focus on the safety of European railways
and propose a new type of Movement Authority, MA+, to bridge the interoperability gap be-
tween ETCS Levels 2 and 3. As part of this proposal, a safety analysis is carried out comparing
MA+ to the current ETCS Level 2-specied Movement Authority. The authors note whilst the
existing Movement Authority does not reveal the route and position of neighbouring trains
and the state of the interlocking system, MA+ would provide this information. Using reliability
theory, the authors consider the likelihood that a ‘dangerous’ event occurs and demonstrate
that MA+ increases the safety and reliability of ETCS Level 2, whilst not aecting the perfor-
mance of ERTMS.
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3.2 Formal Modelling and Verication of Protocols
Protocols are widely used for a number of purposes, whether it is to relay data between two
systems (e.g. TCP and UDP) or to provide secure transmission of data (e.g. TLS). These pro-
tocols, however, require formal assurance that they conform to their specication and, when
faced with an adversary, those protocols which provide security services, do not contain aws
which can be exploited.
When assessing the security of the EuroRadio protocol, previous research work has at-
tempted to provide assurance of its security, such as that presented by Esposito et al. [59] and
Franekova et al. [67], using UML-based approaches. Alternative methods, for example, using
the SPIN model checker by Zhang et al. [150] and petri nets by Hongjie et al. [79] have also
focused on the EuroRadio protocol.
3.2.1 Existing Modelling of EuroRadio
Esposito et al. [59] carry out an analysis of the EuroRadio protocol at a high level from the
perspective of the state machine that exists within EuroRadio. In this analysis, the protocol was
modelled using UML to capture the state machine and protocol in their entirety, specically
verifying the behaviour of the state machine and how it handled unexpected messages being
received or messages which did not conform to the standard (e.g. corrupted packets). This
analysis, unlike using formal modelling tools, e.g. ProVerif, highlighted aws, including the
ability to force the protocol into a state of deadlock (i.e. the protocol is unable to proceed into
any further state) and possible conicts and inconsistencies within the standard. Their work,
however, relates the EuroRadio specication to CENELEC EN50159, a standard which denes
a threat/defence matrix to which safety-critical systems in rail should comply. However, this
analysis does not clearly identify if EuroRadio successfully meets all of the requirements of
the matrix.
UML is one other possible way to model the protocol, where Zhang et al. [150] transform
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Figure 3.2: Threat/Defence Matrix as dened in EN50159 [29].
the protocol into a model which can be veried using the SPIN verier. This model expresses
the protocol as Interface Automata, a dierent approach, which does not require the input/out-
put arguments that other tools require but, instead, works with ‘assumptions’. In this work,
UML complements the Interface Automata in dening a number of properties to which the
protocol must conform. These properties are similar to that of Esposito et al. in [59], for ex-
ample, deadlock conditions, whilst also including extensions, such as mandatory transitions
and consistency checks. The tool found one trace which led to a deadlock. However, neither
this, nor [59] provide any recommendations that would resolve these deadlocks. In reality,
these would be considered unlikely due to the state transitions required to achieve a deadlock
not being typical and would not aect the safe operation of the railway.
In 2012, a petri net-based analysis of the EuroRadio protocol was proposed by Lijie et al.
[97] taking a statistical approach, a dierent perspective from the safety modelling discussed
earlier in this chapter, to determine the impact of lost packets on safety. The authors verify
EuroRadio for ‘liveness properties’, for example, ensuring that all states have a transition, do
not lead to a deadlock and all transitions are reachable in the state machine. In 2013, this
approach was also used by Hongjie et al. [79] to determine the results of using coloured petri
nets to assess the EuroRadio protocol. This model contains an extension for timeouts, which
Zhang et al. in [150] and Esposito et al. in [59] do not capture and more closely matches the
true EuroRadio protocol. Whilst this analysis captures the performance impact and likelihood
of protocol failure, it does not provide assurance from a security perspective.
A similar approach, where a UML model and petri nets are used in an alternative technique,
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is described by Lijie et al. in 2016 [96]. Specically, the authors assess the protocol but from a
safety perspective for timeliness using uncertainty analysis. Here, a model of the EuroRadio
protocol is analysed to determine the likelihood that the protocol may induce an unsafe state,
where a connection cannot be established and the data received is not timely. The results of
this work, by their denition, shows that EuroRadio is a safe protocol but question its validity
as the data received may not be timely. As we will note in Chapter 4, timeliness and the delay
of messages is an important property to inspect, as this can aect the safe integrity of the train.
In comparison, Hongyu et al. [117] use the PRISM tool to assess EuroRadio probabilisti-
cally. In this work, they also assess EuroRadio from a timing perspective for the safe reception
of messages and the impact of message loss. This work, however, does not consider any po-
tential security threats.
At a high-level, Lopez and Aguado identify some issues within the EuroRadio protocol,
for example, a lack of sequence numbers (or timestamps) being used within the EuroRadio
handshake protocol [99]. The authors note that this would allow replay attacks during the
handshake. Under the state-machine as specied, there should be no transition based on a
replayed message unless there was an error in the protocol implementation. The authors also
identify a risk of message ‘ooding’ as each message MAC has to be veried prior to being
handed up to the application-level protocol, creating a performance bottleneck. As Bloomeld
et al. state in [18], this would not impact safety, but would force the train to fail-safe and stop,
potentially causing disruption to the network.
What all these analyses highlight is that, whilst protocols may be shown to be safe, a lack
of formal security verication may lead to exposures in all implementations of the standard.
As security threats can aect the safe integrity of the protocol, it is essential that there is some
verication from a security perspective. However, a weakness in all these analyses is the lack
of a thorough assessment of the EuroRadio and Application Layer Protocols from a security
perspective, using EN50159 as a driver to determine whether the two protocols, when used
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together, provide sucient resistance to attacks.
3.2.2 Protocol Verication Outside of ERTMS
Outside of ERTMS, formal verication of protocols are used extensively in other applications,
for example, in assuring the new TLS 1.3 standard [45], nding aws in ePassports [42] and
analysing the EMV standard used for card payments [50]. de Ruiter models the EMV protocol
[50], used for card payments in the EU and slowly being adopted worldwide, by assessing
its guarantees to authenticate the card, customer and transaction. In this analysis, de Ruiter
demonstrates aws in the EMV protocol, identifying its susceptibility to man-in-the-middle
attacks and that the terminal is unable to verify the authenticity of the transaction. The author
later employs an alternative technique, specically fuzzing, to assess the state machines of a
number of TLS implementations. Fuzzing is a complementary analysis technique to formal
verication where implementations should be assessed for conformity to the standards. If the
implementation does not conform to the specication, there may be additional states which
could lead to an exploitable vulnerability. As an example, McMahon Stone et al. fuzz the 4-
way handshake protocol, used in Wi-Fi, on a number of devices [103]. This analysis identied
a number of additional states or transitions which are not part of the protocol specication
and, again, can lead to exploits such as downgrade attacks. However, whilst a model could
be proven correct, it does not rule out implementation-based vulnerabilities which could be
found through these complementary methods.
Similar to the work conducted in the rail sector [61] to verify a model and automatically
generate code conforming to a given specication, reference implementations of protocols
can also be generated. JavaSPI is an example of a tool which can formally verify the protocol
implementation using ProVerif [8], but this again does not negate vulnerabilities introduced
during implementation.
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3.3 Cryptographic Analysis of MACs
The analysis of encryption schemes is a mature area of research with a signicant volume of
literature available. As highlighted in Chapter 2, the MAC used in ERTMS is a modied version
of the ISO-9797-1 MAC Algorithm 3 [31]. This algorithm, as specied in the ISO standard,
has been analysed previously by Mitchell [105] and Preneel et al. [116, 75]. Although more
directly-related to the EuroRadio MAC, Pepin and Vigliotti [109] completed an analysis of
ERTMS key distribution, which uses this algorithm, whilst Franekova et al. [67] carry out a
specic analysis of the EuroRadio MAC.
3.3.1 Cryptanalysis of ISO-9797 MAC Algorithm Three
The analysis of the ISO-9797 specied MAC algorithm by Mitchell [105] and Preneel et al.
[116, 75] found a collision-based key recovery attack, where 232.5 known plaintext-MAC pairs
and 3 · 256 oine operations were required to obtain the key. One caveat of this research
is its focus on the MAC as specied in the standard. As previously stated, the EuroRadio
MAC algorithm is based on the ISO-9797 MAC Algorithm 3, with a modication to the nal
transformation. This, therefore, means that the attacks described by the authors, whilst useful
at the time, are no longer appropriate due to the change from a double DES transformation
with two distinct keys to a 3DES transformation with three distinct keys.









Figure 3.3: ISO-9797 MAC Algorithm 3, as reviewed by Preneel et al. [116].
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Considering the nal transformations between both MAC versions, Smart, however, pro-
vides proofs (with increased time and space complexity of 264 respectively) that a two-key
3DES transformation can be broken using a chosen-plaintext attack [129]. In this attack, a
chosen-plaintext attack oracle is used to look for key pairs which match at each stage of the
computation and candidate keys (as pairs) are then returned. Smart concludes with a subtle
hint regarding the lifespan of 3DES, where it is ‘just not as secure as one would expect’, given
its keylength of 168 bits.
3.3.2 Analysis of the EuroRadio MAC and Key Distribution Scheme
Franekova et al., on the other hand, assess the EuroRadio MAC and key encryption scheme [66,
67] but focus on the 3DES component of the algorithm. Any attacks found would, therefore,
be limited to key distribution and one part of the EuroRadio handshake. In their former work,
the authors describe the key management hierarchy before identifying three potential attacks
which are more ecient than a brute-force search, in particular, dierential cryptanalysis,
linear cryptanalysis and the ‘Davies Attack’, a known-plaintext attack [66]. They note that
the best type of cryptanalysis for DES is linear cryptanalysis, where 243 known plaintexts are
required with a time complexity in the region of 239 − −242 to recover the key. Whilst this
has a noticeably higher known-plaintext requirement than the attack found by Mitchell [105]
and Preneel et al. [116, 75], it requires less time. The authors then consider a birthday attack,
a similar approach to Mitchell and Preneel et al. to reduce the keyspace. In the latter work
by Franekova et al. [67], the authors use UML to dene this attack, with similar results of
possible collisions to their previous work. As example collisions are not detailed in either
contributions, some additional validation may be required.
In their analysis of the ETCS component of ERTMS, Lopez and Aguado note the limited
lifespan of 3DES, and that the risk of a birthday attack arises from two sources, the extended
use of the same KMAC for multiple trains and weak random number generators [99]. The
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latter risk is critical for the EuroRadio handshake, as both the train and RBC exchange nonces
which, when combined, derive the session key between the train and trackside. If the random
number generator is predictable, it reduces the attack complexity signicantly. The authors
also review the potential alternatives, albeit at a high-level without in-depth analysis.
Pépin and Vigliotti [109] analyse the key distribution mechanism used in ERTMS and as-
sess its resilience against standard attacks against the 3DES algorithm. They specically use
a related-key attack and quantify the cost to the attacker, in terms of expense, resources and
capabilities to break the 3DES encryption, used in ERTMS key management. The attack they
present is, however, considered currently impractical due to the inherent nancial cost, esti-
mated to be in the order of millions of dollars. It also focuses on the 3DES scheme applied to
key distribution, where there would be signicantly fewer keys involved compared to Euro-
Radio session keys.
3.3.3 Cryptanalysis Fundamentals and Wider Applications
Smart outlines three fundamental properties that a hashing/MAC function should satisfy [129]:
• Preimage Resistance – given a hash/MAC, the adversary should only be able to recover
the original input message with negligible probability.
• Second Preimage Resistance – given a hash/MAC, the adversary should only be able to
recover an input message that results in that hash/MAC with negligible probability.
• Collision Resistance – it should be suciently hard to nd two messages which result
in the same hash/MAC.
Using these properties, it is possible to determine the security of a given scheme, demon-
strating appropriate security games which would validate if the algorithm satises the given
properties. Smart also provides insight on the generation of fresh keys from a given, long-term,
symmetric key, where protocols such as Needham-Schroeder and Kerberos are given as exam-
ples, before providing an intuition on two analysis methods which can be used, game-based
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and symbolic.
Looking outside the EuroRadio MAC and into the related research eld of authentication
and encryption of payloads, Karstensen applies a more involved cryptanalysis technique of
brute-force recovery on the A5/1 cipher, used by GSM and GSM-R for encryption of data
between the base station and mobile device [87]. The brute-force attack involves capturing
plaintext/ciphertext pairs and generating a rainbow table by running the A5/1 cipher (as it is a
Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR)-based scheme) and then extracting potential candidate
keys to decrypt the trac. Lu et al. apply a related time-memory trade-o attack [100], also
using rainbow tables, reducing the attack time from the previously attained hours and minutes
to 9 seconds, with a pre-computation time of 55 days on Commercial o-the-shelf (COTS)
hardware and an 81% likelihood of success.
Barkan et al. have also analysed the A5 suite of ciphers [10], focusing in particular on the
A5/2 cipher, an export variant of the A5/1 scheme. The authors use a known-plaintext attack
to recover the A5 key, reducing the previously attained attack time for A5/2 of 6 seconds to
less than a second, requiring 2 GSM frames of data which are 211 frames apart (approximately
6 seconds). They then propose a ciphertext-only attack requiring just 8 frames of data, recov-
ering the key in milliseconds. What is important from the results is that the attack also works
on General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) networks, planned to be implemented into ERTMS
to relieve the capacity limitations imposed by GSM-R. Known-plaintext attacks are, therefore,
common to all three. It is also important to note that GSM and GSM-R broadcast packets are
sent both as plaintext and ciphertext (due to the time-based nature of the protocol), allowing
an adversary to carry out these types of attacks.
3.4 Key Management for ERTMS
Key Management is also a mature area of research. However, when considering post-quantum
solutions, it is still an emerging eld. As we will discuss in Chapter 6, alternative key manage-
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ment schemes have been explored for ERTMS. In this section, we will assess their shortcomings
and also review the literature for potential schemes from other sectors that could have been
applied to ERTMS.
3.4.1 Existing ERTMS Key Management Analyses and Proposals
In 2012, Franekova et al. [68] consider two approaches for an online key management solution.
The authors propose a new key management hierarchy, essentially turning the scheme into a
solution based on public key cryptography, introducing public/private key pairs. Their work,
however, specically focuses on the technical implementation of their solution, for example,
the length of keys and algorithms to be used, rather than exploring their proposed architecture
in more detail. For the purposes of integration into any system, the lack of clarity regarding the
specic public key cryptography used could lead to the loss of forward secrecy. If one entity is
compromised, its private key would be divulged to the attacker, presenting longer-term issues,






















Figure 3.4: The current ERTMS Key Distribution Scheme, assessed by Pépin and Vigliotti [109].
A whitepaper presented by Brandenburg et al. [24] takes an industrial view on the state
of key management in ERTMS and identies some of its associated issues, e.g. cross-border
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operation. Its solutions, however, are not particularly secure, as spreadsheets and text les are
used without any clearly-dened protection. What the whitepaper does highlight is that there
is a need for a more ecient solution whilst also demonstrating the problems associated with
the proposed online scheme.
Existing proposals to improve ERTMS key management have been largely based on the
existing oine scheme and extended such that the back-end KMC infrastructure is accessed
via online communications by trains and RBCs. Fuloria et al. in 2010 [70] use ERTMS as a
case study for protecting communications within critical infrastructure applications. The au-
thors introduce another hierarchy for ERTMS key management, deeming it ‘both ecient and
robust’, but this relates solely to oine key management. They propose a similar key man-
agement hierarchy, used in smart-grid applications, applying this into an online scheme for
ERTMS, introducing a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) with a supporting central key manage-
ment infrastructure. In a further extension to this work by the authors in 2011 [69], consider-
ations are given to when asymmetric cryptography should be applied, compared to symmet-
ric cryptography. Here, they consider the potential threat vectors using a similar model for
ERTMS [19, 21].
Similar to industry-led proposals such as [24], the Danish Rail Board [9] dened their own
set of security goals and prerequisites for an online scheme. Their approach was to limit the
keyspace such that only one train has a single KMAC installed to simplify revocation, a po-
tentially dangerous proposal as Lopez and Aguardo suggest [99]. As we will see in Chapter 6,
this is an unusual approach, where the authors advocate the replacement of the KTRANS key
with public key cryptography, based on the online version of the ERTMS scheme [141].
3.4.2 Alternative Key Management Approaches
If we look at key management as a general concept, it may be possible to identify and adopt
a dierent approach for ERTMS. Boyd and Mathuria [21] provide a succinct overview of the
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problem surrounding key management, particularly where more than one party is involved.
As trains may communicate with many RBCs and vice versa, this is highly relevant. In their
analysis, the authors demonstrate how example protocols based on the Die-Hellman Key
Exchange Protocol do not provide a means of authentication. It does, however, highlight how
some of these protocols may be used to eectively share cryptographic keys between more
than one party. One potential solution that could have been applied in Chapter 6 is the two-
party Die-Hellman scheme. However, this is not suitable as it does not support the notion
of a permissions model and does not provide any guarantees of authenticity.
In their proposal, Burmester and Desmedt [33] argue that a generalised Die-Hellman
protocol could guarantee key authenticity, provided that specic values in the exchange were
authenticated. This proposal was considered insucient by Just et al. [84], where a TLS-style
handshake, outlined by the authors, provides authentication using a signed hash of all mes-
sages sent as part of the protocol. If applied to EuroRadio, this would additionally demonstrate
that no values were ‘tainted’ during the handshake. This signed hash, however, would be par-
ticularly expensive to compute, especially for the RBC as it would have to temporarily store all
the messages received and sent prior to computing the signed hash. An alternative that could
have been considered is to sign each message. This proposal also has a limitation, specically
the bandwidth of GSM-R, where message transmission latency would be impacted.
Biswas further extends the notion of Die-Hellman based key exchanges with multiple
two-party keys and a single multi-party key [13]. In this proposal, ‘base’ and ‘extended’ keys
are used to provide an ecient key exchange technique for large, static groups. Base keys, four
initial keys which can be combined through multiplicative operations to derive extended keys
are initially dened, which can then be used to provide as many keys as required. Considering
its applicability to ERTMS, parties can either be static or dynamic, depending on where the
system is analysed. The current key management scheme [142] is largely static: once a key
‘relationship’ is established between a train and RBC, it will only concern those two specic
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entities. As ERTMS is moving towards a dynamic scheme, where trains can communicate with
a particular RBC but may also be transferred out of the original ‘approved’ region, the proposal
by Biswas still remains partially applicable, albeit with some caveats. One example is that once
keys are allocated, their revocation is dicult. A further limitation, highlighted by Boyd and
Mathuria, is a limitation to the ecacy of the solution, as messages are not authenticated [21].
Two new methods for key agreement are proposed by Ateniese et al. [6, 7] which extend
the GDH.2 protocol by Steiner et al. [132] to provide an authenticated key agreement solution.
One major aw in these proposed solutions is that it is impossible to identify if there are any
other participants in a protocol run, such as an adversary. Attacks which render this scheme
insecure were found by Pereira et al. [110], showing that messages could be modied or re-
played, ultimately compromising the session key. Bresson et al. assess other modications
to GDH.2, introducing the identities of all participants, sending them as part of the message
ow [26, 25]. Here, the authors ensure that each ow is signed with the long-term key of the
sender. This solution is more appropriate for authenticating the general Die-Hellman key
exchange between multiple parties, as all entities are made aware of each other and can iden-
tify dishonest parties that should not be participating in the session. One critical aspect that
we need to consider, especially for Die-Hellman-based schemes, which rely on the diculty
to factor large numbers, is the post-quantum resistance of any proposal. As a result, none of
the proposals above would be considered post-quantum resistant and secure for the future.
Instead of directly using Die-Hellman, an alternative approach for key management can
be achieved through the use of identity-based conference key protocols. All parties are as-
signed a public key based on their identity which, in the case of ERTMS, is the ETCS ID.
Messages between parties are encrypted using this public key, where a central authority holds
the appropriate private key, releasing it to the entity upon successful authentication. Koyama
et al. use Die-Hellman to dene a protocol which agrees a key between a number of entities
[90] and considers a number of potential attacks, including impersonation and interception
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by a passive and active adversary and, of interest when considering post-quantum resistance,
the diculty to factor large numbers and overcome the discrete logarithm problem. In their
proposal, they use a star architecture, requiring one principal to have all messages exchanged
between it and all other participating entities. This, however, introduces additional compu-
tational costs but has the benet of implicit key authentication guarantees. In this scheme,
we rely on a trusted third party to generate the private key which corresponds to the spe-
cic entity. Moreover, as the scheme uses the identities of the participants as the public key,
if no ‘limiting’ factor is appended to the identity, the private key is perpetual, consequently
making key revocation dicult and potentially increasing the likelihood that an adversary
recovers the private key. As Schneier states in 2007, ‘nothing proposed so far is both practical
and secure’ [126] when considering the current state-of-the-art of identity-based public key
cryptography proposals. This still remains a problem today.
Many of the previously mentioned protocols rely on the Die-Hellman protocol but none
provide sucient measures that limit the ‘reach’ of entities or introduce a permissions model.
For example, a train that is only authorised to operate in the West Midlands region should
only be able to interact with a RBC located within the West Midlands. This presents a lim-
itation where some secret value would need to be shared between parties to introduce this
‘permissions’ concept.
Alternative proposals which do not use Die-Hellman include one, for example, by Tzeng
et al., where their protocol can be completed in a single, synchronous round [137]. The only
information that has to be known prior to a session commencing is the session ID. In the
context of EuroRadio, the train could announce a randomly-generated session ID which would
start the key agreement process. In this proposal, a third party, e.g. the railway line as an entity,
would be required to participate in the protocol run. This is not currently possible, as a number
of modications would be required for all entities to support this permissions property and
the announcement of a session ID to EuroRadio.
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3.4.3 Key Management in SCADA Applications
If we look at some of the solutions proposed for SCADA applications, Piètre-Cambacédès and
Sitbon [113] identify where cryptography is best applied in a relatively straightforward pro-
cess noting, however, that managing the keys is a dicult task. They consider dierent key
management strategies, one of which is the ‘key-server based’ solution, the closest-matching
architecture for the oine ERTMS scheme. A comparison of the available strategies is out-
lined, where symmetric keying systems are deemed more attractive than PKI-based schemes,
conrming that the proposals reviewed earlier in this section may not be a suitable approach.
The authors raise the issue of keylength and the limited computational power available, sug-
gesting that a risk-based decision on suitable schemes should be made by the operator. Of
particular interest from this work are the case studies outlined by the authors, where it ap-
pears that the rail sector is not the only area which has industry-led work to improve key
management. For example, DNP3, a protocol used in power grids had its key management
standardised through an industry user group. This provided a two-level keying scheme with
one long-term key shared between entities. One of the key points the authors note is that,
when considering SCADA systems, some trade-os are required, especially when considering
key management, as no single solution assessed was suitable for ICS applications.
As previously stated, the research area surrounding key management is relatively mature.
However, when we consider the design of ERTMS, whilst there is no suitable solution that we
can draw upon from the current ‘state-of-the-art’ solutions, we may use these to form a basis
for a new proposal. Key management in rail additionally presents a unique constraint through
its complexity and requirement for cross-domain interoperability. As many solutions fail to
support these requirements we cannot, therefore, propose solutions which would otherwise
require signicant changes to the underlying standards.
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3.5 Risk and Threat Modelling
Modelling of complex systems is a process that is prevalent in a number of areas, with its ap-
plication now progressing to information and operational systems security. As compliance to
the European Union Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive is now a legal require-
ment, a number of processes, tools and methodologies have been developed for threat and risk
modelling, allowing system owners to review the security of their infrastructure. Anderson
notes that threat modelling is also a critical part of designing systems [2].
3.5.1 Modelling of ICS Systems
A framework for vulnerability detection in ERTMS is proposed by Arsuaga et al. [5] which
takes a ‘lessons learnt’ approach as its motivation and identies existing vulnerabilities in the
ERTMS standards. The authors identify vulnerabilities by simulating a minimal train and RBC
implementation using open source software. Using this attack-focused framework, they aim
to nd potential vulnerabilities by recovering trac sent between the train and RBC through
a man-in-the-middle attack. This work, however, only considers the existing vulnerabilities
within the ERTMS standards, specically the A5/1 encryption keys used by GSM-R and the
related-key attack found by Pépin and Vigliotti [109] to verify whether an attack was suc-
cessful. It does not, however, oer any scalability or scope to assess the security of other
components used within ERTMS.
For ICS systems, the STRIDE (Spoong, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure,
Denial of Service, Elevation of privilege) framework is applied by Khan et al. [88] to a small
synchronous island model. This framework has ve key steps: reducing the system into its
underlying components, creating a data-ow diagram of the system, analysis of threats to
this diagram and the identication and subsequent mitigation of vulnerabilities. From this
methodology, the consequences of a threat are identied, with components matched to those
threats in each of the STRIDE phases. From the outset, this framework carries out a ‘snapshot-
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in-time’ analysis of a system, but does not explore the propagative eect of vulnerabilities
across the system where an exploitation at a given node aects neighbouring nodes, spreading
through the system.
An alternative way of modelling system architectures is proposed by Fielder et al. [64]
which uses particle swarm optimisation in a system model to identify methods that provide
the best defences (with a measurable impact) that can be applied to the system. In this work,
the authors carry out simulations to support the development of security strategies, modelling
attackers and defenders as separate classes of agent, each with their own set of proles and
resources. The results of this work provide an insight into the attack and defence strategies
that can be applied to complex systems to deliver optimal security, within a specied budget.
Whilst Fielder et al. use Netlogo ‘agents’ to represent the input, Lodderstedt et al. [98] use a
UML-like language to express the input, where their SecureUML tool models an access control
system and generates a supporting infrastructure that conforms to the specications provided.
Agent and UML-based threat modelling is one potential approach an asset owner may use.
Alternatively, graph-based risk modelling may be used which has been previously applied to
cyberphysical systems. Santini et al. [125] apply graph-based evidence theory as a way to
express risk in complex, interconnected systems. What is key here is that the authors allude
there must be some union between domain and subject-specic knowledge, providing a con-
textual point of reference to support the development and maintenance of the model. Lautier
et al. also apply graph theory in an alternative context, specically the nance sector [93],
to assess systemic risk to nancial markets, where their framework is able to search for, and
nd, the most probable and shortest path that would result in stock uctuations. However,
in cyberphysical systems, an adversary could chain together a set of vulnerabilities with less
resistance to attack, albeit following a longer path, which the approach by Lautier et al. would
not nd.
Existing work has also investigated the integration of Common Vulnerability Scoring Sys-
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tem (CVSS) metrics to attack graphs. However, there are diering approaches which do not
necessarily work in a probabilistic model. The CVSS metric is dened as a ‘snapshot-in-time’
view of the current system but, beyond this, interdependencies between components are not
captured, which would not provide a rich analysis. As an example, Cheng et al. provide one
such insight to transform a CVSS score into a probabilistic metric of an attack being successful
[40]. As we will see in Chapter 7, by tracking these dependencies, the CVSS probability values
across attack paths can be calculated.
Looking at risk and threat modelling from a dierent context, Ioannidis et al. use mod-
elling for security operations [82] to determine the trade-os for patch management and the
optimal strategy for patching without aecting system security. This approach is also used
by Beautement et al. [11], adapting the security requirements of a system to determine ap-
propriate strategies. Trade-os are decisions that ultimately may have to be made as part of
the modelling process when potential issues are identied. Anderson also considers trade-os
[2] and the balance between the nancial investment to mitigate or reduce the risk against its
likelihood and impact.
An alternative perspective for determining the appropriate action to take (if the asset
owner has an established and well-dened attacker model) are Attack Trees [2]. Given a set of
adversary goals, the asset owner can dene the steps that the attacker would have to take (fac-
toring in the expense and eort required) to progress through the tree. As an example, a node
on the tree could be a perimeter rewall, which may cost $1,000 of time, eort and expense to
breach. Attack-Defence Trees are similar, but contain an extension where the tree is supple-
mented with ‘defender’ nodes, each with their own dened costs and contextual information
as Kordy et al. describe [89]. The outputs of the trees allow the asset owner to balance the
‘cost’ of attack against the cost of implementing defences. Byres et al. assess the use of Attack
Trees when used in SCADA Systems [36], in particular identifying the possibility of becoming
too focused on the resolution of a potential vulnerable node, when the relative risk is low.
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Example trees are outlined by the authors which are then assessed for the relative diculty
for an attack to succeed, its severity and the likelihood that the adversary would be detected.
The SPARKS Horizon 2020 Project applies Attack Trees in a risk assessment for smart-
grids [80] where they further extend Attack-Defence Trees to include vulnerabilities that may
exist within a given architecture. The authors identify an issue with existing Attack Trees, as
asset owners can become too detailed and the tree, as a result, becomes very large and mainly
redundant. In this analysis, vulnerabilities can exist as general threats (e.g. no authentication),
or link directly to a Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure (CVE) that aects that component.
The Project notes that when designing the tree, it is important to have a deep understanding
of the attacks that may arise and also that their methodology denes a process to establish
‘good’ attack graphs. In this methodology, by capturing the vulnerabilities that exist in a
given architecture, the asset owner will become aware of the real threats that exist to their
system, in contrast to the hypothetical threats that may exist.
Both of these approaches rely on the system owner having prior knowledge of the poten-
tial attack vectors that could exist in their system architectures, potentially requiring many
iterative trees, with the additional risk of omitting vectors (and goals). Unlike Attack Trees,
a model-based approach views the system architecture as a whole, rather than siloed compo-
nents. Instead of quantifying security as a cost metric, which is purely an estimate and may be
incorrect, we can, instead, use security proles. These allow the asset owner to pose questions
such as ‘Given this asset, what can reach it?’, similar to the goal-based approach that is taken
by Attack-Defence Trees. Shostack reviews a number of the previously mentioned processes,
including STRIDE and Attack Trees [128] and how they can be managed and addressed, in
particular, dealing with the potential type of trade-os that may arise, e.g whether the risk
should be accepted, mitigated, avoided or transferred. The author also appraises the value
of modelling systems and the potential threats posed, providing a summary of the tools and
methodologies that are available.
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For safety-critical systems, risk assessments, as identied earlier in this chapter, are un-
dertaken using safety modelling. These assessments dene the possible hazardous events and
scenarios that may lead to a threat to life. From this, causal and consequential analysis is
carried out, evaluating the risk and dening those actions necessary to mitigate, reduce or re-
move the identied risk factor. This approach is primarily safety-driven but can be adapted for
security. However, this would suer from the same aws that exist in Attack-Defence Trees,
where a denitive metric is needed to quantify the security impact and investment required
to compromise an asset. Matulevičius oers an alternative approach through the ISSRM se-
curity metric [102], which factors in the likelihood and vulnerability level (the relative ease
to exploit). We could argue that the vulnerability level inuences the likelihood but, on the
other hand, there may be more attractive targets for an adversary, where the vulnerability
level would be a more useful metric than the likelihood when analysing a system. Matule-
vičius continues to argue that, when modelling a system, the capabilities of the ‘threat agent’











{w1,  w2,  null} {w3, null}
{w4, w5, null}
{w4, null}{w1, null}













Control Control Descriptions Combat
c1 anti-virus software w1
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comp. 0.33 0.33 0.33
intact 0 0 1
Weakness Description  Location Exploitability
w1 Internet Malware T1, T2 0.8
w2 Removable Drive Malware T1 0.6
w3 DoS Attacks T3 0.7
w4 Buffer overflow T3, T4 0.8
w5 Man-in-the-middle T4 0.6
Figure 3.5: Bayesian ICS Threat Model [95], showing the graph network (a), threats (b) and
controls that can be placed (c).
Li and Hankin extend the work of Fielder et al. [95] to dene a metric that measures
a system’s tolerance to ‘zero-day’ attacks. The authors use Bayesian networks to model a
simple ICS environment and look at the eects of applying controls (e.g. deploying rewalls
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or anti-virus solutions) to the network (shown in Figure 3.5). In their model, they assess the
progressive eect of zero-days with time to determine which combination of controls provides
maximal defence against such vulnerabilities. This approach is similar to that of HYRIM [80],
where a combination of both approaches could be eective. Again, similar to some of the other
approaches outlined in this section, one aspect that the asset owner has to carefully control is
the threshold metric, as its accuracy is critical.
In the United Kingdom, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) introduced the Cy-
ber Assessment Framework (CAF) 1 as a way to bridge the gap for asset owners to assess
their level of compliance with the NIS Directive. The CAF framework is broken down into
‘NIS objectives’, aligned with the The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST)
framework, where asset owners evidence ‘indicators of good practice’, to protect, detect and
respond for NIS compliance. This is unlike some other standards, e.g. the PCI-DSS standard
which governs the management of payment card data, where asset owners can ‘check o’ their
compliance to the standard, compared to CAF which is evidence-based, similar to ISO 27001.
The framework, however, requires a level of cybersecurity knowledge to be able to condently
assess compliance with each objective. One limitation of CAF is that no automated tool exists
to demonstrate ecacy and compliance to the principles, which would otherwise allow faster,
more accurate assessments.
Mann details the human aspects of social engineering from an industry perspective [101].
This is another consideration when determining the threats that exist within an organisation
and how assets may not have a computational vulnerability, but one exploitable through hu-
man intervention. Whilst his mapping technique was applied to enterprise data, a similar ap-
proach can be used to consider the human element in ICS environments. This is a factor which
has been previously highlighted, but there is no simple method to model human behaviour.
Beautement et al., however, dene a method to formally model this human element [11], as
1https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/nis-directive-cyber-assessment-framework
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part of a wider analysis on the trade-o of memory stick security. Similarly, Cauleld et al.
assess the human element and model it formally [38], using a similar agent-based approach to
Fielder et al. [64].
3.5.2 Risk Analyses of ERTMS
ERTMS-specic analyses have been previously conducted by KPMG and Bloomeld et al.
[91, 18]. The KPMG report focused on the key management scheme, highlighting that key
installation is vendor-specic and how the key hierarchy is dened. The analysis by Bloom-
eld et al. focuses on components e.g. the EuroBalise and potential vectors, identifying where
there is a lack of authentication in the architecture. Their analysis is given at a high-level and
does not provide any details of the specic issues identied.
A process was outlined in a later publication by Bloomeld et al. [19] where a methodology
is dened for carrying out a risk assessment of ERTMS. In this methodology, the authors
consider the trust relationships that exist in the architecture and the potential attack strategies
an adversary may use. In their risk assessment, a number of outcomes that should be avoided
are outlined which, today, would constitute a NIS violation if the threshold was exceeded.
A ‘lessons learnt’ retrospective review of the work, undertaken in the UK, assessing the risk
of a national deployment, is outlined by the authors, where the impact assessment, given
as attacker capability levels, closely matches that of Braband [23]. One exclusion from the
scope of their assessment is information leakage which, itself, should be considered a focus
of assessment. As the authors note, information that could be potentially leaked may include
specic details about hazardous cargo which, at the hands of an attacker, could have severe
consequences. What is highlighted by the authors is that there is a need for a holistic analysis
of architectures, both externally to identify relationships between systems and also internally,
with in-depth assessments of the components used.
An alternative approach for conducting high-level security assessments is dened by Evans
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et al. [60], outlining a process which can be applied in the rail industry to identify potential
risks prior to commencing an expert security assessment. In this process, the authors outline
three steps as part of the assessment: identify, describe and assess. In the rst two phases,
the rail asset owner species their critical assets and priorities, before gathering information
about the interdependencies and interactions that take place within the system under assess-
ment. One potential issue that may arise in these phases is that they may lack sucient detail
which would be captured in the nal step, when an expert assessment is conducted. Both this
approach, and the evidence-based CAF framework, however, are wholly dierent and manual
processes, where this particular approach would allow asset owners to establish some baseline
for security which they can improve upon.
In the wider eld of SCADA, Igure et al. argue that the open standards, which ICS systems
are based upon, are part of the problem [81]. The authors outline the potential attack vectors
that could exist in SCADA architectures, additionally highlighting the challenges in mitigating
potential threats due to the currently existing technology constraints, for example, limited
computational power, a factor that was identied by Piètre-Cambacédès and Sitbon [113].
Another assessment of SCADA threats was conducted by Cárdenas et al. [37], providing a
chronology of SCADA attacks, similar to the safety-focused review outlined by Fantechi [61].
The authors note similar challenges to secure SCADA systems to those identied by Igure et
al., but also quantify the diculties in identifying when an attack is taking place. Their work
also considers the complexity of patching and resolving vulnerabilities, highlighting a worst-
case scenario from the power sector. An attempt is made to formalise this into a framework
but, as the authors note, as there are no case studies available, it is dicult to appraise its
capabilities.
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3.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, it is clear that the rail sector has been primarily safety-focused, albeit with in-
creased eorts to assess and improve the security of the sector. However, the security schemes
introduced to date lack any form of future-proong, where previous work shown in this chap-
ter has identied attacks or technical issues in the standards which should be resolved prior
to mass deployments of ERTMS.
Providing sucient security, however, is not a sector-specic issue, where a similar con-
clusion can be drawn from other ICS applications. As we have observed in this chapter, asset
owners may not understand the intricate detail of their architectures, such that they may be
unaware of the vulnerabilities that exist.
Through the application and assessment of the methods reviewed in this chapter, we are
able to develop and establish a baseline of the current security of a given architecture which
allows us to conduct detailed security assessments to identify vulnerabilities in existing sys-
tems, using formal verication of protocols and cryptanalysis and security assessments. We
can then develop methodologies which can be used in our assessment of emerging threats and
exploitations.
Part I




Formal Verication of ERTMS Protocols
In this chapter, we will examine a formal analysis of the train to trackside communications
used in ERTMS and, in particular, the EuroRadio protocol. As part of this analysis, we will set
a number of security goals that the protocols should conform to and make recommendations
that will ensure the future security of these protocol layers, as part of the secure architecture
for ERTMS.
4.1 Motivation
The European Train Control System (ETCS) component of ERTMS is composed of a suite of
protocols and standards. For example, the EuroRadio protocol is used to ensure that messages
exchanged between train and trackside entities are genuine and have not been forged or mod-
ied by an attacker. It is also used to manage the eective handover of trains from one area
of control to another. For the UK rail network, which is a largely analogue, semi-automatic
system, the transformation to a wholly-digitised, fully supervised system, may expose it to
threats not previously deemed possible.
During the deployment of a new system, it is prudent to carry out appropriate analysis
to ensure that the replacement systems protect the underlying infrastructure and operational
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rolling stock from what were previously considered as ‘impossible’ attacks. As ERTMS is
a major, safety-critical system, it is essential to ensure that trains and Radio Block Centres
(RBCs) cannot be externally inuenced into an unpredictable, potentially unsafe state, or be
coerced by an attacker into sending out unsafe instructions.
Currently, attacks are typically perceived by the public to be some exploited aw or weak-
ness in vendor systems, rather than potential weaknesses in the underlying standards. For
ERTMS, the standards underpin all vendor equipment where the protocols, cryptography and
application messages provide consistency and interoperability between proprietary vendor
systems, e.g. interlocking systems. We commonly think of exploits being the result of back-
doors or through precise trigger conditions being met which put the attacker in a privileged
position. Whilst this may be the case, when new systems are implemented, it is critical that the
standards, from a security perspective, are assured prior to implementation. This ensures that
vulnerabilities are more likely to be due to incorrect implementation or error on a vendor’s
part [134, 135].
Automated protocol analysis is one way in which we can assure the security of protocols
although, as discussed in Chapter 2, it does not guarantee the total security of the system.
This, when coupled with analysis of the cryptographic primitives used by the protocol can,
however, show that, from the perspective of the standards, they are secure from the outset.
4.2 Contributions
In this work, we carry out a formal analysis of the EuroRadio protocol and parts of the higher-
level Application Layer protocol, using the applied pi-calculus [1] and ProVerif analysis tool
[14, 17]. Prior to this research, there was no known formal verication of the suite of protocols
used in ERTMS, as most previous research has primarily focused on correctness issues [18] or
assessing the general security and possible attacks that are sector-specic [19].
As part of this analysis, we explore the Application Layer timestamps in ProVerif, illus-
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trating that, whilst the replaying of messages is not possible, the Application Layer itself does
not prevent messages from being dropped in transmission. From the perspective of EuroRadio
and the Application Layer, we then assess the resilience of the standards against a number of
requirements to which, we believe, any safety-critical protocol should comply.
We will nally consider in this chapter the potential issues that arise from the use of these
protocols and how they can be remediated in future iterations of the standard.
4.3 Background
In this section, we will outline the purpose of the EuroRadio protocol and Application Layer
in ERTMS and provide an intuition about the requirements imposed on these layers.
4.3.1 The EuroRadio Protocol
When a train is due to start its journey, it will contact the RBC responsible for the area in
which the train is located. Once a data-link has been set up over the GSM-R connection be-
tween the train and RBC, a handshake protocol (EuroRadio) will take place. The main aim
of this protocol is to verify the identity of each party and the authenticity of messages sent
between train and trackside. During this handshake, the train and RBC broadcast their iden-
tities, establish a session key and negotiate a Safety Feature (SaF), the cipher to be used for
message authentication.
In Figure 4.1, we outline the various steps taken by each party to authenticate themselves
before any Application Messages are sent. Once authenticated, messages may be sent between
train and trackside. We will then examine, in detail, each step of this protocol and its function.
Prior to a EuroRadio handshake taking place, there are a number of pre-requisites, speci-
cally that all entities are allocated with an ETCS Identier, centrally allocated by the European
Rail Agency (ERA) and that a pre-shared 3DES master key, KMAC, has been created and dis-
tributed between the two entities. This 3DES key is unique per train-RBC pairing and is used
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Key Description
AUx Authentication Message x
IDx ETCS Entity ID of party x
Rx Nonce generated by party x
SaF Safety Feature selected
To Initiator/Responder Flag to indicate in which direction the message is being sent
Typex ETCS Entity ID type (e.g. RBC or train)
Figure 4.1: The EuroRadio Handshake Authentication Protocol. The RBC and Train share a
unique, symmetric key, KMAC. RL and RR are used to indicate the leftmost and rightmost 32
bits respectively of a given nonce. The KMAC is a 3DES key, composed of three single DES
keys: KMAC = (K1,K2,K3).
to authenticate handshake messages and negotiate the session key for future messages, as part
of this specic ERTMS session.
At the start of the handshake, the train sends the rst message, generating a 64-bit nonce
(RT ) and sends this to the RBC. This message will contain the type of ERTMS entity, followed
by AU1, a direction ag, the ERTMS Identity of the train (allocated by the ERA), the proposed
SaF and its nonce.
The AU Safety Protocol Data Unit (SaPDU) is a collection of ags which determine the
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progress of the EuroRadio handshake. AU1 is the rst authentication message, followed by
AU2 and nally AU3, where the handshake is complete and data may be sent. At each stage of
the protocol, validation takes place, e.g. at AU1, the RBC requires a shared KMAC key between
itself and the train. If it does not have a key, then the protocol will enter an error state and
the EuroRadio connection is terminated. The same response occurs if there is a mismatch in
the MAC received compared to the data sent. The direction ag is a binary value, indicating
whether the message is being sent to a recipient or the original sender (relative to the entity
sending the message).
If the RBC has a key corresponding to the received train ID, it will then generate its own
nonce and carry out a key derivation step, taking its 64-bit nonce, the train’s 64-bit nonce and
generate three keys, based on halves of each nonce, where the product is KSMAC, a session
key used to MAC all future messages. Once the key has been generated, the RBC will respond
with its ETCS entity type, the AU2 SaPDU, direction (to the train), its ETCS identity, the SaF to
use, its nonce and then a MAC over the message, using the derived session key.
Upon receipt of this message, the train will derive the session key using the same process
that the RBC followed, verify the MAC of the received message and respond with an AU3
message, conrming the completion of the handshake and allowing Application Messages to
be sent to and from the RBC.
4.3.2 Application Message Layer
Sitting above the EuroRadio layer, the Application Layer is responsible for ensuring timely
receipt of messages and delivery to the onboard European Vital Computer (EVC). Within this
layer is a 32-bit counter-style timestamp, measured in milliseconds, relative to the train’s clock.
The RBC is expected to maintain multiple clocks, one per active session, relative to that of the
train. Messages are passed up from the Application Layer, if and only if, the timestamp on the
message received is greater than that of the last received message. Any time greater than the
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last received message will, therefore, be accepted.
Assumptions are placed on the underlying EuroRadio layer that messages have been ap-
propriately authenticated with the only exception being ‘High-Priority’ messages, where a
ag in the DT (Data) SaPDU indicates the priority of the message, either normal-priority or
high-priority. Only a subset of messages (currently Emergency Stop) may be sent with this
ag. This forces the EuroRadio MAC checks to be bypassed, ensuring that the Application
Layer receives the message as soon as possible. The justication for this will be questioned
later in this chapter.
4.4 Formal Modelling in ProVerif
In this section, we will introduce the ProVerif automated verier which is used to carry out
the analysis of EuroRadio and part of the Application Layer protocols.
ProVerif leverages the applied-pi calculus, which allows us to specify processes capable of
receiving input and generating some output and, more importantly, can run in parallel and
replicate. Running processes in parallel reduces the time required to analyse protocols, whilst
replication allows new processes to be created as required. Alternative tools could also be used
for this purpose, including Tamarin [104] and Scyther [47].
The applied-pi calculus (as shown in Figure 4.2) allows us to declare new, private, names
within processes which can be used to simulate, for example, a private channel or nonce.
The functions provided by the calculus can also be used to model a range of cryptographic
primitives, namely MACs, encryption, signatures and key generation. These, however, are
abstractions from any implementations of cryptography, where they are assumed to be cryp-
tographically perfect and conform, in their entirety, to the specication. In this analysis, we
focus only on the verication of the protocol, rather than any known existing weaknesses or
exploits as the direct result of the cryptographic schemes used. Consequently, we can provide
assurance of the protocols, as dened in the standard.
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M,N ::= terms
x ,y, z variables
a,b, c,k, s names
f (M1, . . . ,Mn) constructor/deconstructor application
P ,Q ::= processes
0 nil
out (M,N ).P output N on channel M
in (M,x ).P input x from channel M
P | Q parallel composition
! P replication
new a.P create new name
if x = M then P else Q term evaluation (if statement)
event (x ) execute event x
Figure 4.2: ProVerif syntax [17], an application of the classic Applied Pi Calculus syntax.
In ProVerif, we can use the applied-pi “let” statement to express “if” statements and
conditional inputs to branch, based on the input received. We can also force explicit binding
for input to a specic variable to match using “=”. As an example, given a channel c , we can
ensure that a variablea transmitted is exactly the same value asa using the statement in(c, = a).
If we receive something that is not equal to a, then the process will terminate. In Figures 4.3
and 4.4, ags such as AU1, AU2 and direction are explicitly checked in this way.
The calculus also supports methods to report back the current state at key points in the
process, through ‘Events’. These can be placed at any point in the model but are used at critical
points, where they can be parameterised with variables held within the model. In the case of
ProVerif, the tool is able to provide guarantees for soundness where, if no attack is found,
the protocol is correct. The tool, however, is not complete, as it could potentially return false
attacks [17]. Events, therefore, provide a means for manual verication of possible attacks
returned by the tool.
ProVerif supports several types of queries which enable us to check the security properties
of a given protocol. The most basic queries check for secrecy in a protocol, i.e. if an attacker
is able to learn specic values which are not meant to be openly communicated, for example,
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1 let Train =
2 (∗ Set up a new session for the model ∗)
3 (∗ Create a fresh session identier used to link dierent events in the model ∗)
4 new session;
5 (∗ Get the identity of the RBC the train wants to communicate with ∗)
6 in(id, rbc_etcs_id);
7 (∗ Start of the actual authentication protocol ∗)
8 (∗ TCONN.request Au1 SaPDU ∗)
9 new trainNonce;
10 event trainStartSession(rbc_etcs_id, train_etcs_id, trainNonce, SAF);
11 out(c, (TRAIN_ETCS_ID_TYPE, AU1, DF_SEND, train_etcs_id, SAF, trainNonce));
12 (∗ TCONN.conrmation Au2 SaPDU ∗)
13 in(c, (=RBC_ETCS_ID_TYPE, =AU2, =DF_RESP, in_rbc_etcs_id, rbcSaF, rbcNonce, inMAC));
14 (∗ Generate the session key ∗)
15 let trainKS = genSessionKey(trainNonce, rbcNonce, getKey(in_rbc_etcs_id, train_etcs_id)) in
16 (∗ Output encrypted secret to check secrecy of keys ∗)
17 out(c, encrypt(SECRET, trainKS));
18 out(c, encrypt(SECRET, getKey(in_rbc_etcs_id, train_etcs_id)));
19 (∗ Verify whether the received MAC is correct ∗)
20 if inMAC = mac(trainKS, ((PAYLOAD_LENGTH, train_etcs_id, RBC_ETCS_ID_TYPE, AU2,
DF_RESP, in_rbc_etcs_id, rbcSaF), rbcNonce, trainNonce, train_etcs_id)) then
21 (∗ TDATA.request Au3 SaPDU ∗)
22 event trainFinishSession(in_rbc_etcs_id, train_etcs_id, trainNonce, rbcSaF, rbcNonce, trainKS);
23 out(c,(ZEROS, AU3, DF_SEND, mac(trainKS, (PAYLOAD_LENGTH, train_etcs_id, ZEROS, AU3,
DF_SEND, trainNonce, rbcNonce))))
Figure 4.3: The ProVerif model of a train carrying out the EuroRadio Handshake (the calling
party).
cryptographic keys. Another type of query that ProVerif supports is correspondence assertions
which can be used to verify whether, in the case of a particular event being executed (i.e.
reached), another prior event was executed. A typical application of this could be to connect an
input/output operation between two processes. Two correspondence assertions, non-injective
and injective, can be veried within the ProVerif tool. As an example, let us consider the
subtle dierences between these assertions. Non-injective queries, e.g. ev:event1(vars)
==> ev:event2(vars), hold if event2 was executed at some point before event1. Injective
assertions, however, e.g. evinj:event1(vars) ==> evinj:event2(vars) hold, if and only
if, for every execution of event1, there was a unique execution of event2.
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4.4.1 Modelling the EuroRadio Protocol
As EuroRadio only involves two parties (the train and RBC), it is fairly straightforward to
map the protocol into its constituent processes. In Figures 4.3 and 4.4, we see the result of
transforming the protocol described in Figure 4.1 into a ProVerif model. We then proceed
to analyse the normal-priority messages sent between the train and RBC for each process, in
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 respectively. A further model was created to analyse high-priority messages
and demonstrate how it is possible for an attacker to bypass the authentication and timestamp
checks, which are included in Appendix A.
1 let RBC =
2 (∗ Set up a new session for the model ∗)
3 (∗ Initialise with the RBC ID ∗)
4 in(id, rbc_etcs_id);
5 (∗ Start of the actual authentication protocol ∗)
6 (∗ TCONN.indication Au1 SaPDU ∗)
7 new rbcNonce;
8 in(c, (sent_ETCS_ID_TYPE, =AU1, =DF_SEND, in_train_etcs_id, trainSaF, trainNonce));
9 event rbcStartSession(rbc_etcs_id, in_train_etcs_id, rbcNonce, trainSaF, trainNonce);
10 (∗ Generate the session key ∗)
11 let rbcKS = genSessionKey(trainNonce, rbcNonce, getKey(rbc_etcs_id, in_train_etcs_id)) in
12 (∗ Output encrypted secret to check secrecy of keys ∗)
13 out(c, encrypt(SECRET, rbcKS));
14 out(c, encrypt(SECRET, getKey(rbc_etcs_id, in_train_etcs_id)));
15 (∗ TCONN.response Au2 SaPDU ∗)
16 out(c, (RBC_ETCS_ID_TYPE, AU2, DF_RESP, rbc_etcs_id, trainSaF, rbcNonce, mac(rbcKS, ((
PAYLOAD_LENGTH, in_train_etcs_id, RBC_ETCS_ID_TYPE, AU2, DF_RESP, rbc_etcs_id,
trainSaF), rbcNonce, trainNonce, in_train_etcs_id))));
17 (∗ AU3 SaPDU ∗)
18 in(c,(=ZEROS, =AU3, =DF_SEND, inMAC));
19 (∗ Verify whether the received MAC is correct ∗)
20 if inMAC = mac(rbcKS, (PAYLOAD_LENGTH, in_train_etcs_id, ZEROS, AU3, DF_SEND ,
trainNonce, rbcNonce)) then
21 event rbcFinishSession(rbc_etcs_id, in_train_etcs_id, rbcNonce, trainSaF, trainNonce, rbcKS)
Figure 4.4: The ProVerif model of the RBC in the EuroRadio protocol (the called party).
The expressive nature of the syntax for ProVerif allows us to dene the processes run by
the verier in a number of ways. In the model presented in Figure 4.3, we create and initialise
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1 (∗ Send three messages from the train to the RBC ∗)
2 new time;
3 let msg1 = (DT, time, MESSAGE_1) in
4 event DataSent1(session, msg1);
5 out(c, (msg1, mac(trainKS, msg1)));
6 let msg2 = (DT, inc(time), MESSAGE_2) in
7 event DataSent2(session, msg2);
8 out(c, (msg2, mac(trainKS, msg2)));
9 let msg3 = (DT, inc(inc(time)), MESSAGE_3) in
10 event DataSent3(session, msg3);
11 out(c, (msg3, mac(trainKS, msg3)))
Figure 4.5: ProVerif model of the Application Layer sending normal priority messages.
both instances for the RBC and train as replicating processes, through the ‘!’ command. These
may be nested, i.e. giving us an arbitrary number of train and RBC processes which can be run
in parallel. This ensures that the verier can carry out a thorough examination of the protocol
and, from the perspective of an attacker in ProVerif, allows it to reuse variables it has observed
from previous protocol runs. Given a set of properties dened within the model, we can assess
whether these hold using ProVerif and, if not, the tool will provide a trace if a possible attack
is found.
In Figures 4.3 and 4.4, we need to include an additional variable that is not part of the
EuroRadio protocol, the session. This will be used during verication to show the reordering
and replaying of messages so that we can observe the session from which these messages
originated. During the setup process, we also note that the train and RBC processes are sent
the ID of the RBC (in(id, rbc_etcs_id)). This allows us to assert that the train knows the
identity of the RBC to which it should be connecting. We then directly model the EuroRadio
specications from the start, where the nonces and identities of the parties are exchanged,
with the inclusion of the session key derivation step. In the next step, we generate and output
a secret value, encrypted with the negotiated session key. We validate the condentiality of
this secret value to verify whether the attacker is able to establish the session key, which
should not be possible. At each stage of message reception we verify the MAC appended to
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messages before proceeding. This simulates the process within EuroRadio and the expected
behaviour when EuroRadio is implemented by vendors. Once the AU3 SaPDU has been sent
by the train, the EuroRadio link is established. From here, we can take one of two routes.
Firstly, we can either apply the model to normal-priority messages, or, alternatively, model
high-priority messages.
1 (∗ Receive messages from the train ∗)
2 in(c, ((=DT, timeA, msgA), macA));
3 (∗ Check the MAC of the received message ∗)
4 if macA = mac(rbcKS, (DT, timeA, msgA)) then
5 event DataReceived1((DT, timeA, msgA));
6 in(c, ((=DT, timeB, msgB), macB));
7 (∗ Check the MAC and timestamp of the received message ∗)
8 if macB = mac(rbcKS, (DT, timeB, msgB)) then
9 if greater: timeB, timeA then
10 event DataReceived2((DT, timeB, msgB));
11 event MessagesReceived2((DT, timeA, msgA), (DT, timeB, msgB));
12 in(c, ((=DT, timeC, msgC), macC));
13 (∗ Check the MAC and timestamp of the received message ∗)
14 if macC = mac(rbcKS, (DT, timeC, msgC)) then
15 if greater: timeC, timeB then
16 event DataReceived3((DT, timeC, msgC));
17 event MessagesReceived3((DT, timeA, msgA), (DT, timeB, msgB), (DT, timeC, msgC))
Figure 4.6: ProVerif model of the Application Layer, receiving normal priority messages.
In Figures 4.5 and 4.6, we observe the Application Messages sent through EuroRadio, where
MESSAGE_X can represent any message sent between a train and RBC, including the application
of timestamps. Once a EuroRadio session has been established, we generate a value for the
timestamp and proceed to use it when sending messages. Each time a message is sent, we
use a light-weight notion of time, which we will review shortly. Upon receipt of the message
from the train, the RBC will verify the MAC and then the timestamps of the message. If the
timestamp in this message is greater than that of the previous received message, the message
will be accepted and execute the appropriate ProVerif event to indicate that it was received in
the context of that session. When the event is executed, we include the session identier to
ensure that an attacker cannot combine messages from dierent sessions.





5 greater: x,y > greater: inc(x),y.
Figure 4.7: ProVerif model which captures counter-style timestamps. Timestamps are incre-
mented using the inc predicate and we can compare two timestamps using the greater predi-
cate.
4.4.2 Modelling Counter-style Timestamps in ProVerif
ProVerif and the applied-pi calculus do not support notions of timestamps. However, for the
validation of the Application Layer component of the protocol, we need to assure its behaviour
from a formal analysis perspective. To support the validation of timestamps, we have a min-
imal notion of time added to the model. In the Application Layer, we check whether the
timestamp on a given message is greater than that of the previous message. In the model,
we instantiate the time by using a relative train-borne counter. Time can increase using this
model, enabling us to compare dierent timestamps based on the same initial timestamp. This
means that we have no notion for how much time an action may take but, in the context of
the model, this proves to be adequate.
In Figure 4.7, we dene this notion of time, where a timestamp can be incremented using
the inc operator and two timestamps can be compared using the predicate greater.
4.5 Assessing the Security Goals of Protocols
Using ProVerif, we can verify whether the protocol preserves the secrecy of keys and that an
attacker cannot disrupt the handshake and key agreement process. Whilst these checks are
standard ProVerif queries, we also want to ensure that the protocol meets expectations that
would have an impact on safety and security if they were not held. It should not be possible
for an attacker to insert, reorder, replay or delete messages without being noticed. We can
consider ways that these checks can be carried out, specically by making the train send three
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messages to the RBC and tagging them with a particular event. Additionally, events are used
to tag the messages sent by the train, their particular order and the resultant three messages
received by the RBC and their order. From this analysis, we can check for the insertion, re-
ordering, replaying or deletion of messages using queries on these events. The results of this
analysis (corresponding to EN50159) are summarised in Figure 4.8. However, this analysis
goes beyond EN50159 and includes verifying the secrecy of keys, agreement on a shared key,
mutual authentication and the analysis of high-priority messages.
For each of the properties, an intuition is given for the possible impact if that security
goal was breached in some way. We will then explore appropriate recommendations and their
feasibility and any issues identied using this model-based approach in Section 4.6.








Figure 4.8: Analysis Summary as a Threat/Defence Matrix corresponding to EN50159 [29].
4.5.1 Secrecy of Keys
As EuroRadio is a safety-critical component for train to trackside communications, it is im-
perative that the cryptographic keys used to provide authenticity and trust to the platform
cannot be recovered by an active attacker, through aws in the protocol for both the long-
term train-RBC key, km and the session key, ksmac . We can check this by creating a new,
private value, ‘SECRET’, encrypting it using both the long-term and session key and publicly
broadcasting this over the channel to which the attacker has full access. If the attacker can
learn the value ‘SECRET’, it means that the keys were recovered or learnt by them. In ProVerif,
this can be expressed by using the query attacker:SECRET, which veries if the attacker is
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able to establish a given value – in this case, SECRET. Private values are not disclosed to the
attacker and ‘SECRET’ is only output on the public communication channel encrypted using
the long-term and session keys. Therefore, if the attacker was able to learn the value, ‘SECRET’,
then one of the keys must have been compromised.
Running this ProVerif model, we nd that the attacker cannot learn the value ‘SECRET’,
conrming that the EuroRadio protocol succeeds in its main goal of keeping the cryptographic
keys secure from an active, Dolev-Yao attacker, who is interfering with the protocol, as they
cannot guess the keys. The theorem proving method of ProVerif further assures us that this
holds for an unlimited number of runs of the protocol.
If ProVerif produced an attack trace proving otherwise, such that ‘SECRET’ was able to be
recovered, then the attacker also has knowledge of the shared session key. In the context
of EuroRadio, this key provides authenticity and integrity for all future messages exchanged
between the train and RBC. Moreover, most of these messages are safety-informed decisions,
e.g. Movement Authorities where, if an attacker had access to the key used in the EuroRadio
MAC, they would then be able to reliably forge messages with valid, trusted, MACs which
would be accepted by the train. Some additional technical caveats exist if this was possible,
for example, upon receipt of a message, the train would acknowledge it to the RBC [140].
To prevent the RBC being made aware of the attack, the GSM-R data connection could be
temporarily jammed by an adversary.
4.5.2 Agreement on a Shared Session Key
EuroRadio provides a means to negotiate a shared session key such that, even if the attackers
cannot learn the initial shared key or session key, they may still attempt to interfere with the
key establishment process. If successful, a session key would not be able to be negotiated,
leading to possible denial of service and the EuroRadio link never successfully becoming es-
tablished between a train and RBC. In ProVerif, we use the following injective correspondence




These queries will only hold if, whenever a train believes it has successfully completed
the EuroRadio handshake protocol, having established the session key, ks , there was then a
single RBC that has also run the protocol and believes the established key is also ks and vice
versa. ProVerif returns a conrmation that these queries hold, establishing that EuroRadio
succeeds in its second major security goal by successfully negotiating and setting up a shared
key between the train and RBC.
If an attacker was able to aect the shared session key, the accompanying EuroRadio MACs
between the train and RBC would not be equivalent when the MACs are veried. Under
the current standard [138], the MACs are rejected and the connection between the train and
RBC may be terminated [140] on the rst indication that an error has occurred. Furthermore,
this would lead to a possible denial of service where an attacker, intervening in sessions, for
example, at Clapham Junction, the UK’s busiest rail junction, could lead to signicant delays
which would propagate throughout the network.
4.5.3 Mutual Authentication – Agreement on All Shared Values
During the EuroRadio handshake, critical values determine the negotiated session key, what
MAC cipher to use (SaF) 1 and the identities of the train and RBC. In the model, we extend
the queries to investigate the malleability of these values to ensure that, at the point the train
and RBC have completed the handshake, the values that are agreed and the train and RBC are
aware of, remain unchanged.
The model is further extended with the following queries:
1Currently, only one cipher is allowed (with the exception of CRC used in Italy). However, in future baseline
standards, this may change, based on nationally-dened requirements.





We observe that the rst correspondence assertion holds – when a train conrms it has
nished the handshake, it has agreed the same values as the RBC. However, the second asser-
tion does not hold, where ProVerif is able to provide an attack trace 1. In this trace, we observe
that the attacker was able to redirect the initial message sent by the train to a dierent RBC.
This is possible because the train does not explicitly verify the identity of the RBC, nor is there
any remediation if it is shown to be incorrect. At the same time, it is possible for the MAC
cipher (SaF) to be modied in-ight by the attacker, where a less secure cipher could be forced
upon both entities.
Following on from the RBC example given above, the threat presented here is that a train
which has started its ‘mission’ may not have an accurate location reference (e.g. in the case
of stabled or recovered units). As a result, the RBC may issue a ‘sta-supervision’ authority,
where the train is allowed to be moved forward to the next balise at low speed until it is able
to report an authoritative location. In the event that the train is redirected to a RBC that does
not have authority for that region of track, it is possible that the train could be placed in a
conicting section of line with another train.
4.5.4 Ability to Insert Attack Messages
Once the handshake has been completed, we want to ensure that it is not possible for an
attacker to arbitrarily insert their own messages to the train/RBC. In the ProVerif model, we
use the DataSent‘i’(m) event to express that some message, m, was the i-th message sent
1Attack traces and full models are available at http://research.rjthomas.io/rssrail2016.
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by the train and received by the event. Using this event, we can check if an attacker has been
able to insert their own message into the protocol where, for all messages m received by the
RBC, they must have been sent by the train as one of three messages. The queries are shown
below:
ev:DataReceived1(m) ==>
(ev:DataSent1(s2, m) | ev:DataSent2(s2, m) | ev:DataSent3(s2, m))
ev:DataReceived2(m) ==>
(ev:DataSent1(s2, m) | ev:DataSent2(s2, m) | ev:DataSent3(s2, m))
ev:DataReceived3(m) ==>
(ev:DataSent1(s2, m) | ev:DataSent2(s2, m) | ev:DataSent3(s2, m))
Here, we observe that for each of the messages received, they arrived in some order but
only for those exact three sent by the RBC. ProVerif conrms that this goal holds and the
attacker cannot arbitrarily insert their own messages.
The insertion of arbitrary messages by an attacker presents an interesting issue, specically
that the EVC onboard the train would be required to process each message. An attacker could
use this as a way of carrying out a denial of service on the train/RBC by storming them with
a large volume of messages. Those messages do not need to carry a valid MAC, as EuroRadio
will still attempt to verify the MAC and accept/reject the message. If a train cannot handle
the volume of messages, it will stop [18]. For a RBC, however, many trains would be forced
to stop, leading to signicant disruption, considering the area of control for which RBCs are
responsible.
4.5.5 Ability to Replay Messages
Whilst we are able to ensure that an attacker cannot arbitrarily insert their own messages
into the EuroRadio stack, they may still be in a position to capture valid messages between
the train and RBC and subsequently replay them. The receiver would be tricked into thinking
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these messages are new and, as they carry a valid MAC, it would rely on the Application Layer
to detect this type of attack. We further develop this possibility by modifying the queries for
the insertion to be injective, i.e., for each DataReceived event, there must have been a single,
unique DataSent event:
evinj:DataReceived1(m) ==>
(evinj:DataSent1(s,m) | evinj:DataSent2(s,m) | evinj:DataSent3(s,m))
evinj:DataReceived2(m) ==>
(evinj:DataSent1(s,m) | evinj:DataSent2(s,m) | evinj:DataSent3(s,m))
evinj:DataReceived3(m) ==>
(evinj:DataSent1(s,m) | evinj:DataSent2(s,m) | evinj:DataSent3(s,m))
ProVerif shows no possible attack traces, with all correspondence assertions holding, mean-
ing that the attacker is unable to replay messages. This is due to the counter-style timestamps
having a requirement that the timestamp of the message received must be greater than that of
the last message. Replayed messages will be allowed through the EuroRadio MAC validation
but will be detected at the Application Layer when the timestamps are validated.
If an attack was to be found, it would mean that specic messages, e.g. a ‘Revoke Emer-
gency Stop’ order would be invaluable to an attacker. In the event where an emergency stop
message has been previously issued by the RBC, the attacker could simply replay the revoca-
tion message, which may have serious implications such as allowing a train to request a new
Movement Authority when it is unsafe to do so. Again, as identied previously, the attacker
could still attempt other attacks, e.g. denial of service, as the MAC would be valid, but would
prevent other messages being received as a queuing mechanism is in use [140].
4.5.6 Ability to Reorder Messages
An alternative means by which an attacker could aect the normal operation of a train is by
reordering messages, e.g. swapping the order of a ‘Movement Authority’ and ‘Reduce Move-
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ment Authority’ message. Given no additional messages are required and they are unique, the
previous two correspondence assertions (insertion and replay) do not attest EuroRadio and
the Application Layer’s ability to prevent arbitrary reordering of messages.
As a result, we require an alternative event and query to be used to verify the precise
ordering of messages. This is given in the MessagesReceived3(m1, m2, m3) event, which
holds if messages m1, m2 and m3 were received in that exact order. Using this event, we can
build an injective correspondence assertion as follows:
evinj:MessagesReceived3(m1, m2, m3) ==>
(evinj:DataSent1(s,m1) & evinj:DataSent2(s,m2) & evinj:DataSent3(s,m3))
When proving the model, ProVerif shows this assertion holds. However, the attacker may
still be able to prevent messages from being received and we will shortly assess how this is
possible. An attacker could, therefore, block one of the messages from being received and
reorder the remaining two (i.e. MessagesReceived3 is never executed). Consequently, we
also need to consider this possibility:
evinj:MessagesReceived2(m1, m2) ==>
((evinj:DataSent1(s, m1) & evinj:DataSent2(s, m2)) |
(evinj:DataSent1(s, m1) & evinj:DataSent3(s, m2)) |
(evinj:DataSent2(s, m1) & evinj:DataSent3(s, m2)))
In this event, we explicitly check the possible ordering of two messages and the corre-
sponding event which generated these messages. Specically, were the two messages received
the rst, second, or third output? The assertion considers the possible permutations where one
could have been blocked, whilst the remaining two would have been successfully received.
This correspondence assertion holds, conrming that, for three messages sent, they could not
be reordered by an attacker.
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As alluded to in the previous assertion, an adversary could try to force a train enter an un-
predictable state by reordering messages, e.g. if a MA was issued and then reduced, reordering
these two messages could have the eect of providing a MA that extends beyond a safe limit.
Conversely, if two emergency stop messages were issued, e.g. the rst being conditional, fol-
lowed by an unconditional emergency stop (potentially as part of a ‘Stop all Trains’ command
from the Rail Operation Centre (ROC)), a revocation message sent and the messages subse-
quently reordered, to which stop message does that revocation apply? However, this analysis
shows that reordering is not possible.
4.5.7 Ability to Delete Messages without the Receiver Knowing
We have established, thus far, that it is not possible for an attacker to insert, reorder or replay
messages. Blocking the successful reception of a message, however, is equally important and
we need to ensure that there is a way of knowing if a message was not received. It should be
the case that, for two messages, m1 and m2, m2 should not be accepted if m1 was never received.
In the model, we can check this property using the following correspondence assertions:
evinj:DataReceived1(m) ==> evinj:DataSent1(s, m)
evinj:DataReceived2(m) ==> evinj:DataSent2(s, m)
evinj:DataReceived3(m) ==> evinj:DataSent3(s, m)
Here, for three messages, we ensure that for each of those messages, upon receipt, there
must have been a corresponding send event. These assertions, however, include the addi-
tional verication to determine whether reordering and also the ability to delete messages
was possible. As previously demonstrated, reordering is not possible. This set of correspon-
dence assertions will, therefore, only hold if deletion is impossible, failing if a message can be
successfully blocked/deleted, by an attacker, from being received.
Using ProVerif, we nd that these correspondence assertions fail to hold where, given the
counter-style timestamps must be greater than that of the last received message, there are no
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simple means that can be employed by the recipient to detect the absence of a message. This
can be partially mitigated by using acknowledgements and timeouts, as we will discuss in the
following sections.
Deletion of messages have the potential to impede the safe operation of the railway. For
example, if an emergency stop message was blocked by an attacker, the train would not receive
the message and could be travelling into an unsafe situation.
4.5.8 Analysis of Emergency Messages
As outlined earlier, emergency stop messages may be sent without a corresponding MAC,
where they bypass the EuroRadio layer and are immediately handed to the Application Layer
protocol. As this behaviour is not typically found in some protocols, each test is re-run in
a second model to assess the eect of the lack of a MAC on emergency stop messages. As
previously found, the secrecy of keys, authentication of parties and the mutual agreement on
shared values continue to hold, meaning that an attacker could not simply pretend to be a
train or RBC, with communications only possible between a valid train and RBC.
That said, we now nd that an attacker is able to insert, delete, reorder and replay messages
successfully, with the correspondence assertions failing to hold, as the MAC is no longer ver-
ied. As a result, once a EuroRadio session has been set up, it is now possible for the attacker
to insert an emergency stop message, which would be accepted by the train.
4.6 Discussion and Recommendations
In this section, we will discuss the possible solutions to address the issues identied from the
analysis undertaken in this chapter.
4.6.1 Insertion of High-Priority Messages
When executing the second model, which carried out an analysis of the high-priority mes-
sages, we nd that it is possible for an attacker to insert arbitrary messages as no protection
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is oered to this class of message. It should be noted that only two messages can be sent as
high-priority, a conditional and unconditional emergency stop. As a result, anyone who is
able to access the EuroRadio communications layer has the ability to insert an unconditional
emergency stop message into the stream, which would trigger the train to immediately engage
its emergency brakes, without any driver intervention. Whilst this might not directly lead to
an incident involving trains colliding, it has a disruptive capability, such as having crew and
rolling stock displaced. This type of disruption has a more profound impact on the network,
especially if the emergency stop was to be carefully timed, for example, when a train is in a
known GSM-R blackspot with no reception. In this case, the RBC would not be aware of the
emergency stop as it cannot communicate with the train and consequently unable to revoke
the emergency stop. In the UK, a set of procedures exist [120] for the driver to follow until
GSM-R coverage is available again. In the event of a train carrying out an emergency stop in
this situation, it would take signicantly longer to recover operations to the timetable after an
emergency stop, which could propagate delays throughout the national network. It is impor-
tant to note that for this attack to be successful, the adversary would need to be close to the
target train and can only stop that particular train.
To prevent an attacker being able to send unauthorised messages, high-priority messages
should be authenticated using MACs, as is the case with normal-priority messages. They
would still have the same priority given to them by the EuroRadio layer as is the case cur-
rently when a high-priority message is received. This proposal presents us with a dilemma
concerning the motivations for excluding a MAC in high-priority messages and whether this
is still appropriate. One concern could have been that if the keys were corrupted at some
point, either by the train or RBC, it should still be possible to fall back to voice communica-
tion (as is currently the case in most systems). The benets of using a MAC in high-priority
situations would, however, prevent the misuse of these messages by an external attacker, pre-
venting them from successfully injecting messages in the communications between a train
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and RBC. This, however, would not prevent an attacker causing disruptions by other means,
e.g. jamming the GSM-R communications channel or physically damaging the infrastructure
where simpler, but eective, attacks exist.
4.6.2 Deletion of Messages
As previously identied, the EuroRadio protocol does not protect against the deletion of mes-
sages and would need to be handled by the Application Layer. The use of counter-style
timestamps also oer no protection against the deletion of messages. In ERTMS, the message
sender has the ability to request acknowledgements upon receipt of the message, although
this is not the default for all messages and has to be explicitly requested. We also note that
recipients have no way of knowing if a message was deleted in-ight and, therefore, not re-
ceived and not detected by the Application Layer. In the most extreme case, where an attacker
prevents the reception (i.e. deletion) of emergency stop messages, a train may compromise
the safe operation of the railway, entering a stretch of track which could conict with the
movement of another train.
It is dicult to prevent the total deletion of messages, as an attacker could jam all com-
munications between two parties, but it is possible to detect the deletion of single messages.
A simple solution would be to add a counter to all messages sent. If the recipient notes that
the counter has skipped between two messages, then a message must have been missed and
may be reported back to the sender, in a NACK-style response that exists in TCP. This proposed
solution would require changes to the current Application Layer specication to amend both
the message format (adding the counter) and the procedures on how to deal with the situation
where a missed message is identied. A counter is more eective against delay of messages,
although enforcing an acknowledgement for all messages would also be a suitable short-term
solution.
Currently, the ERTMS specications include a mechanism to cater for a situation should a
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jamming attack take place, where an emergency stop is triggered to bring the train to a stop
if no messages are received within a given timeout period. This timeout and the action to be
taken if the timeout is reached are dened as part of nationally-set parameters for ERTMS.
These parameters are T_NVCONTACT and M_NVCONTACT respectively. The possible actions are
to trigger the normal ‘service’ brakes, trip the onboard systems including the immediate ap-
plication of the emergency brakes, or take no action. The default, as set out in SUBSET-026
of the ERTMS standards is ‘no reaction’ with an innite amount of time [118], i.e. there is
no timeout for the safe reception of messages. This measure may result in problems within
GSM-R blackspots, i.e if a train spends too much time in a blackspot (e.g. due to poor weather,
causing the train to run at a lower speed) the brakes could be automatically triggered. Con-
sequently, the standard provides methods to inform the train of GSM-R blackspots, meaning
that the proposal of eectively using timeouts, and the appropriate actions to take, should not
conict with the existing standards.
4.6.3 Disagreement over RBC Identity and Safety Feature
One area that the EuroRadio specications do not specically cover is ensuring that when a
EuroRadio session is started by a train, the RBC with which it establishes its communications
is not only genuine, but is also the correct one with responsibility for the area in which the
train is operating. When a train tries to set up a EuroRadio session, it is not always aware
of the identity of the RBC with which it will be communicating. As previously identied, the
specic case we consider here is a train that is not aware of its location where, at the ‘start
of mission’ the train may invalidate the RBC identity and phone number. This may occur
when a train is recovered following a breakdown or its state is lost following a system reboot.
The specications [73] allow the train to reuse the last RBC identity and phone number. It
also allows the use of the EIRENE shortcodes to use location-based addressing to contact the
most appropriate RBC for the area the train is connected to, via GSM-R. This assumes that
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the attacker cannot compromise the network-level routing in the GSM-R backend which we
consider to be an involved, high-risk and expensive task. Finally, the driver can enter the
RBC number manually. The latter two considerations would allow the connection to a RBC
which may not be situated in the area to which the train should be connected. Either through
malicious means or human error there is, therefore, the possibility of an unsafe command
being issued to the train.
When the train knows the identity of the RBC with which it is to communicate, there is
no remediation oered in the specications if the identity presented during the EuroRadio
handshake diers from that which the train expects, nor whether this should be veried. To
remove this possibility of ambiguity, we would recommend that the specications consider
this eventuality, where the RBC identity must be veried, if it is known and, if the validation
fails, the connection should be terminated.
The Safety Feature (SaF) also presents a similar issue, where the attacker has the ability
to inuence its negotiation, given the rst message is sent in plaintext and fundamentally
underpins the MAC cipher to be used. The train selects the SaF in the rst message and the
RBC responds with conrmation of the SaF to be used. However, the standards do not consider
the possibility that the train and RBC Safety Features mismatch. As highlighted earlier in
this chapter, only one SaF is currently supported but we expect that, for future revisions and
baseline standards, new SaFs may be supported and it is therefore essential to add in this
verication. It should be enforced that the selected SaF is either equal to, or more secure than,
what was sent by the initiator of the EuroRadio handshake. From here, two questions may
be presented: (1) how do you rank MAC algorithms and (2) what if the train/RBC does not
support the proposed SaF?
Naïvely, we could maintain a list of MAC algorithms in the standards documents, with
Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) and ciphers known to be vulnerable and weak (e.g. DES and
RC4) ranked lower, with AES-MAC and known, strong, ciphers ranked higher. It is expected
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that the ERTMS standards provide a ‘minimum’ set of ciphers that are to be supported by all
entities, with possible extensions by National Infrastructure Managers, who may introduce
newer, more secure schemes. In this case, an alternative approach can be taken from TLS,
where a list of supported ciphers is provided by the sender and the recipient simply chooses
one from that list, where there must be at least one supported cipher shared between the train
and RBC.
4.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have carried out a security analysis of the EuroRadio protocol and elements
of the Application Layer protocol used in ERTMS. As part of this, we developed a novel way
of representing the counter-style timestamps used in the standards and new correspondence
assertions to test for message insertion, deletion, reordering and replay.
From this analysis, we nd that EuroRadio defends the security of its key and authenticates
the parties involved against an active Dolev-Yao attacker. It does, however, have weaknesses
which should be addressed to improve its resilience to meet the security properties mentioned
earlier, including message deletion and the insertion of emergency stop messages by an at-
tacker. The relevance of these ndings are discussed in the previous section of this chapter.
The model itself currently only considers the sending of exactly three messages which is
sucient to prove the security of the EuroRadio protocol. However, an extended model which
captures the interleaving of normal-priority and high-priority messages could be created. This
can be achieved by including the priority ag in the model with appropriate changes to asser-
tions to capture the security requirements for any number of messages. Whilst this analysis
found that EuroRadio and the Application Layer protocols do not oer any protection against
the insertion of high-priority messages, we should note that the insertion of messages into
a GSM-R data stream is currently technically dicult and alternative, more physical, attacks
may have more impact in the short-term whilst this capability is developed.
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One other issue presented by the ProVerif model is that it assumes that the cryptography
used is perfect. However, as we will nd in Chapter 5, this is not the case.
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Chapter 5
Cryptographic Analysis of the ERTMS MAC
In this chapter, we build on the work from Chapter 4, in which we observed that one of the gaps
in that analysis arose from ProVerif’s assumption of ‘perfect’ cryptography, with no observable
weaknesses or vulnerabilities. We, therefore, ‘close’ this gap by carrying out a cryptographic
analysis of the MAC used in EuroRadio, a custom cipher based on an ISO standard [31]. From
this, we identify a weakness which, whilst not currently exploitable, has the potential to be
when used in high-bandwidth applications.
5.1 Motivation
As highlighted in Chapters 2 and 4, ERTMS is built up from a stack of three core protocols
and layers: GSM-R, EuroRadio and an Application-Level protocol layer (see Figure 2.3), where
each layer is relied upon to provide specic security and safety guarantees to the layer above.
The MAC algorithm used in EuroRadio itself is based on the ISO-9797 MAC Algorithm
3 [31, 140], a DES-based Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) cipher which is modied from the
standard. As a result, any assurances and formal proofs, if any, that were conducted on the
algorithm, as dened in the standard, may no longer hold and requires separate assurance. Of
particular interest to us is the change at the end of the cipher from two DES encryption rounds
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to three, i.e. the cipher itself uses a single DES transformation for all but the last block, where
this nal round has been modied. The justication for moving from using just 2 keys for the
nal round is to mitigate the possibility for weaknesses to be exploited. EuroRadio, therefore,
uses 3 distinct keys in the nal Triple DES (3DES) round instead.
Without this assurance, it is possible that the cipher could suer from an unknown, or
unaccounted for, weakness and an attacker would then be able to formulate new attacks which
undermine the security of the protocols which rely on these ciphers. EuroRadio is the next line
of defence after GSM-R, which already has existing weaknesses, namely the A5/1 encryption
cipher, used to provide condentiality for the data sent between the base station and endpoint
[100]. EuroRadio has a signicant responsibility in providing the secure and safe operation
of ERTMS, as it guarantees the authenticity and integrity of messages to and from trains and
RBCs. If an attacker leveraged a cryptographic weakness in the EuroRadio MAC, they would
then be able to forge their own valid messages, which could have serious consequences.
5.2 Contributions
Here, we carry out a cryptographic analysis of the MAC cipher used in the EuroRadio protocol,
building on previous work which has analysed the standardised version of the ISO-9797 MAC
[105, 116, 115]. This work found a collision-based key recovery attack, requiring 232.5 known
plaintext-MAC pairs, coupled with 3 · 256 oine operations.
As EuroRadio uses three distinct keys instead of the two-key 3DES transformation in ISO-
9797, these attacks should become less eective. In this chapter, we will consider the cryp-
tography oered by each layer in the ERTMS stack (GSM-R, EuroRadio and the Application
Layer protocol) and nd an attack that allows an adversary to forge messages at the EuroRa-
dio layer, leveraging several limitations and weaknesses within the EuroRadio and Application
Layer protocols. This chaining of attacks shows how an attacker can use weaknesses in the
entire stack to succeed.
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We will nally assess what possible mitigations and remedial actions can be implemented,
taking into account the original design decisions and the impact of these proposals.
5.3 ERTMS Train to Trackside Technical Overview
In this section, we will provide an intuition of each component, the cryptography and mes-
sage formatting used in ERTMS, which we will then use in this chapter to formulate our attack.
This intuition is more technical than that presented in Chapter 4, when considering the cryp-
tography used.
5.3.1 GSM-R Communications Layer
The GSM-R communications protocol sits at the lowest layer of the ERTMS stack and is used to
handle communications between the train and trackside infrastructure [72, 73]. It is important
to note, however, that this communication medium is only used for railway operations (e.g
train to RBC and train to signaller communications) and not for, say, reading balises.
GSM-R is based on the GSM mobile communications standard [72], but leverages dierent
frequency ranges, based on national spectrum availability, typically consolidated to a common
set of ranges across nations. More importantly, GSM-R has additional functionality included,
for example, support for multi-party communications between drivers and signallers (group
calls), emergency calling and priority-based pre-emption. Here, specic types of calls/mes-
sages are allocated priorities, where active calls/transmissions may be terminated if a higher
priority call/message is received. A classic example of where pre-emption may be used is if
a driver is currently engaged in a call, but another driver engages the emergency group call.
As a result, all calls in the local area will be terminated as emergency calls carry the highest
priority [122]. For ERTMS, however, all communications take place at the highest priority for
the data modem calls and cannot be pre-empted.
Compared to GSM, which has a cell-based network layout, GSM-R uses an alternative cell
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layout, where base stations are instead situated alongside, or near to, railway lines, with over-
laps provided to ensure redundancy in the event of a cell failure. In Great Britain, a nationwide
deployment of GSM-R was completed by the Infrastructure Manager, Network Rail, in 2014,
as part of a programme to retire its outdated predecessor, Cab Secure Radio (CSR). GSM-R
data support was rolled out in 2010 on the Cambrian Line in Wales as part of the deployment
of ERTMS Level 2, the rst deployment of its kind in Great Britain.
Whilst progressive, the cryptography used is the same as the current public GSM network,
where both employ the use of the A5 suite of cryptographic ciphers, specically A5/1, a stream
cipher, based on Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs). Alternative ciphers are available,
such as A5/2, an export version of the A5/1 cipher, and A5/3, a block cipher. At this time, it is
understood that only A5/1 is deployed on the railways, although the infrastructure is capable
of supporting all three ciphers. These ciphers are used to encrypt the communications that
take place between ‘mobile stations’ (i.e. trains and handheld devices) and a GSM-R base
station, providing condentiality during transmission. Of particular interest is the fact that
mobile handsets and devices are authenticated to join the network, though the base station
never authenticates itself to the handset.
5.3.2 EuroRadio
The EuroRadio protocol layer sits between the GSM-R and Application Layer protocols where
its main function is to provide authenticity and integrity verication for messages sent and
received between the train and trackside infrastructure. It provides guarantees that messages
sent and received are authentic, through the use of applying cryptographic Message Authen-
tication Codes (MACs). EuroRadio relies on GSM-R to provide guarantees of condentiality
through encryption of communications between the train and base station, where EuroRa-
dio has provisions for algorithm negotiation for the MAC during the handshake. It should be
recognised, however, that only one MAC algorithm is supported.
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The MAC message authentication algorithm used in EuroRadio is based on the ISO-9797-1
MAC Algorithm 3 (also known as ANSI X9.19 Optional Procedure 1) [4, 140, 31] and is used
to compute the MAC for a given message using a combination of DES and Triple DES (3DES)
ciphers, as shown in Figure 5.1. This algorithm works by dividing a message into n blocks of
64-bits each, padded appropriately, which are then fed as the input into a CBC circuit which
uses DES encryption for the rst n − 1 blocks of the EuroRadio message payload, where the
nal block is subject to a 3DES transformation. The MAC is computed with a 40-bit prex,
formed of the message length and the ETCS ID of the recipient, followed by the message being
sent and some optional padding to ensure it is a suitable length for MAC computation [140].










Figure 5.1: The EuroRadio MAC Algorithm. This cipher is made up of of n − 1 DES rounds,
followed by a nal 3DES round.
In EuroRadio, the MAC algorithm uses three distinct DES keys for the nal 3DES transfor-
mation, compared to that specied in the ISO standard, which uses only two keys for the same
transformation. The padding method, Padding Method 1, is the same for both specications
and is used to ensure the message is the correct length before a MAC computation takes place,
such that the data length is a multiple of the block size. Should the message length be equal
to a multiple of the block size, no padding is added.
As we noted in Chapter 4, the EuroRadio handshake establishes session keys which are
shared between the train and RBC. This key is used by EuroRadio’s MAC algorithm to provide
authenticity and integrity validation checks.
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5.3.3 Application Layer Protocol
Once the train to trackside communication link has been established and both the train and
RBC have mutually authenticated each other, data may now be exchanged via the Applica-
tion Layer Protocol. This protocol and accompanying standards [58] are used to specify the
messages sent between the train and trackside and how they are to be dened.
All messages at this layer contain a header, set appropriately dependent on whether the
message was generated by the train or RBC, in addition to a timestamp (see Chapters 2 and 4
for a more detailed overview of how the timestamp is managed).
Typically, messages sent from the train to the RBC have the following format:





A message sent from the RBC to the train will, instead, have this format:





Common to both messages is that they contain their respective type, length and the relative
timestamp. The dierence between them is that the train will report its current position and,
dependent on the message being sent, additional data, as prescribed in SUBSET-026 [58]. The
position report sent by the train contains the distance and direction of travel relative to the
Last Relevant Balise Group (LRBG), an upper and lower level based on the tolerance of the
onboard systems and the location accuracy of the LRBG, with part of this data provided by the
balise located between the rails. To ensure the full byte length and that the message length is
a multiple of the block size for the EuroRadio MAC, optional padding of ‘0’ may be added to
the end of the message.
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5.4 Attacking EuroRadio to Forge Valid Control Messages
In this section, we will review the roadmap of an attack against EuroRadio, leveraging known
vulnerabilities against GSM’s cryptography. Whilst the focus of this chapter is a cryptographic
analysis of the EuroRadio MAC, in reality an attacker may need to additionally overcome the
security provided by GSM-R. This could be achieved using Commercial o-the-shelf (COTS)
equipment, for example, the $100 HackRF Software Dened Radio (SDR) and an NVIDIA GTX
Titan X GPU for $1,400 to recover the A5/1 key.
5.4.1 Obtaining andDecryptingGSM-RCommunications betweenTrain
and Trackside
Given that GSM-R uses the same cryptographic primitives and mechanisms as GSM to pre-
vent message interception and malicious modication, any vulnerability that exists against
the current GSM standard may also be exploitable within GSM-R. As an example, a jamming
attack against GSM would also be eective in GSM-R, with the further complication that it
would have the capability of aecting all ERTMS operations within its eective range.
A more sophisticated attack would be to directly target an individual train, with the po-
tential prospect of the interception of communications to eavesdrop, or insert messages into
the communications channel. By inserting messages, an attacker could, for example, instruct
a train to stop for an indeterminate period of time or even coerce a train to enter an unsafe
situation, such as allowing two trains to occupy the same block of track. In GSM, messages
sent only provide authentication that the communicating party has possession of the A5 key
for encryption and not that the message being conveyed is actually from a genuine, honest
party. Again, as stated in Chapter 4, simpler, physical, attacks could be used to stop a train.
Existing work has largely assessed the security of the GSM encryption scheme. In 2015,
it was shown that the A5/1 cipher used in both GSM and GSM-R could be broken in as little
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as nine seconds using COTS hardware [100]. This work used a time-memory trade-o attack,
with a probability of success of 81%. This statistic, however, does not reect the two months
preparation time and the reconnaissance work involved. Within this two month set-up period,
lookup tables were produced. As these tables are reusable, once the set-up period has been
completed, the attack can be repeatedly run in a short time period. An alternative form of
attack is the use of rainbow tables, a pre-computed lookup table of plaintext/ciphertext pairs,
used by Nohl et al. [131, 87, 85], although requiring some 1.6TB of storage capacity. Whilst
this was previously considered to be a barrier, with the advances in hardware, storage capacity
is now relatively inexpensive.
As previously mentioned, an export variant of the A5/1 cipher, A5/2 exists. This was also
shown to be weak and, by having a reduced keylength, allows near real-time attacks, breaking
the cipher in less than one second [10, 112]. Barkan et al. proposed a means to man-in-the-
middle the GSM protocol, forcing it to fall back to the A5/2 cipher, reducing the overheads
(e.g. nancial and eort) and the time required to break the cipher. In the context of A5/1,
this reduction may make the dierence between the attack being successful or not. Once an
attacker has established the A5 key, they can then start to decrypt the messages being sent
over the link. In the case of GSM-R, this applies to ERTMS train control messages.
Breaking the A5 cryptographic keys is just one example of the various alternative methods
of attack, such as using so-called ‘IMSI Catchers’ [48]. These work by tricking mobile devices
into connecting to a dishonest GSM base station, masquerading as a genuine network. This is
possible as the base station does not authenticate itself to the mobile device. For such an attack
to succeed, the attacker needs to learn the Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) of the
victim train, in the ‘Identication’ phase. In some countries, including Great Britain, running
timetables and open data Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) exist to provide real-
time train position data. However, the TMSI and some ERTMS values (for example the train
ID) are not publicly available. In the second phase, ‘Camping’, the attacker simply captures
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trac between the train and trackside infrastructure, where an attempt will be made to recover
the A5/1 key. If successful, they then can control all trac to and from the train and RBC. It
is worth noting here that interception of the downlink (from base station to train) is well-
documented, however, due to the timeslot-based nature of GSM, capturing the uplink (from
train to base station) remains an open research question, as the adversary would have to ‘latch’
onto the particular timeslot a train is using.
5.4.2 Recovery of k1 from the EuroRadio MAC
Given that the attacker has now recovered the A5/1 key, they can observe messages between
the train and RBC and, furthermore, look for two unique messages which have the same
EuroRadio MAC.
As the current EuroRadio MAC generation and verication scheme depends on the DES
and 3DES encryption ciphers, the way that the DES cipher is used in the EuroRadio MAC gen-
eration makes it possible for collisions to occur due to the small block sizes (i.e. 64-bits) [116].
In a typical, well-designed scheme, we would not necessarily suggest that the existence of a
collision implies a vulnerability. This, however, when coupled with ‘interesting’ functionality
provided by the Application Layer protocol (as outlined in Section 5.6) and aws in the MAC
(due to the short keylength of DES) allows us to not only recover the key through brute-force
attacks on k1 (from Section 5.5) but also forge messages.
5.4.3 Forging a Malicious Movement Authority Message
In 3DES, the recovery of a single key does not normally compromise the rest of the scheme
or provide a means for further attack. That said, as EuroRadio uses a combination of DES and
3DES, we can successfully use a single recovered key to produce a false, malicious, payload
which has the same MAC as an observed genuine message, using just the rst key, k1.
Messages sent from the RBC to the train can include optional packets, outside of the ‘re-
quired’ components. In ERTMS, a free-text text message can be sent which is then displayed
5.5. Recovering EuroRadio Keys 90
to the driver, the conditions for the message to be shown being specied by the RBC. Using
this message, we can use random bytes and take advantage of an unattainable condition to
construct a valid, correctly-formatted Application Layer message which would be accepted
and acted upon by the train. As the conditions for the message to be displayed to the driver
would never be met, they would be unaware of any messages being received by the train.
5.5 Recovering EuroRadio Keys
In this section, we will review one method whereby a malicious actor could recover k1, one of
the three DES keys used by the EuroRadio MAC algorithm. As we have identied earlier in this
chapter, this attack is possible by leveraging the small block size of the DES and 3DES ciphers,
where the attacker simply has to wait for a collision to take place between MACs. Whilst
recovery of the key is only one, potentially signicant part of the attack, the nal building
block for the attack uses exploitable components from the Application Layer, which we will
investigate as part of Section 5.6 using the key recovered in this section.
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3DES(Hman−1 ⊕man ) =
3DES(Hmb
l−1 ⊕mbl )
Figure 5.2: Recovery of the k1 DES key through MAC collisions, where two unique, indepen-
dent messages under the same EuroRadio session keys have the same MAC.
As identied from Figure 5.1, a single key is used for the single DES rounds which may
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be bruteforced, making it possible for two, unique, messages to have the same corresponding
MAC. As the nal 3DES transformation is deterministic, it follows that the input to the 3DES
block must have been identical for those two messages. Using these two limitations, we are
able to recover k1 as described further in this section. The EuroRadio MAC uses a CBC-like
mode to compute messages from the Application Layer, using the following process:
A given message, m, generated by the Application Layer, is split into 64-bit blocks m =
(m1,m2, ...,mn). If the nal block, mn, is not 64-bits long, it is padded with 0s (dened by
Padding Method 1 from ISO-9797 [31]) to allow it to be encrypted appropriately. For each
blockmi , i ∈ {1, ...,n − 1}, the MAC cipher block Hi is then computed:
Hi = DESk1(Hi−1 ⊕mi ) (5.1)
In the rst block, m1, H0 = 0, where Hi − 1 ⊕ mi is the result of an XOR operation on
Hi−1 and mi . The nal transformation, used for mn, is the result of a 3DES encryption which
produces our nal MAC, that is MAC(m):
MAC(m) = 3DESk1,k2,k3(Hn−1 ⊕mn) (5.2)
For this attack to succeed, as previously highlighted, two unique messages are required
which share the same MAC. The likelihood of observing at least one MAC collision occurring
between two message/MAC pairs for N possible values is given below [49]. We set N to be 264
for DES and 3DES. A diagram providing an intuition about this collision is given in Figure 5.2.
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For safety-critical systems, such as those employed in rail, it should be the case that a 1%
probability of compromise is signicant. Reversing Equation 5.3 where P = 0.01, the number
of message/MAC pairs to be observed by an attacker to achieve a collision is M = 6.1 · 108.
Whilst this appears to be a high number of message/MAC pairs that need to be captured, we
will rationalise the feasibility of such a data collection in Section 5.8.
For two unique messages, ma and mb , which share the same MAC (i.e a collision exists)
and the number of blocks contained in each message respectively is n and l , we already know
that the input to the 3DES transformation in the MAC algorithm (see Figure 5.2) must have
been the same. Conversely, it follows that Hman−1 and H
mb
l−1 are identical:
Hman−1 ⊕man = Hmbl−1 ⊕mbl (5.4)
Using this property of the MAC algorithm, we are able to carry out a brute-force search for
k1, as both the plaintext messagesma andmb are known to the attacker. Using these messages,
the attacker can compute potential candidates forHman−1 andH
mb
l−1, for all possible keys k
′
1. When
Equation 5.4 holds, we then have a possible candidate key k1. An overview of the time and
resources required by an attacker to compute these possible keys is given in Section 5.8.2.
To provide a concrete idea of how this attack works, let us consider an example with two,
three-block messages.
Example. Let n = l = 3 for messages ma and mb . Using Equation 5.4, Hma2 and H
mb
2 can be
computed. Expanding this to the underlying transformations, i.e. DESk1(H
ma
1 ⊕ma2) ⊕ma3 =
DESk1(H
mb
1 ⊕mb2) ⊕mb3 , this results in the following nal expansion:
DESk1(DESk1(ma1) ⊕ma2) ⊕ma3
= DESk1(DESk1(mb1) ⊕mb2) ⊕mb3
(5.5)
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As all blocksma1, ...,3 andmb1, ...,3 are known to the attacker, the only unknown that remains
is k1. Using these blocks, however, we can use the brute-force guessing attack to recover this
and forge our own messages with valid MACs.
5.6 Forging Valid, Malicious, Train Control Messages
Once an attacker has recovered k1, they have only completed part of the ‘puzzle’. They can
attempt to use this to create a malicious message, but without the remaining two keys, k2 and
k3, it is not possible to resolve the nal 3DES transformation that takes place at the end of the
MAC algorithm. As we have previously alluded, we require aws that exist in all three layers of
the ERTMS stack to allow this attack to succeed. So far, we have access to the communications
channel via the cryptographic weakness of the A5/1 GSM encryption cipher and can now
recover k1 from the EuroRadio MAC. The remainder of this section will look at how we can
manipulate application-level messages to produce messages which have identical MACs to
one previously observed. Using this vector, we only require the recovered key, k1.
Key to this section is, however, the assumption that we have observed two messages,mv =
(mv1, . . . ,mvn ) and m′v which have the same corresponding MAC, allowing us to recover the
rst key, k1.
It is possible to create a malicious, forged, message, m f if, and only if, we ensure that
the valid message is not identical to the malicious message, i.e. m f = (m f1, . . . ,m fl ) 6= mv
and, using Equation 5.2, the MAC for m f , MAC(m f ) is identical to the valid message MAC
(MAC(mv )) if the following holds:
Hmvn−1 ⊕mvn = H
mf
l−1 ⊕m fl (5.6)
As we know k1, we are in a position to compute all of the H intermediate MAC values for
each message for all blocks, with the exception of the last block (using Equation 5.1) and we
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Figure 5.3: Ideally, for two given EuroRadio messages, mv and m f , the corresponding MACs
for both should not match.
are then able to compute Hmvn−1 ⊕mvn and H
mf
l−1 ⊕m fl . One pertinent detail lies here, speci-
cally that there is a very high likelihood that these two messages will not have an identical H
intermediate value up to the penultimate block (see Figure 5.3).
For an attacker to be able to ensure that they can reliably produce valid MACs for their
payloads, the messagem fl can be extended with an additional block,m f +1l+1 (see Figure 5.4):




By adding this additional block, we can force the input of the 3DES transformation in the
MAC computation to be the same for the new, forged message as the old, observed message.
Even if we do not possess k2 and k3, we are still, therefore, able to ensure that the MAC for this
message is the same as mv . The additional block, however, has to be crafted by the attacker
to contain some random data which, due to the exibility of the Application Layer message
standard, is unlikely to be veried. Using this approach, we can craft a message such that we
can achieve a higher level of control over it and ensure the message conforms to the current
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Figure 5.4: The forged messagem f can have the same MAC asmv through the addition of the





In SUBSET-026 [144], the standard that governs application-level messages, there is an
additional feature that allows optional packets to be sent in addition to those packets that
are mandatory for a given message. A plaintext message can be sent in this packet, where the
limit is 255 characters, intended to be displayed on the driver’s console (Man Machine Interface
(MMI)). As a rst step, we would want the random data included in this block (m fl+1) to be
the text message to be displayed within this packet. This packet, however, allows condition-
based events, which determine if and when the message should be displayed to the driver.
These conditions, however, can be specied such that the message, most likely, will never be
displayed.
Core to this plaintext message is that there is a requirement for the data to be encoded
to the ISO 8859-1 encoding standard, which includes ASCII characters [30]. It is not explicit
within the standards whether the encoding is to be validated, or, if and when it is displayed
to the driver at all. However, for the purposes of this chapter and to demonstrate that it is
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Figure 5.5: For the Plain Text Message to be correctly encoded, we add two blocks, m fl+1 and
m fl+2 , both of which we control.
the standard and not its implementation at fault, we will assume that the encoding is checked
when a message is received. Now, all that remains is for us to use these building blocks to
construct a valid, forged, message which includes this valid-encoded text message.
As previously mentioned, the attacker now has control over the last two full blocks as
input to the MAC computation. In these blocks, we can therefore include a 16 character text
message within the attack message (see Figure 5.5). The start of the message is denoted as
before – m f = (m f1, . . . ,m fl ). We add two additional blocks, those that form the actual text
messages, to be appended to blocksm fl+1 andm fl+2 . These two blocks are sucient to provide
exibility in the plaintext to ensure they conform to the ISO 8859-1 standard.
We rst need to compute the input up to the 3DES transformation block for the origi-
nal message (Hmvn−1 ⊕mvn ) and the intermediate MAC of the xed part of the forged message
(Hmf
l
) using our recovered key, k1. We then proceed to randomly generate the rst half of the
plaintext text message in the correct encoding, placing it into block m fl+1 . For the last block,
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m fl+2 , we compute the value such that m f has the same MAC as the original message, using
Equation 5.7, and Hmf




m fl+2 = mvn ⊕ Hmvn−1 ⊕ H
mf
l+1
It is important to verify that m fl+2 is a valid ISO 8859-1 encoded message. If it is not, then
we start over again by generating another random rst half of the text message m fl+1 , and
determine if this is a valid candidate for a correctly formatted block for m fl+2 . Once m fl+2 is
correctly encoded, we have our forged message. In Section 5.7, we provide an example of a
valid forged Movement Authority message.
It is also important to evaluate the probability of nding a correctly encoded m fl+2 . For
this, we assume a uniform distribution, which should be the case, given the nature of the DES
encryption used to compute Hmf
l+1 . ISO 8859-1 does not allow 65-byte values. We can then
calculate the probability that a random string of 8 bytes is correctly encoded. As we assume
DES to be a pseudo-random function, on average we need to carry out 10 attempts to nd a
correctly-encoded block, with 50 attempts providing a 99% success rate. Limiting ourselves
to just ASCII-encoding, the probability drops to
( 95
256
)8 ≈ 0.04%, whilst requiring, on average,
2,780 attempts to nd a correctly-encoded ASCII block.
5.7 End-to-End Process of Forging a Message
Following the work outlined in the previous section, we will now rearm this with a practical
example, detailing such an attack against ERTMS.
One example message an attacker may wish to send to a train, which would have a debili-
tating eect, is the Movement Authority (MA) message, which is coupled with the Plain Text
Message (PTM) packet, using the format given in Table 5.2. The Movement Authority in this
message to the train changes a number of parameters, for example allowing the train to travel
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for the next 328 kilometres at 200 km/h. The values in this crafted message are such that,
through the inclusion of the optional variables, we can align the text message exactly with
the last two message blocks used in the computation of the MAC. The MAC algorithm adds a
40-bit prex and the message header (75-bits), supplemented by the MA packet (113-bits) and
the Plain Text Message. The PTM without the actual message (92-bits) is 280-bits. This xed
component of the message is exactly contained within ve message blocks, so the text to be
displayed will commence at the start of the sixth block.
In order to generate an example of a MAC collision to use in this proof-of-concept, a pro-
gram was developed in Java to generate a set of ERTMS messages. To ensure that this program
matched real-world conditions, we can use the Acknowledgement Message (Message 146 in
the standard). This is a message sent by the train to the RBC and is one of the most common
messages, as the train will typically acknowledge most normal-priority messages sent to it (the
RBC has to request an acknowledgement in the rst instance). Not necessarily every message
sent by the train, however, will result in the RBC carrying out some action. An example of
such an Acknowledgement Message is given below in Table 5.1.
Variable Length(bits) Description Example
Message 146 (Acknowledgement)
NID_MESSAGE 8 Message type 146 (Acknowledgement)
L_MESSAGE 10 Length of message (bytes) 10
T_TRAIN 32 Train timestamp 53088208
NID_ENGINE 24 Train ID 1
T_TRAIN 32 Timestamp being acknowl-edged 53088178
Table 5.1: Example of an Acknowledgement Message that is sent by a train.
Within the acknowledgement message is the current timestamp, relative to the train’s
onboard clock and the timestamp of the message being acknowledged. As we recall from
Chapter 4, there is no notion of sequence numbers in ERTMS messages, where a counter-style
timestamp is all that encapsulates and ensures timely receipt of data. We could argue that, as
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Variable Length(bits) Description Example
Message 3 (Movement Authority)
NID_MESSAGE 8 Message type 3 (Movement Authority)
L_MESSAGE 10 Length of message (bytes) 51
T_TRAIN 32 Train timestamp 1327095428
M_ACK 1 Acknowledgement required 0 (Acknowledgement not required)
NID_LRBG 24 ID of Last Relevant Balise Group 1
Packet 15 (Movement Authority)
NID_PACKET 8 Packet ID 15 (Movement Authority)
Q_DIR 2 Direction 2 (Both directions)
L_PACKET 13 Length of packet (bits) 113
Q_SCALE 2 Scale used for denition of resolution 2 (10m scale)
V_EMA 7 Maximum speed 40 (200km/h)
T_EMA 10 Validity time 1023 (unlimited)
N_ITER 5 Number of iterations 0 (No iterations)
L_ENDSECTION 15 Length of section in MA 5000 (50000m)
Q_SECTION-
TIMER 1 Section timeout Qualier 0
Q_ENDTIMER 1 Timer for end section in MA qualier 0 (No information)
Q_DANGERPOINT 1 Indicates whether a danger point ex-ists or release speed is to be specied 0 (No information)
Q_OVERLAP 1 Indicates whether overlap exists orrelease speed is to be specied 1 (Overlap information to follow)
D_STARTOL 15 Distance from overlap timer start toend of MA 0
T_OL 10 Validity period for overlap 0
D_OL 15 Distance from the end of the MA toend of overlap 0
V_RELEASEOL 7 Release speed for overlap 126 (Use calculated onboard speed)
Packet 72 (Plain Text Message)
NID_PACKET 8 Packet ID 72 (Plain Text Message)
Q_DIR 2 Direction 0 (Reverse)
L_PACKET 13 Length of packet (bits) 220
Q_SCALE 2 Scale used for denition of resolution 2 (10m)
Q_TEXTCLASS 2 Class of Message to be displayed 0 (Auxiliary)
Q_TEXTDISPLAY 1 Display message if one/all events ful-lled (start/end events relation) 0 (as soon as one event fullled)
D_TEXTDISPLAY 15 Distance at which text is displayed(start event) 32767 (327670m)
M_MODE-
TEXTDISPLAY 4
Operating mode for text display (start
event) 9 (System Failure)
M_LEVEL-
TEXTDISPLAY 3
Operating level for text display (start
event) 0 (Level 0)
L_TEXTDISPLAY 15 Length the text is to be displayed for(end event) 0 (0m)
T_TEXTDISPLAY 10 Time the text is to be displayed for(end event) 0 (0 seconds)
M_MODE-
TEXTDISPLAY 4
Operating mode for text display (end
event) 9 (System Failure)
M_LEVEL-
TEXTDISPLAY 3
Operating level for text display (end
event) 0 (Level 0)
Q_TEXTCONFIRM 2 Conrmation required 0 (Not required)
L_TEXT 8 Length of text message 16 (16 chars)
X_TEXT variable Contents of text message ...
Table 5.2: An example of a forged message which could be sent to a train. This message
contains a Movement Authority and Plain Text Message packet, both containing forged values.
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timestamps are limited to 32-bits in length, wrap-around might be an issue. However, this is
an accepted characteristic of ERTMS and is therefore not considered a problem. Nevertheless,
we should model this in the proof-of-concept to ensure this reects real-world conditions.
In the proof-of-concept, we can compute the MAC value for a range of acknowledgement
messages, using the same xed set of keys, looking for collisions. The only values that are
dynamic and subsequently parameterised, are the timestamps, where a xed oset between
the timestamp being acknowledged and ‘current’ time was introduced. To allow us to simulate
reality, the osets were set to intervals of 10, 20 and 30ms respectively. This would result
in the simulated train having the ability to create and reply to a message received with a
corresponding acknowledgement set by that oset limit. As previously mentioned, all other
parameters (e.g. the train ID) remain static, to simulate one train acknowledging all messages
sent to it.
Running the program, approximately 12.9 billion (3 · (232 − 1)) candidates were generated,
which, under Equation 5.3, should provide a probability of collision of 99.9999%. Fewer can-
didate MACs could have been generated and, if a collision was not found, the program could
simply be re-run. The program would simply output plaintext/MAC pairs, using the uniq and
sort UNIX utilities to nd collisions. Running the program continually over two days, 8 col-
lisions were found (given below with their corresponding MAC) running on a system with
an Intel® Xeon E5-2420 CPU, running at 2.2GHz. For example, the following two messages
resulted in the same intermediate MAC (Hn), 80B7557F31566DBB for k1 = 01020407080B0D0E:
00120000020A9203A2105E0480000062105DFD0000000000
00120000020A9203AAE360078000006AE360000000000000
Details of the additional collisions can be found in Appendix B.
To allow us to verify our candidate keys, a total of six DES encryptions (three for each
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message to calculate the inputs to the 3DES transformation) are required. From the literature,
highlighted in Chapter 3, the fastest DES cracker currently in known existence is the RIVYERA,
cracking some 292 billion candidate keys per second 1, taking just under one day to recover a
single DES key. The cost of such a system is, however, approximately $140,000.
These two factors are limiting to an attacker, where time is of the essence and cost can be
prohibitive. Alternatively, an adversary could leverage high-performance cloud-based com-
puting solutions, for example Amazon’s EC2 or Microsoft’s Azure Platforms. Within this re-
search, the cost and speed of cracking DES keys was also evaluated, considering where it may
be more attractive for an attacker to use scalable platforms which charge per hour, rather than
incurring a large initial startup cost. Amazon oers an EC2 cloud computing instance which
was, at the time of publication in 2017, tted with 16 NVIDIA Tesla K80 GPUs (p2.16xlarge),
with the state-of-the-art password cracker, hashcat 2 used to benchmark the number of DES
operations per second. Today, this instance is now deprecated and has been replaced with
the p3.16xlarge, which boasts 8 NVIDIA V100 GPUs, which include additional oating point
units for computation. As a result, this may further reduce the time and cost required to break
a single key.
Using cloud-based services allows almost innite scalability and thus, scaling the number
of instances used to crack the DES key, it is possible to brute-force k1 within 30 minutes for a
cost of $48,960. This provides the attacker with a trade-o between cost and time. At further
expense, they can obtain the key in a smaller window, but if they do not need the key as
urgently, they can use fewer instances. By using this method, we obtain a feasible window to
recover the key, unlike that previously obtained using dedicated crackers like RIVYERA and
the EFF’s cracker, COPACOBANA. Further information on the full breakdown of the costs and
benchmarking output using a p2.16xlarge instance can be found in Appendix C.
1https://www.voltage.com/technology/rivyera-from-sciengines/
2https://hashcat.net
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Let us now focus on what this speed advantage means to an attacker. Using the collision
found between two messages, a forged message with the same MAC can be constructed. A
Python script was written which, given some k1, will nd a valid text message. This script
provides exibility in searching for valid text messages conforming to the ISO 8859-1 encoding,
or purely ASCII text. Using the messages given in this section, we can create a valid text
message, ASCII-encoded, on an Intel Core i7-4550U CPU in 0.209s, resulting in the below text
message:
Z|1MB%<w*RRf)8n/
The corresponding ERTMS message that would be sent is:
030cd3c677a100000021f01c651ff809c4080000000007e4801
b90fffd2000000120105a7c314d42253c772a52526629386e2f
This message is constructed without the need to recover k2 and k3 and has the same inter-
mediary MAC as the acknowledgement messages (80B7557F31566DBB), therefore providing
the same nal MAC. When received by the train, it would pass both the EuroRadio MAC val-
idation and the Application Layer timestamp checks. The message above is broken down in
Table 5.2.
There is one caveat to the attacker, which is to ensure that the attack ‘holds’. When the
attack is deployed, the train will be compelled to respond to the RBC with an acknowledge-
ment. If the RBC receives an acknowledgement for a message it has not sent, it might trigger
an emergency stop or changes made to the Movement Authority that would overrule the at-
tacker’s desired objective. An attacker would, therefore, need to block both the upstream and
downstream GSM-R links to and from the train to ensure that the command is not detected
by the RBC. Additionally, if the RBC detects, through the interlocking and track circuitry, two
trains occupying the same section of track, the attacker would have to prevent the reception
of an emergency stop or amended MA to the train. One side eect of such jamming is that it
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would hamper GSM-R’s voice capabilities as the same frequency ranges are shared – only the
timeslots dier. This would prevent a driver contacting the signalling centre and vice versa,
meaning that the train is essentially a ‘ghost’, unreachable by the dened processes stated in
the Rulebooks. If an attacker had managed to compromise the RBC or GSM-R base station, a
simpler course of action could be taken. This could be as simple as dropping those replies or
any other messages, which are irrelevant, negating the eects of the attack.
5.8 Means of Data Capture for Attack
The attacker, at this point, can now nd collisions for two given messages, recover k1 and
now craft their own attack message which has a corresponding, valid, MAC. Data capture is
the only factor that is now pivotal to this attack, where they need to capture data sent to and
from the train. How much data, however, is a consideration that provides a foundation for the
criticality of this attack and the ease by which an attacker can perform it. Let us consider how
much data needs to be captured and also the likelihood of such an attack being successful.
What we have established so far is that the attacker needs to capture train control data to
nd a collision. One possible way is that they target a specic, single, train and capture all
the GSM-R data between the train and base station. An alternative, perhaps more ambitious
means, would be to monitor the network infrastructure which links RBCs, base stations and
Rail Operation Centres (ROCs) together. Capturing data here would be far more eective in
providing a larger set of data to the attacker, increasing the likelihood of nding a collision,
but this would be much more dicult to compromise. We will consider both types of attack
vectors in detail and, to ensure we set the boundaries of what is an acceptable and reasonable
probability threshold, let us consider a 1% likelihood of an attacker, having the ability to aect
a train, as being unacceptable.
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5.8.1 Monitoring of a Single Targeted Train
For this type of attack to be successful, an attacker would, most likely, need to be travelling
on the train or have a remotely-connected device on the unit which can monitor the GSM-R
data stream, following the appropriate GSM-R handovers between base stations. As we have
already noted, the GSM protocol and its encryption ciphers have been shown to be weak and,
given sucient time for pre-computation [100], the attacker can easily decrypt the stream in
real-time.
From Section 5.5, the chance of observing a collision at this threshold requires 6.1 · 108
messages. To provide some perspective, the average message length sent between a train and
RBC is 32 bytes, therefore requiring 19.5GB of data to be captured. Assuming a train does
not send and receive at the full possible bandwidth of GSM-R (14Kbps), but a modest 10Kbps,
to obtain 19.5GB of data (the amount of 32 byte messages to exceed the threshold), the train
would need to send messages constantly over a period of 23 days. Of particular interest is that
the specications do not explicitly mention key rotations or the limitations on key lifetimes if
a train never leaves a single RBC zone. The only time the key is renegotiated is at startup or
when communications take place with a new RBC. In reality, it is unlikely for a train to retain
the same session key for such a long period for this type of attack to become feasible.
5.8.2 Monitoring Multiple Sessions
A more attractive option which the attacker could consider, would be to tap into the wired
connections between the GSM-R base stations and the railway communications backbone,
allowing them to monitor a potentially large number of trains at the same time. These cables
and infrastructure are typically buried in the ground or carried overhead alongside the railway
lines. This method of attack would, therefore, involve signicant eort, risk and time, although
it is technically possible. GSM-R base stations are, however, situated in open spaces, unlike
the cell-based public networks, such that unauthorised access may not be detected as quickly,

































Figure 5.6: Graph showing the attack probabilities for the number of messages and sessions
that are observed.
if at all. In comparison, an ‘inside’ attacker could achieve the same goal more easily by having
direct access to the underlying infrastructure.
To establish the probability of nding one or more collisions in S sessions, we need to adapt
Equation 5.3. Each session contains M messages, which gives us the probability of collision P
as follows:







≈ 1 − e−M(M−1)·S/(2N )
(5.8)
A range of the possible values is given in Figure 5.6. To provide a concrete intuition, let
us consider Great Britain, which currently has approximately 4,000 trains in service each day
[107], all of which communicate at a theoretical maximum bandwidth of 10Kbps, sessions
which last for 10 hours and an average message size of 32 bytes. Using these values, we can
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establish the number of messages per session and the number of sessions an attacker would
need to monitor. Using Equation 5.8, for an attacker to have a 1% chance of nding a collision
and having a successful attack, this would take approximately 45 days. However, to increase
the probability of an observed collision to 50%, it would require 8 years. The attack, whilst








































Figure 5.7: Attack probabilities over the number of days and sessions per day.
These gures are, however, only theoretical estimates of typical usage. High-speed trains,
which traverse between RBC zones of control in a short space of time will have shorter ses-
sions compared to local trains, which may not leave a RBC’s control area, resulting in longer
sessions. Data speeds also uctuate based on network capacity and equipment, inuencing
the bandwidth speed. What is clear, however, is that with more trains being introduced into
service, this landscape may change, resulting in increasing opportunities for an attacker. In
Figures 5.7 and 5.8, we see how the likelihood of success for the attacker varies as the esti-
mates and variables change. In Fig. 5.7, the potential of an attack being successful grows for
an attacker who waits and is able to observe messages in a densely populated environment of










































Figure 5.8: Probability of attack taking into account the session length and bandwidth of the
connection.
trains. Fig. 5.8 assumes an attack space of 45 days and shows how the likelihood of an attack
becoming successful changes with the session length and data speed. For short sessions and
low speed, the cipher itself is safe to use. However, as the quantity of data sent and bandwidth
increases, this rapidly becomes a problem. Dening the threshold at which safety becomes
compromised will be reviewed in this chapter.
As discussed in Section 5.4.1, although capturing data sent over GSM is not a new con-
cept, for completeness we should consider how, in reality, the attacker may deploy it. In real-
world conditions, the HackRF Software Dened Radio (SDR) was used, with the airprobe and
gnuradio (see Figure 5.9) Linux tools to capture trac on the Cambrian Line, an ERTMS/ETCS
Level 2-tted regional line on the North Wales coastline (captures of which are shown in Fig-
ure 5.10). Other software-dened radios and alternative tools, for example OsmocomBB and
BladeRF may also be used. Firstly, the operating frequency of the base station must be iden-
tied. The kalibrate tool scans for GSM-R base stations, where airprobe can then capture
trac on that frequency, decoding it into Control (broadcast) Channel trac and encrypted
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trac. The capture les can be passed as input to kraken, which will recover the A5/1 key.
kraken requires the Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) of the entity, which is ex-
posed in the ‘Paging Request’ (Figure 5.10) messages, which then allows full recovery of the
Figure 5.9: RF Waterfall Graph taken on the Cambrian Line, using gnuradio. Potential GSM-R
data (red areas) frequency ranges are shown between 923.6MHz and 924.4MHz.
Figure 5.10: Wireshark Capture of GSM-R packets. Here, we can recover the TMSI value of
the train and pass it as input to kraken.
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key.
It is worth highlighting that this is just one method by which trac can be captured. An
alternative way would be to impersonate a base station and relay trac to a genuine base
station, which can be achieved through open-source GSM base station stacks, for example
OpenBTS, OsmoBTS and Yate. A gure showing each ERTMS layer and the corresponding
attack (as described in this chapter) is given in Figure 5.11.
Application Layer Type Length Time-stamp [data] Padding Plain Text Message
Attack Used
MAC Collision and k1 Recovery
A5/1 Key Recovery Attack
EuroRadio Type Direction MAC
GSM-R GSM-R header GSM-R footer
Figure 5.11: Overview of the ERTMS communication layers and corresponding attacks from
this chapter.
5.9 Mitigations for the Future of EuroRadio
Whilst, based on the current assumptions that we have made in this chapter, the likelihood
of an attack being successful is relatively small, we must still consider ways in which the
EuroRadio MAC algorithm can be made more secure. Where DES was fairly new in 1997
and there was no alternative, fast, secure competitor when EuroRadio was rst proposed [22],
these arguments simply no longer hold now that hardware-accelerated ciphers, for example
AES, are now widely available. In this section, we will explore the possible improvements that
can be made to further secure ERTMS train to trackside communications for the future, whilst
also protecting users who may deploy the EuroRadio MAC in alternative applications.
To modify a pre-existing standard, there is a cost in terms of expense, time and eort to
the Infrastructure Manager, operators and vendors to implement these changes, which might
present a barrier to such proposals being deployed. The following recommendations below,
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therefore, are ranked in order of the highest compatibility against the current standards (i.e.
little change is required and interoperability is maintained), with low implementation cost
through to those solutions which require signicant changes to the standard, with associated
higher implementation costs:
• Restricting the use of the EuroRadio MAC from high-bandwidth applications.
• Forcing session keys to be rotated on a regular basis by limiting the lifetime of a session
to ensure the probability of nding a collision is P 6 10−6.
• Expanding the Safety Feature (SaF) list of allowed algorithms to a set that are more
secure.
• Reducing the EuroRadio and Application Layers into a single, combined, secure message
sending/receiving protocol layer directly interfacing between GSM-R and the European
Vital Computer (EVC).
As previously stated, EuroRadio is considered safe for the currently-dened ERTMS stan-
dards for command and control applications against an attacker targeting a single train. How-
ever, EuroRadio’s MAC algorithm should not, in future, be considered for use in high-bandwidth
applications, e.g. streaming data services used for remote condition monitoring, as the time
required to obtain a collision (Figure 5.7) reduces, increasing the likelihood of session key re-
covery. Similarly, the algorithm should not be used in other applications as newer, faster and
more secure alternatives exist, which we will discuss later. As these alternatives can be im-
plemented at the design-stage for new systems, the cost is considered relatively insignicant
and has a ‘no change’ mentality, whilst maintaining intercompatibility.
One other suggestion, as we observe in Figure 5.8, is that if a session period is suciently
long, then the probability of a successful attack increases. For trains which constantly operate
in the same area of control (e.g. commuter trains), sessions could be torn down on a regular
basis, forcing the session key to be changed. As discussed in Section 5.5, assuming a collision
probability P = 1%, a total number of messages, M , would have to be very large – M = 6.1 ·108.
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This probability, however, is much higher than that typically used in safety analysis, P = 10−6
[147], measured in the space of a year. Using Equation 5.8, the number of messages per session










As an example, with N = 264 and S = 1, 825, 000 sessions and assuming an attacker moni-
tors 5,000 sessions per day for an entire year, the number of messages per session which would
result in a collision probability of P = 10−6 is M = 4, 496. Once this number of messages in a
session has been reached (attainable via a counter mechanism as proposed in Chapter 4), the
session should be terminated and the keys renegotiated. This requires a few minor changes to
be made throughout the standards, where there is some exibility for implementation on either
the RBC or the train, as there is already provision for the RBC and train to terminate sessions,
as required, for other purposes. The RBC managing session message sequence numbers is a
better proposal, as there are fewer RBCs deployed, compared to trains, and this solution can
be implemented and tested as a software update in a shorter timeframe, compared to updating
trains in depots which would be a more substantial work programme.
Core to the attack presented in this chapter is the EuroRadio MAC, which relies on the
security of the DES and 3DES ciphers. In the case of DES, it has previously been shown to be
vulnerable, whilst 3DES currently does not have a full key recovery attack. Current estimates
show that in the case of 3DES, it may be possible to brute-force keys and recover them by
2030 1. Longer term solutions which mitigate this attack, for example, changing the supported
MAC algorithms as part of the Safety Feature negotiated during the EuroRadio handshake
would require signicant changes to the standards, software and, in some cases, reissuing
keys where the keys stored are too short. Additionally, Infrastructure Managers cannot simply
update the derivation key on every train and RBC, as it would be an ‘all or nothing’ approach
1https://www.keylength.com/en/3
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at the same time, to support these changes. Economically and logistically, this would have
a signicant infrastructure deployment and implementation cost. As ERTMS is an evolving
standard, new Safety Features should be phased in as part of new baseline standards which
are then backported to the lower level implementations during ratication.
Alternative MAC schemes exist and, in this section, AES and HMAC-based MAC schemes
are also considered, where eciency and, more importantly, longevity are a consideration.
Any proposed MAC changes should be quantum-resistant to prevent key recovery in a ‘post-
quantum’ world. A study of possible alternative MAC schemes was also undertaken, using
the same collision detection code, but with dierent MAC algorithms. Where the key size was
too short for the proposed alternatives, the same prex was used and the keys extended with
distinctly dierent bits. The computations were timed to measure their relative performance
against the current EuroRadio MAC, and the results given in Table 5.3. We include a ‘patched’
version of the EuroRadio MAC algorithm that has a 3DES transformation in the rst block,
which would prevent this collision attack.






(current) 10276.89 - ×
3DES Patch 13155.26 28% slower ×
AES-256-CBC
MAC 8589.98 12% faster X
HMAC-SHA-256 4558.64 55% faster X
Table 5.3: Assessment of the performance impact of using dierent MAC Algorithms. These
Algorithms are also assessed for Quantum Computer Resistance (QCR).
This table demonstrates that, using a DES-based cipher, has a signicant eect on the time
to generate a corresponding MAC compared to the suggested alternatives. It should be noted,
however, that these theoretical performance improvements may not directly map to the real
world in terms of functionality improvements. To give perspective to what these improve-
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ments achieve in terms of time, the train’s stopping distance is not signicantly aected by
changing the MAC algorithm. Under the current scheme, a train travelling at 200km/h would
travel 0.05cm in the time taken to validate the MAC. The improvement in the time to compute
a MAC, therefore, has a minimal eect in terms of the physical distance travelled.
Finally, if the opportunity arose that the ERTMS specications allowed the EuroRadio and
Application Layer protocols to be merged, each with its own set of individual defences, they
may be combined into a unied layer providing the same guarantees as before, specically
authenticity, integrity and replay protection. This, though, is the most prohibitive change,
requiring signicant changes to the standards and subsequent impacts on the supply chain
and ERTMS users.
5.10 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have reviewed and analysed the EuroRadio MAC algorithm, used to se-
cure communications between trains and trackside systems by providing guarantees of the
authenticity and integrity of messages. In the wider context of ERTMS, EuroRadio also has
safety-critical responsibilities and any security aws could have an impact on the safe op-
eration of railways. By assessing each layer, it is possible to leverage weaknesses that exist
within each layer to develop this novel key recovery attack and exploit cryptographic weak-
nesses that exist in EuroRadio. Combining this with a weakness that exists in the Application
Layer protocol, the attacker could then reliably forge their own Movement Authority mes-
sages with corresponding valid MACs. These would be accepted by both the EuroRadio and
Application Layers and accepted by the train, potentially placing it in an unsafe situation.
Finding an attack vector is only one concern, as all of the recommended solutions to min-
imise exposure require changes to be made, in varying degrees, to the standards. Some re-
quire minimal changes which leverage existing functionality in ERTMS, for example, forcing
the renegotiation of session keys after a specied time period, whilst others involve signi-
5.10. Chapter Summary 114
cant change, such as consolidating the EuroRadio and Application Layers into one, cohesive,
security-service protocol. What has been made evident by the work presented in this chapter
and Chapter 4 is the need to consider an evolving attacker model and their evolving capabili-
ties. This will form a key part of inuencing proposed improvements to the ERTMS standards
as we will explore in Chapter 6.
Part II




Key Management for the Future of ERTMS
This thesis has, thus far, shown that the ERTMS standards have remained largely unchanged
in terms of security and not been updated to reect the capability of today’s adversaries. The
absence of formal assurance of both protocols and cryptography highlights signicant issues in
a standard that is currently deployed internationally. In Chapter 4, we explored the application
of cryptography in ERTMS to negotiate a secure session key and validate that each party was
authentic whilst, in Chapter 5, weaknesses were found in the cryptography. What has not yet
been explored, however, is how these cryptographic keys are deployed and maintained and
consider what changes can be made to secure the ERTMS architecture.
Key management in ERTMS is entirely ‘home-grown’, specied in its own set of stan-
dards [142, 143], as explored in the previous two chapters, and has not been subjected to
sucient, detailed, analysis to provide assurances for the future. In this chapter we will, there-
fore, complete this analysis of key management in ERTMS, identify its issues and weaknesses
and propose improvements which guarantee a secure architecture for the platform, especially




As we reviewed in previous chapters, the Application Layer provides little assurance of the au-
thenticity of messages. Rather, its only purpose is to ensure messages are correctly formatted
and received in a timely, ordered fashion. The EuroRadio layer provides these guarantees to
validate the message sender and its integrity through a MAC, as explored in Chapter 5. How
this MAC is keyed depends on the EuroRadio handshake protocol, as analysed in Chapter 4,
which authenticates the train and RBC using a key only they share. It then uses that key and
two exchanged nonces to derive a session key, which is then used to generate the MAC for
messages sent between the train and RBC. This MAC, as demonstrated in this thesis, has been
shown to be weak. The fact that the same base cipher (3DES) is also core to the ERTMS key
management process is also of concern.
A number of issues exist within the current form of the key management standard. In
particular, there is a signicant responsibility imposed on the Infrastructure Managers to pro-
vision and maintain cryptographic keys both at home and across borders. To alleviate part
of this burden, a proposed online version of the standard is under consideration but this does
not consider the lifespan of ERTMS as a platform. The reliance on public-key cryptography in
this online proposal, whilst considered secure now, will not be in the future when faced with
a quantum-capable adversary.
Industrial Control System (ICS) environments are designed with the purpose of having a
long lifespan as a core fundamental feature. Therefore, any solutions proposed for these sys-
tems should take into account issues such as post-quantum security, where quantum comput-
ers could render some of the current encryption schemes in use, for example, RSA public-key
cryptography, insecure. Whilst there are eorts by The National Institute for Standards and
Technology (NIST) and The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) to stan-
dardise post-quantum public-key cryptography, the timescales we understand to deliver the
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recommended standards and ratify them exceeds the intended start of Great Britain’s national
deployment of ERTMS. However, progressive deployments, for example, Crossrail in London
and the East Coast Main Line are expected to be ERTMS-ready by 2021. Parts of the Thames-
link capacity upgrade also included the deployment of ERTMS Level 2 with Automatic Train
Operation (ATO) in 2017 where Network Rail, the UK Rail Infrastructure Manager, is also
taking the opportunity to carry out major resignalling programmes by deploying ERTMS.
As key management is a core part of the secure architecture for ERTMS, if the management
of keys is insecure, or is unable to cope with the future capabilities of adversaries in its lifespan,
it is essential to consider solutions which could prevent future exploitation. These solutions
would, however, for the purposes of integration by industry bodies, have a number of specic
requirements placed upon them. Without meeting them, any proposals would have limited
acceptance and there is the likelihood of a ‘do-nothing’ approach.
6.2 Contributions
In this chapter, we will review the existing ERTMS key management scheme and its proposed
online variant, highlighting the potential issues and the lack of scalability oered by both stan-
dards. One fundamental contribution of the work covered in this chapter is a new proposed
key management scheme, TRAKS, the Train and RBC Authenticated Key Scheme, which aims
to reduce the complexity of managing cryptographic keys within both geographic domains
and cross-border operations, reducing the risk of introducing potentially insecure practices.
From the outset, TRAKS has been formulated to enable the secure generation of message
authentication keys between train and trackside. As its application is unied in ERTMS, it can
also be applied to other environments, such as the authentication of balise payloads. Using
dynamic key generation, Pseudo-random Functions (PRFs) and a shared secret would result
in a signicant reduction in the overhead of deploying cryptographic keys. Specically, RBCs
would be given a single, long-term, key for derivation, rather than a potentially large number
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of keys for trains with which they may interact.
We have previously mentioned the motivation for this work and, in Chapter 1, we noted
that the lifespan of ERTMS is signicantly longer than most systems – in the order of 30-
50 years. As a result, any critical elements which are part of the secure architecture of the
platform need to either provide security for the future or allow exibility, such that there is
interchangeability of components to ensure future security. Backwards-compatibility is also
a necessity to minimise the implementation overheads for operators who have currently de-
ployed ERTMS. TRAKS uses symmetric cryptography, designed such that it is fully backwards-
compatible with the current ERTMS scheme, allowing phased deployment. It also, through the
use of post-quantum secure PRFs, introduces longevity to the scheme, where we demonstrate
that TRAKS is at least as secure as the current standard. However, TRAKS provides the addi-
tional benets of post-quantum security, scalability, extensibility and improved cross-border
operation, all of which are limitations or omissions of the current ERTMS scheme.
In this chapter, we will provide an intuition into the current key management scheme,
how it operates and its shortcomings and create a generic formalism to compare to TRAKS.
Using this formalism, we will assess the security of both schemes, review the key management
lifecycle and distribution and complete case studies of applications for TRAKS within ERTMS.
6.3 Background
Currently, the ERTMS standard [140] requires key management and provisioning to be carried
out based on geographic domains, where each domain has its own Key Management Centre
(KMC), responsible for the generation and management of cryptographic keys for all ERTMS
entities in that domain. The KMC also denes the procedures and policies by which keys are
installed on trains (also known as On-Board Units (OBUs)) and RBCs. Throughout this chapter,
the terms train and OBU will be used interchangeably, so that we have a direct reference to the
standards, such that comparisons between the ERTMS schemes and TRAKS may more easily
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be drawn.
For a new OBU or RBC to be introduced to the network, the keys for these entities are
generated by the KMCs following a key management request, typically from the vendor (e.g.
Siemens, Bombardier or Alstom) and are then installed (in the clear) on the ‘requesting’ OBU/RBC
through portable media (e.g. USB storage) [142]. This process is, however, inecient and in-
secure. The use of portable media signicantly increases the risk of compromise of the cryp-
tographic keys, thus removing the need for the attacker to recover the rst key used in the
MAC algorithm to forge their own message and MAC as shown in Chapter 5. The transport
keys (the keys installed on the train when ‘born’) are installed in plaintext and future keys,
whilst encrypted, are not protected. Additionally, the storage devices on which the keys are
stored may not oer protection against unauthorised access to that data. The provisioning and
management of ERTMS keys is also inecient, for example, updating a key on a RBC would
require physical access by an engineer to install the key from the portable media.
In researching the real-world application of ERTMS key management, informal discussions
with Rail Infrastructure Managers highlighted that, due to nancial and logistical constraints,
insecure strategies may become commonplace. Typical examples found were provisioning all
(OBU, RBC) key pairs to each OBU and RBC (essentially removing the unique pairing between
a train and RBC) or, alternatively, using the KMC to extend the lifetime of keys when they
are due to expire, given the eort required to replace keys nationwide. In Great Britain, RSSB
guidance suggests that keys may have their lifetimes innitely extended [123], a potentially
insecure practice. Cross-border operation of trains is also impacted, as the train keys need to
be shared across geographic domains, managed by dierent KMCs. For these foreign KMC
operators (the KMC operators who are outside of the ‘home domain’ in which a train is regis-
tered), there is a signicant burden placed on them by the current version of the standard. For
each new OBU to operate in their domain, they have to carry out the key provisioning process
and also distribute them to the ‘home’ KMC for installation. What is subtle in the standards
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[142] is that the foreign KMC operator will need to generate keys for that train and dispatch
an engineer to install keys on every RBC with which the train may need to communicate. As
a typical example, let us consider the Thalys PBKA analogy from Chapter 1. This train passes
through France, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, thus requiring the involvement of
four KMC operators, with four sets of key provisioning and distribution activities taking place
for a single train to operate. If, say, the United Kingdom was to operate an increased num-
ber of trains through to mainland Europe, this burden would increase. The current scheme
also impedes cross-border operation through the logistical burden of provisioning keys by the
foreign KMC operator.
Additionally, the current scheme relies on the security of 3DES which, as we have consid-
ered in Chapter 5, is only recommended for use through to 2030 1. With the lifespan of ERTMS
expected to go well beyond 2030 it should, therefore, be replaced with an alternative scheme
which will be secure throughout its lifespan. We also note, in the case of the EuroBalise, that
Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) encoding is used to validate the integrity, but not the au-
thenticity of payloads, presented by the balise [139]. A unied solution which brings balises
into the secure architecture would ‘close the loop’, given the level of trust that is placed on the
balise.
ERTMS key management is dened in two standards, one oine [142] and a proposed on-
line scheme [143] which forms part of the developing Baseline Level 3 standards. Introduced
in the online variant is a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), where certicates and keys are is-
sued to trains and RBCs, which can then be used to communicate with the KMC. This places
assumptions on GSM-R (for trains) that it has sucient capacity and bandwidth to handle
trains polling for new and updated keys and, to meet a requirement of the PKI variant, the
Infrastructure Manager has rolled out GPRS support across the entire network. Importantly,
support for GPRS over GSM-R is not currently widely available, nor is it a feasible solution.
1https://www.keylength.com/en/3/
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This change would not only be disruptive to operations, but its management for cross-border
operation would also place additional load on operators through the requirement for a regular
polling and update cycle.
The only dierence we can see between the oine and proposed schemes is that engineers
would not need to interface with trains and RBCs after their initial commissioning, with the
exception of out-of-band maintenance. As the key hierarchy remains the same, the proposed
online solution, using RSA certicates, is one that would be insecure in the future, in a post-
quantum world.
As discussed in depth in Chapter 3, we observed how a number of solutions have been
proposed by both industry and academia (e.g. the Advanced Access Content System (AACS)
scheme) but have limited applicability in the real world, placing functional requirements rst
and foremost. Security, consequently, takes a less important role to alleviate the strains on the
Infrastructure Managers.
In this chapter, we will further consider the industry requirements and what would be
necessary to include key management in the secure architecture for ERTMS and propose a
new solution, TRAKS, for the future.
6.4 Overviewof ERTMSandTRAKSKeyManagement and
Generation
In this section, we will analyse how key management and generation takes place in ERTMS,
introducing common terms and language which we will then use to compare the existing
standards to TRAKS.
6.4.1 ERTMS Key Management
As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, long-term keys are installed on RBCs and trains (OBUs) and
are used to derive session keys through exchanged nonces during the EuroRadio handshake
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protocol [140]. This negotiated session key is then used in all future messages between the
OBU and RBC as a MAC key to ensure the authenticity and integrity of messages between the
train and trackside. These unique long-term keys are allocated by the Infrastructure Manager
for each OBU-RBC pair and are randomly generated by the KMC which then encrypts and
MACs these keys (Figure 6.1). However, this process, as previously highlighted, is due to
change under proposed modications to the standard as part of ETCS Level 3. The main change
is that a PKI is introduced, allowing the trains and RBCs to communicate directly to the KMC
over TCP/IP. In the case of RBCs, this is achieved via a pre-existing xed network, where trains
are expected to use GPRS over their GSM-R datalinks to poll for changes.
ERTMS Entities Handshake MAC Encryption
OBU↔ RBC KMAC KSMAC ×
RBC↔ RBC KMAC KSMAC ×
KMC↔ RBC/OBU × kt1 kt2
KMC↔ KMC × K-KMC1 K-KMC2
Figure 6.1: The current ERTMS Key Management Hierarchy [141], showing the specic keys
(in the notation used in this chapter) that are used between ERTMS entities for specic appli-
cations, including EuroRadio Handshakes, Message Authentication and Encryption.
ERTMS Keys Current TRAKS
NID_C (Line) Secret × knid_c
RBC Derivation Key × kmrid,null
Train Key KMACr id,oid kmrid,oid
Balise Secret × km
Balise NID_C Area Key × kmNID_C,null
Balise MAC Key × kmNID_C,bдid
Figure 6.2: The proposed Key Management Hierarchy under TRAKS. As an example, a train
with OBU ID 7, communicating with a RBC with ID 3 would have the key kmrid3,oid7. Balise
MAC keys are bound by the NID_C in which they are located and their unique balise group ID,
bдid .
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6.4.2 Issues with the ERTMS Schemes and Comparison with TRAKS
Both the existing oine and proposed online ERTMS schemes (including those implemented
by National Infrastructure Managers outside of the current standard) carry signicant opera-
tional overheads and present a security exposure given the potential to arbitrarily extend the
lifespan and validity of the key. In TRAKS, backwards-compatibility is maintained, allowing
the KMC to issue keys until such a time that the RBC can be updated to support dynamic
key generation. This reduces the operational overheads on national KMC operators, enabling
more ecient cross-border operations and interoperability. It also reduces the requirement
of home and foreign Infrastructure Managers to deploy engineers into the eld, visiting each
and every RBC to install keys for each new OBU commissioned.
As established in the previous section, EuroBalises (EBs) do not have any means of authen-
ticating their payload and can only guarantee their integrity, which are two distinctly dierent
sets of guarantees. Balises are implicitly trusted to provide accurate location and data refer-
ences but, without a trust anchor to guarantee this, it would be possible for an attacker to
impersonate such a device. TRAKS, however, as described in this chapter, can be extended to
include balises within its scope. Figure 6.2 highlights the key dierences between the current
ERTMS scheme and TRAKS.
Let us now consider some of the ‘building blocks’, requirements, denitions and security
principles that will be applied and factor in the development of TRAKS:
SecurityRequirements. A review of the existing key management scheme in ERTMS shows
that an implicit permissions model exists, where a EuroRadio session cannot be established if
there is no cryptographic relationship between two entities, id and id′. This arises because
no key exists (kmid,id ′) between these two entities. Contextually, having no cryptographic re-
lationship and requiring some form of approval to operate in a given area can be seen as a
benet, as it means that a train cannot carry out a EuroRadio handshake with a RBC with
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which it is not authorised to communicate. As stated in Chapter 4, one attack EuroRadio can-
not prevent is relay attacks, where the train’s GSM-R connection is re-routed to a RBC located
outside of the region. Without this permissions model (assuming for operational simplicity
that all keys have been installed), the train would be able to complete the EuroRadio hand-
shake and be given the command to move forward until it has reached the next balise and
is able to provide its location. The eect of this could place the train in a potentially unsafe
situation.
Informal Attacker Model. In the development of TRAKS, we investigate the impact of
attackers who have capabilities including the insertion of keys, interception of keys between
the KMC and train, and also the interception of keys between the KMC and RBC.
If an attacker was able to insert their own keys onto a train or RBC, a state of dissociation
could be created between what the KMC asserts should be installed on the train and RBC as
the set of installed keys, and what is actually installed on the train and RBC. Currently, it is
not clear in the ERTMS standards how entities handle the event where an attacker might try
to replace an existing key with their own, using the insertion commands.
Key interception is also a signicant concern. Once ‘transport keys’, a pair of keys to
authenticate and encrypt the OBU-RBC keys in transit from the KMC to the train and RBC,
have been installed, the attacker is unable to recover and establish the kmid,id ′ keys unless
they know the appropriate encryption and authentication keys. Whilst this appears to be a
sensible scheme, as the transport keys are transported and installed on the train and RBCs in
plaintext, an attacker intercepting those transport keys during commissioning would be able
to intercept all future keys successfully.
In order to assess the security of both the existing and proposed schemes, in addition to
TRAKS, we must therefore consider an attacker from the Dolev-Yao model, one who operates
in polynomial time and is able to observe all communications between the KMC and any train
and RBC. Additionally, the attacker can also send arbitrary messages to any party, delaying,
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modifying or deleting messages from being sent and received between parties. Any proposed
solution for such a critical part of ERTMS should consider and address the capabilities of such
an attacker.
ERTMS System Parameters. In the ERTMS System Specications [56], identity variables,
known as NID_C, are assigned to specic ‘zones’ of operation, which have varying scopes.
These scopes can be as granular as a particular line in a country to the entire country itself.
The European Rail Agency (ERA) centrally assigns the values for these variables from a pool of
available values [56]. Within TRAKS, we can leverage these variables to dene a permissions
model of where a train can operate, rather than relying on the direct pairing relationship
between the train and RBC that the current scheme employs, implicitly giving us the desired
permissions model.
As we will explain in further detail later in this chapter, the Infrastructure Manager is
responsible for generating a set of derived keys which are allocated to the RBCs that operate
in a specic area, identied by a specic, unique, NID_C. What we must consider, however,
is that it may take considerable time to phase in the full capability of dynamic generation
and derivation of keys on a national basis for RBCs. To simplify this issue, the Infrastructure
Manager could carry out the same functions that the RBC would, specically computing the
RBC key and then applying it to the set of train IDs that are authorised to operate in that given
NID_C. For completeness, the RBC and train IDs are allocated by the Infrastructure Manager
from an ERTMS identity database for that domain, hereafter known as EDB. Through the pre-
computation of these keys, the Infrastructure Manager has a set of keys which are backwards-
compatible with the existing ERTMS scheme, but are TRAKS-ready. In Section 6.4.3, we will
consider a high-level hierarchy under TRAKS.
One of the benets of using TRAKS is that, for National Infrastructure Managers, the time
taken to provision the necessary keys for cross-border operation is signicantly reduced, as
the pre-requisite step to install keys onto all RBCs with which the train would interact would
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no longer be required. This is because, in the rst message of the EuroRadio handshake, the
train announces its identity to the RBC, which it can then use to derive the appropriate key
required to proceed. Through this, we enforce our permissions model through partitioning of
the rail network. Keys are not, therefore, unnecessarily issued and can be managed in a more
controlled manner, with operational zones precisely dened and supervised. One further aw
that exists in the current scheme arises when train eets are moved across franchises and zones
(e.g. the Class 172 Bombardier Turbostar units currently operated by Transport for London
on the London Overground will soon move to the new West Midlands Railway Franchise)
which would require a new provisioning run for each train, with an engineer visiting all RBCs
and trains in the new area to install the new requisite keys. Under TRAKS, however, this
is simply managed between the KMC and the train, without any requirement for interaction
with the RBC, as it can simply derive the appropriate key to use. Additionally, this enables key
management operations to be allocated to maintenance periods, for example when the train
is stabled or in a depot.
Dening the Current ERTMS Key Distribution Scheme. The current method of key
distribution in ERTMS is a manual process, where keys are generated by the KMC and then
distributed, as required, in response to a valid request. These keys are then accompanied with
a separate MAC and encrypted using pre-shared symmetric keys, known as transport keys. It
is important to note, however, that during the initial commissioning of a train or RBC (i.e.
where no transport keys are installed), these keys between the KMC, train and RBC are in
cleartext. Should the transport media be compromised (whether it is a USB storage device,
CD or smartcard) it would therefore allow an attacker to intercept and record the keys and all
future keys issued by the KMC. The impact of this, as previously highlighted in this chapter, is
that the attacker would no longer need to recoverk1 using the attack presented in Chapter 5, as
they have full control of all keys and can forge their own valid MACs for a specic train without
having to wait for a MAC collision. Moreover, under the current scheme, if they target a RBC
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during commissioning, they would have the ability to control a potentially large number of
trains. To address this, by leveraging TRAKS, we can consider a new key distribution scheme
which removes this attack vector. Trains and RBCs would, instead, be allowed to generate
their own transport keys in such a way that an attacker would require knowledge of the keys
in order to obtain any keying material. Furthermore, as we will see in Section 6.9, a new
level of control is also introduced in TRAKS, where a shared key exists between the KMC and
approved vendors, used only for vendor-KMC interactions. The expectation here is that trains
and RBCs will have their own burnt-in key pair, installed by the vendor, which can be used
for train/RBC-vendor commissioning.
Prior to comparing the current ERTMS scheme to TRAKS, we need to dene a framework
for ERTMS key generation, outlining the functions performed by the KMC. Using this outline
denition, we can create a model of the current scheme (Algorithm 1) and TRAKS (Algo-
rithm 2). Using these, we are able to prove the security of these mathematical models against
an attacker, giving us condence that the proposed solution in TRAKS does not compromise
the security of ERTMS.
Denition 6.1 (ERTMS Generation Scheme) An ERTMS key generation scheme KMAC =
(SGen, INIT.ID,GEN.KMAC)with an ERTMS Identity database EDB is a tuple of three polynomial-
time algorithms:
knid_c ← SGen(1λ) : is a probabilistic key generation algorithm run by the KMC. It takes, as
its input, a security parameter λ and outputs a random value, s , of length λ.
IDt ← INIT.ID(EDB, t ) : is a deterministic algorithm run by the KMC to retrieve a set of ids
from an ERTMS database. It takes, as its input, a database EDB and an ERTMS entity
type t (e.g. train/RBC) and outputs the set of ids corresponding to t . In the current
ERTMS Standard, t ∈ {OBU ,RBC,EB}.
kmid,id ′ ← GEN.KMAC(id, id′,knid_c) : is an algorithm run by the KMC to generate a MAC
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derivation key. It takes, as its input, two ids id ∈ IDt and id′ ∈ IDt ′ , and a secret knid_c ,
and outputs the key kmid,id ′ which is used to authenticate communications between id
and id′.
6.4.3 TRAKS Application Worked Example
Let us now consider a high-level hierarchy of ERTMS key management under TRAKS as shown
in Figure 6.3. For key management operations that span across borders (e.g. to allow a train
in the GB domain, managed by Network Rail, to operate in the FR domain, managed by SNCF
Réseau), the operations required to provision keys remain unchanged, where a symmetric pair
of keys, one for encryption and the other for authenticating payloads, is shared between KMCs.
What is dierent, when comparing this to the existing ERTMS scheme, is that an intermediary
level is introduced, leveraging NID_C, where keys at this level are denoted, using Figure 6.3, as
knid_cx , where x is the identity value of the region (i.e. NID_C) for operations. As a reminder,
NID_C is an allocated ERTMS variable that diers in granularity, either referencing a specic
line, region, or entire country. For each NID_C, a unique secret key is allocated, mapping the
NID_C to its given line secret.
In any given line or region, there may be more than one RBC – in Figure 6.3, as an example,
the region represented as NID_C1 has only one RBC, but NID_C2 has two RBCs in its area of
scope. Using the line secret, knid_cx and the RBC identity, the RBC keys can be established.
In this Figure, we have two trains, each of which are authorised to operate over two NID_C
regions. Using Denition 6.1, we input the identities of the two trains and the KMC will
allocate the keys required for those OBUs. For the RBC, however, only the single derivation
function is required to establish the keys.
As a detailed example, let us consider the national domain dened by Figure 6.3. This
domain has 4 NID_C regions and 6 RBCs. For each NID_C in this domain, which have allocated
NID_C identities of 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively, the KMC will generate a line secret (based on
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Figure 6.3: Proposed TRAKS Key Hierarchy for ERTMS. TRAKS is composed of four layers:
(1) the National Key Management Centre for the ‘home domain’, responsible for liaising with
foreign KMCs for cross-border operations. (2) Geographic regions within a country, identied
as NID_C. (3) RBCs, responsible for sending command and control messages to trains. (4)
Trains, which may operate across one or more NID_C regions.
a function which produces random output, for example, using a Hardware Security Module
(HSM)), for each region. The KMC then stores the outputs of this function (i.e. the line secret)
knid_c1, . . . ,knid_c4. For the RBCs in each region, the KMC will use the line secret for that
given NID_C and compute the individual key for that RBC by combining the ID of the RBC with
the line secret. The specic detail of how these keys are computed is given in Section 6.10.
For RBC2 and RBC3 as shown in Figure 6.3, the KMC will use the line secret for NID_C2,
that is knidc2, and compute the individual RBC keys based on the identities of RBC2 and RBC3,
rid2 and rid3 respectively, producing two keys, kmrid2,null and kmrid3,null . These are the keys
that will be installed on each RBC respectively and allow it to carry out the appropriate key
derivations.
Where train keys are requested, the KMC will determine the specic RBCs for which a key
is required and, for each of these RBCs, will derive the corresponding RBC key, outputting a
key which is the result of applying the train ID to the RBC key using
GEN.KMAC(rid,oid,knid_cx ). The result of this process is a key which uniquely pairs a spe-
cic OBU to a RBC, for installation on the OBU. During the EuroRadio handshake, the rst
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message contains the train ID, which the RBC uses to compute the key it requires by taking
its own RBC key and applying the train ID to it. As an example, for Train1, with identity oid1,
operating in NID_Cs 1 and 2, the KMC will allocate all the necessary keys it requires to com-
municate with the RBCs in that area. Specically, the train will have kmrid1,oid1, kmrid2,oid1 and
kmrid3,oid1 installed.
For the rest of this chapter, we will formalise the denition of the TRAKS scheme and its
suitability, highlighting its applicability and possible areas of implementation. In Section 6.5,
we will formally dene the current ERTMS key management scheme, before dening the
TRAKS scheme in Section 6.6. Here, we will review the security requirements and attacker
model that TRAKS must consider, before dening the key lifecycle. Using these formal deni-
tions, we can prove the security of the current key management scheme compared to TRAKS.
6.5 Oline ERTMS Key Generation
In this section, we will review the current, oine, ERTMS key generation scheme in more
detail. The key provisioning process during commissioning of systems begins with the ven-
dor/system builder (e.g. Siemens, Alstom or Bombardier) of an ERTMS entity (e.g. OBU/RBC)
making a formal request for an identity (ETCS ID) to be allocated from the central pool of
values held by the ERA. This is followed by a request to the KMC for the appropriate keying
material to be established.
The KMC, upon receipt of the request, will generate and issue two transport keys, kt1 and
kt2, used for authentication and encryption respectively. These keys are then returned to the
vendor for installation, in the clear, on portable media devices [142] on the intended entity.
When the transport keys, kt1 and kt2, have been successfully installed, the KMC will then
proceed to generate unique keys for each train and RBC pair (as dened in the request from
the vendor), identied by their identities oid and rid respectively. To ensure messages can be
successfully authenticated within the EuroRadio protocol, each entity will receive a collection
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of these keys. In the ERTMS standard, these are referred to as KMAC keys. The set of keys
provisioned to both the OBUs and RBCs will be denoted as KM . KM , itself, can be initially
empty (in the case of a new train or RBC being ‘born’), but will have keys added later as the
train is authorised to communicate with the relevant, appropriate, RBCs and vice-versa.
We can consider an algorithm that captures this generation process for the
GEN.KMAC(id, id′,knid_c) function from Denition 6.1, as shown in Algorithm 1. In this
algorithm, two inputs are given, id and id′, which correspond to the identities of the two
entities authorised to communicate with one another. The output of this algorithm is kmid,id ′ ,
a randomly-generated 3DES key which is used for message and party authentication in the
rst steps of the EuroRadio protocol. As an example, for a train with ID oid and a RBC with
ID rid , the key generated would be kmrid,oid ← SGen(1λ).
Algorithm 1: Oine ERTMS Key Generation
Input: id, id′
Output: kmid,id ′
1 function GEN.KMAC(id, id′,null )
2 kmid,id ′ ← SGen(1λ)
3 return kmid,id ′
This algorithm shows that, under ideal conditions, as specied in the standard, for any
given pair of identities, a completely random key should be generated. Let us now consider a
scheme which is more dynamic and intelligent.
6.6 TRAKS - A Unied ERTMS Key Management Scheme
In the previous section, we observed how keys were statically generated and that, in larger
quantities, this places a signicant maintenance burden on the Infrastructure Manager. In
this section, we will explore the TRAKS proposal, a more ecient key generation scheme
for ERTMS. In this scheme, we can leverage the existing partitioning of the rail network into
individual control zones, denoted by a national identier. This national identier is already
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announced to the train by EuroBalises as part of the location report. Under this partitioning
scheme, an explicit permissions model is enforced, ensuring that trains cannot start EuroRadio
sessions and operate outside of their agreed areas of operation. TRAKS builds on the oine
ERTMS scheme by allowing dynamic key generation for RBCs, removing the obstacles that
impede cross-border interoperability and maintaining the notion of static key provisioning for
trains. The benet of TRAKS is maximum backwards compatibility with the current standards
and key management practices, allowing a phased-in introduction.
In this section, we will also highlight how EuroBalises can eectively be introduced into
this notion of a secure architecture, by extending the OBU-RBC authentication scheme to
include OBU-EuroBalise authentication. TRAKS is therefore a universally applicable scheme
for any rail entity.
6.6.1 Line Secret Generation
As highlighted in Figure 6.3, for a given country, it is possible for there to be one or more
dened regions of operation. Each region is identied through a public value, NID_Ci for a
region with NID_C value i . As a real-world example, the Cambrian Line in Wales (190km) has
a NID_C of 1, whereas a country such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has a single
NID_C, 882, covering all its 1,200km of track [56]. For each given NID_Ci , the KMC will gen-
erate a random secret, knid_ci . The KMC can, therefore, generate multiple secrets in order
to partition the rail network into the dened geographic zones. Alternatively, it can also be
used to establish trust between entity types, e.g. keys between OBUs and RBCs in the zone
represented by NID_C1 would be generated using knid_c1 and for zone NID_C2, knid_c2 would
be used for key generation.
The generation of the TRAKS shared line secret is similar to the current ERTMS key gen-
eration process, where
knid_ci ← SGen(1λ)
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and SGen(1λ) is a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) with the security parameter λ.
However, unlike the oine ERTMS scheme, this secret key is never revealed outside of the
KMC to the OBUs or RBCs. This secret is, instead, used together with the identities of the
appropriate parties (e.g. RBCs and OBUs) to generate the message authentication keys. By
taking this approach, we signicantly enhance the usability of the scheme and reduce the
overall management overhead (i.e. secret key material storage, distribution and disposal). In
reality, the storage saving is in the order of megabytes whilst the eect of key accessibility has
a more profound and signicant benet.
Let us now dene, in detail, how this secret is used to generate the authentication keys for
each ERTMS entity.
6.6.2 TRAKS Key Generation
In Algorithm 2, we observe how keys are generated under the TRAKS scheme, using knid_c
and the identities of the communicating ERTMS entities.
Algorithm 2: TRAKS Key Generation
Input: id, id′, s
Output: kmid,id ′
1 function GEN.KMAC(id, id′, s)
/* computing keys using s = knid_c (line secret) */
2 if id 6= null then
3 kmid,id ′ ← PRF (id, s);
/* computing train keys for a particular RBC */
4 if id′ 6= null then
5 kmid,id ′ ← PRF (id′,kmid,id ′);
/* computing OBU-RBC keys using s = kmrid,null */
6 else if id = null then
7 kmid,id ′ ← PRF (id′, s);
8 return kmid,id ′
This algorithm can be used to generate both static keys, which can be used to directly au-
thenticate a set of messages between two entities, with identities id and id′, and also generate
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dynamic keys which can be combined by the respective entities with any given id′ to derive a
static key. We will now apply these concepts directly using the TRAKS scheme to show how
keys can be generated for OBUs, RBCs and EBs.
OBU (Train) Key Generation. OBU keys are static and are generated by the KMC. Similar
to the oine ERTMS scheme, the train, identied by its identity, oid , is authorised to operate
on a specic line when provisioned with a set of keys KM = {kmrid1,oid ,kmrid2,oid , . . . ,
kmridn,oid}, where rid1, . . . , ridn are the identities of the RBCs responsible for that area of
control.
Each kmridi,oid key is computed using the GEN.KMAC(ridi,oid,knid_c) function, as de-
tailed in Algorithm 2. In the rst step of the key generation process, the line secret key,
knid_c is combined with the RBC’s identity, ridi using a PRF which generates an interme-
diary pseudo-random value (as shown in line 3 of the algorithm). Using this intermediary key,
we subsequently combine it with the OBU identity, oid , using the same PRF as given in line 5
of the algorithm, to produce the nal kmridi,oid key.
The explicit PRF used has specically been omitted from this recommendation as any se-
cure, non-malleable function may be used, provided it has been proven secure against length-
extension attacks. Example functions which meet this criteria include HMAC-SHA-256 and
AES-CMAC, a view also shared by Ferguson et al. [63]. It should be noted that, up to this
point, the TRAKS scheme has been shown to be fully backwards-compatible with the existing
scheme, as key management onboard the train remains unchanged. We will now explore the
extensions oered by TRAKS which signicantly improve ERTMS key management.
RBC Key Generation. Under TRAKS, the way train keys are managed remains broadly
similar to the existing scheme. However, for RBCs, their keys are dynamically provisioned
compared to trains. This means that RBCs are able to produce the necessary keys for the
EuroRadio handshake with any train, upon receipt of their OBU identity. This identity is
provided to the RBC during the rst EuroRadio handshake message, where the train is required
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to announce its oid to the RBC. By taking this approach, TRAKS can seamlessly replace the
existing ERTMS scheme with only minor software changes to the RBC to enable support for
dynamic key generation.
As shown in Algorithm 2, we are also able to generate RBC keys. However, unlike a train,
which is provisioned with a set of keys, the RBCs will only be provided with a single key,
kmrid,null . This key is generated by the KMC via the GEN.KMAC(rid,null ,knid_c) function,
where rid is the identity of the specic RBC. This is the same key generated in line 3 of the
algorithm which is used as an intermediary key for OBU keys. For any broadcast oid in the rst
EuroRadio message, the RBC can use the kmrid,null key to generate the message authentication
key kmrid,oid through the GEN.KMAC(null ,oid,kmrid,null ) function.
From this, we can observe that the generated kmrid,oid key, based on the line secret key
knid_c, can be used to enforce an explicit permissions model for operations. Any OBU and
RBC capable of completing the EuroRadio handshake must have been explicitly approved to
operate in a given NID_C. In comparison, the current scheme denes this implicitly (i.e. keys
which uniquely pair a train to a RBC exist, but may be provisioned on a large scale), which
may be violated with no known means of prevention (e.g. relaying).
EuroBalise Key Generation. As previously highlighted in this chapter, TRAKS improves
the current key management scheme by adopting capabilities available today without mod-
ications to generate these authentication keys. As a scheme, it oers exibility, allowing
authentication between other entities, such as EuroBalises. It is worth noting, however, that,
whilst EuroBalises are given as an example in this section of the extended functionality through
the application of TRAKS, this notion of universal key management can be extended to other,
possibly not yet developed/ratied, entities.
Currently, EuroBalises oer no cryptographic means of protecting their payloads and guar-
anteeing authenticity and are implicitly trusted by the train for the accuracy and validity of
this data [139]. One critical packet the EuroBalise can announce is the so-called ‘Packet 44’,
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used to provide specic information about nationally-dened applications outside of ERTMS.
As an example, in Great Britain, one active use for Packet 44 is the Tilting Authorisation and
Speed Supervision (TASS) beacon [119], used on the West Coast Main Line (WCML) as a means
of authority to allow trains to tilt on sections of track. It is therefore possible for an attacker
to attempt to impersonate a real balise and change the parameters of the TASS authority as
there is no cryptographic mechanism that would prevent this.
Under TRAKS, the process for generating the unique authentication keys for a balise is
similar to that used to generate the keys for the OBU-RBC pairs. The KMC generates a balise-
specic shared secret, kbls ← SGen(1λ), ensuring that the shared keys between EuroBalises
and the OBUs are completely separate from the ones shared between OBUs and RBCs, used
within EuroRadio. Furthermore, the keys are generated by each KMC responsible for the
country in which the balises are located. As EuroBalises do not have any computational ca-
pabilities, they are unable to carry out any operations on their data, as their payloads are
xed. To overcome this restriction, the EuroBalise payload can be provisioned with their xed
messages concatenated with the corresponding MAC, which is then read and validated by the
train. The MAC itself is computed using a static authentication key, generated through the
GEN.KMAC(NID_C,bдidi,kbls) function for every balise group, bдidi, located within some
NID_C. A balise group is a collection of balises which are concentrated in a specic geographic
area, typically in pairs, communicating the same ‘telegram’. To simplify the deployment of
EuroBalise MACs, balise group IDs are used instead of the individual balise identity. Alterna-
tively, the balise group ID could be replaced with the balise ID. This is covered in more detail
in Section 6.10. Once a key has been allocated for balises, the corresponding keys for NID_C,
used to provision OBUs, can be computed as follows:
kmNID_C,null = GEN.KMAC(NID_C,null ,kbls).
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This allows trains to use kmNID_C,null to generate the keys required corresponding to any balise
group created using kbls and NID_C, by computing the specic balise group key as:
kmNID_C,bдid = GEN.KMAC(null ,bдid,kmNID_C,null ).
6.7 SecurityAnalysis of ERTMSKeyGeneration andTRAKS
One omission from the ERTMS guidance and documentation is a security analysis of the ex-
isting and proposed key management schemes. In this section, we will formally review and
discuss the security of ERTMS key generation using a game-based approach. Such games are
used to formalise the security of the cipher, demonstrating the probability in which an adver-
sary can query a black box and determine which ‘world’ it is in. Cryptographic games are a
strong requirement in assuring their security, although failing the game does not necessarily
constitute a real attack.
In this game, as formally described in Denition 6.2, we will begin by allowing the attacker
to have access to all identities which can be generated from EDB, the ERTMS Identity Database.
The attacker wins the game if they are able to generate some valid key kmid,id ′ for any pair
(id, id′) for ERTMS entity types t and t ′, where id ∈ INIT.ID(EDB, t ) and id′ ∈ INIT.ID(EDB, t ′).
We do this to prevent an attacker from being able to incorrectly generate RBC-RBC and OBU-
OBU keys which are not valid, constraining the domain to one that is realistic.
Denition 6.2 (Key Indistinguishably from Random) Let KMAC = (SGen,
INIT.ID,GEN.KMAC) be a scheme over a database EDB with security parameter λ, where t and
t ′ are entity types with t 6= t ′, and b ∈ {0, 1}. We consider ExpbA(KMAC) (see Figure 6.4), a
probabilistic experiment played between an adversary A and a challenger C consisting of four
steps:
1. Get IDs. C runs INIT.ID for types t and t ′ to generate the sets ID and ID′.
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ExpbA(KMAC)
ID ← {i |i ∈ INIT.ID(EDB, t )}
ID′← {i |i ∈ INIT.ID(EDB, t ′)}
s
R←− SGen(1λ)
for id ∈ ID, id′ ∈ ID′ do :
if (id, id′) 6= (last (ID), last (ID′)) :
kmid,id ′ ← GEN.KMAC(id, id′, s)
endif
endfor
if b = 0 :
kmlast (ID),last (ID ′) ← GEN.KMAC(last (ID), last (ID′), s)
else :
kmlast (ID),last (ID ′)
R←− K
endif
b′← A((kmid,id ′)id∈ID,id ′∈ID ′, ID, ID′)
return b′
Figure 6.4: Security Game for ERTMS Key Derivation with an adversary A.
2. Generate keys. C generates a new random secret s and uses it to generate unique keys by
runningGEN.KMAC(id, id′, s) for all pairs (id, id′) ∈ ID×ID′ except for (last (ID), last (ID′)).
The function last (X ) returns the last element from a set X .
3. Challenge. If b = 0 then the last key is generated as
kmlast (ID),last (ID ′) ← GEN.KMAC(last (ID), last (ID′), s).
If b = 1 then kmlast (ID),last (ID ′) is sampled randomly from the keyspace K .
4. Guess. A is given access to all the identiers in ID and ID′ and to all the generated keys
kmid,id ′ , where (id, id′) ∈ ID × ID′, and computes a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}. The output of the
experiment is b′.
The advantage of the adversaryA against the security of the keys generated in ERTMS is
dened as:
AdvA =
Pr[Exp0A(KMAC) = 1] − Pr[Exp1A(KMAC) = 1] 
The key is indistinguishable from random if, and only if, the advantage is negligible in λ.
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Let us now compare the current ERTMS scheme (KMACERTMS ) and TRAKS (KMACTRAKS ).
6.7.1 Key Indistinguishability for KMACERTMS
This chapter previously established how the current scheme (Algorithm 1) generates a random
key for each OBU-RBC pair. Clearly, the advantage to the adversary is based on their ability
to distinguish the output from the GEN.KMAC function from random. As the key kmid,id ′
produced under the current scheme for any pair (id, id′) is randomly sampled, the advantage
of A to distinguish kmid,id ′ from random is
|Pr[Exp0A(KMACERTMS ) = 1] − Pr[Exp1A(KMACERTMS ) = 1]|, which is negligible in λ.
6.7.2 Key Indistinguishability for KMACTRAKS
As we recall from Algorithm 2, there are three possible cases for the function GEN.KMAC to
follow. Let us consider each case in detail:
Case 1. If GEN.KMAC is only provided with a single ERTMS entity identier in the form
of id , the resultant key, kmid,null is generated using the secret s . With the assumption that the
PRF used in this computation produces output that is indistinguishable from random, then the
advantage for the adversaryA to distinguish which ‘world’ they are in (i.e. b = b′) is negligible
in λ.
Case 2. If two ERTMS entity identiers id and id′ are provided as inputs to the GEN.KMAC
function, then the key kmid,id ′ is generated as follows:
1. An intermediary key is generated by the PRF function with the secret s and input id . As
shown in Case 1, this is indistinguishable from random.
2. The previously generated intermediary key is used as a secret in a second PRF compu-
tation that additionally takes, as its input, id′. If the PRF is secure, this input will then
also be indistinguishable from random.
Case 3. If the identier id′ is provided with the secret kmid,null as inputs to the GEN.KMAC
function, then the key kmid,id ′ is generated, as shown in Case 2.2. above, i.e. the value kmid,null
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is used as an input to the function, together with id′ in the PRF. As kmid,null is indistinguishable
from random (from Case 1), if the PRF used in this computation is also secure, then the output
is also indistinguishable from random.
From these three cases, the advantage to the attackerA to distinguish any kmid,id ′ key for
the TRAKS scheme, i.e. |Pr[Exp0A(KMACTRAKS ) = 1] − Pr[Exp1A(KMACTRAKS ) = 1]|, will also
be negligible in λ for any pair (id, id′).
From this section, we have now proven the security of the current (oine) ERTMS scheme
and compare it to TRAKS.
6.8 Managing the Key Lifecycle under TRAKS
Now that we have formally dened TRAKS and have demonstrated its security against an
adversary, let us now consider its key lifecycle. Specically, we will review how the keys will
be used and the changes required to support its rollout on a larger scale. As part of this analysis,
we will also consider additional aspects, including how keys can be revoked under TRAKS and
what actions and processes should be followed when trains and RBCs have reached the end
of their usable life.
Key Usage. Under TRAKS, the RBC no longer has a set of keys installed on it which, under
the current ERTMS scheme, would have placed it in a vulnerable position. This improves its
security posterity, as it can now derive its own symmetric keys based on public information
broadcast by the train, the OBU’s ETCS ID. As the keys are derived, only a single key has to
be installed on the RBC, which it uses to derive the keys which correspond to those held by
the train for communications. Moreover, this limits the need for less-secure practices to exist
which have attempted to address the limitations of the existing scheme. Where the RBC does
not have the capabilities of supporting dynamic key generation (i.e. it has not been updated, or
the Infrastructure Manager has not enabled this functionality), it can still continue to operate
using the same set of keys that would have been allocated to trains, bound to that RBC’s
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ID. The benet here is that no changes are required to the EuroRadio protocol design. The
only changes necessary would be in the way that keys are looked up. The RBC performs a
lookup using its own ETCS ID and then nds a corresponding entry that pairs the RBC to
the presented OBU ETCS ID and vice-versa, for the train to locate the key required for the
EuroRadio handshake. If the lookup is successful and a key entry is found, then it will use that
key. However, if no matching key is found, the EuroRadio protocol will trigger an error and
fail as there is no key available for the RBC and OBU to proceed with the handshake.
As an example, under TRAKS, the RBC will use the kmrid,null key to derive the key used to
compute a symmetric session key for MAC authentication within the EuroRadio protocol. For
the train, during commissioning, the KMC will carry out a lookup of the set of RBCs within the
NID_Cs specied in which the train is authorised to operate and will carry out the computation
of the kmrid,oid key for each RBC in that set. Similar to the current process [142], the train will
simply receive a set of keys, which, upon the receipt of the rst response message from the
RBC in the EuroRadio handshake (the AU2 Safety Protocol Data Unit (SaPDU)), will select the
appropriate kmrid,oid key to use.
Revocation of Keys. The existing standard [141] provides a set of messages that can be
issued by the KMC to the OBU/RBC which essentially revokes keys from that entity, through
the ‘DELETE_KEY’ command. During maintenance and stabling, a blacklist, made available by
the KMC for entities to download, would inform the train of RBCs with which it cannot engage
and, similarly for a RBC, a set of trains that are no longer permitted in the RBC’s area of control.
In the event that there is a need to ‘reintroduce’ that particular ETCS ID into operation, there
is no straightforward, comparable solution similar to the current ERTMS scheme, available
under TRAKS that retains the existing ID other than to generate a new knid_c , an intensive
and disruptive process which would require all existing entities to be rekeyed. A more eective
and simpler alternative to the existing scheme is, however, available under TRAKS which
would allow the ETCS ID of the aected ERTMS entity to be changed. The validity of keys
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(including their lifespan) would be governed under the validity of knid_c , ensuring that keys
are refreshed on a regular, enforced basis. If we were to reintroduce a train or RBC into the
network, a new ETCS ID should be allocated to that entity, as we would consider all keys
allocated to the original ID to be potentially compromised and, thus, not eligible for reuse.
Disposal and End-of-Life. All keys for safety-critical applications should have a set, en-
forced, lifespan, ratied by national bodies and scoped for the appropriate risk ‘budget’ linked
to that lifespan. At the end of a key’s lifespan and validity, a ‘DELETE_KEY’ command should
be issued to the entity to remove the key and a conrmation received by the KMC that the
key has been deleted. During decommissioning, however, in order to protect the integrity of
ERTMS by preventing cryptographic material being leaked, a ‘DELETE_ALL_KEYS’ command
would be issued by the KMC, where the entity conrms receipt of the command, deleting all
km keys, prior to deleting its kt transport keys. During this process, the KMC should retain
an auditable copy of the keys, marked as ‘invalid’, to prevent any keys corresponding to that
entity from being reissued. In the case that an entity operates across borders, the responsible
Key Management Authorities would be requested by the ‘home’ operator to initiate their ap-
propriate ‘DELETE_ALL_KEYS’ command. At this point, the entity in question may be disposed
of safely.
6.8.1 Specic Changes and Discussion
So far in this section, we have demonstrated how TRAKS has been engineered to be backwards-
compatible, such that Infrastructure Managers are able to immediately move to this scheme
without any changes to the way that the EuroRadio standard operates. All changes can be
performed within the software, with most changes being made at the KMC or RBC interfaces.
Considering the strategic direction of the ERTMS key management standards, TRAKS is ad-
ditionally able to operate in both oine and online situations.
In the oine scheme, the RBC requires a single initialisation and installation of its deriva-
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tion and kt keys, compared to a visit by an engineer each time a train is commissioned or
introduced to the network. Trains, however, at the point of manufacture, can have their keys
installed at the same time as commissioning, whilst updates to the key database onboard can
take place when the train is stabled or undergoing maintenance. If a train was ‘moved’ to a dif-
ferent operational region, for example the Class 323 units moving from the current Northern
Franchise to the West Midlands, then the blacklist for the ‘previous’ RBC should be updated
to contain that train unless it was going to continue operating in that region. Similarly, a
‘DELETE_ALL_KEYS’ command would be issued if the train is no longer operating in a given
area, specically to prevent the relay attack that we have explored in Chapters 4 and 5, as
a train should not be allowed to make a journey for which it does not have the appropriate
keying material or operational approval to proceed.
For online communications, when a RBC comes online for the rst time and has carried
out the appropriate TLS handshake and client authentication with the KMC, the KMC will
only need to issue the necessary derivation key and appropriate constraints that apply to that
key, as set out in the SUBSET-038 Standard [141]. For a new train, however, the process is
simply an online version of the oine scheme. However, instead of physical media, an online
connection is used. This solution provides the additional protection that, in the event that the
KMC goes oine, the entities will retain sucient keying material that would allow them to
complete the EuroRadio handshake if, and only if, they were initially approved to operate by
the KMC in that geographic area.
We also need to consider the case of existing, operational trains. Under the existing, oine,
ERTMS scheme, each train has a unique key shared with the appropriate RBC for ‘approved
routes’. Operationally, this is a challenging concept. During the process of a national deploy-
ment under TRAKS, the line secret needs to be established and the appropriate derivation
keys generated and distributed. This means that when RBCs are introduced to the network,
no additional keys are required to be installed for the RBC to communicate with a new train
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and, likewise, a train can immediately start communicating with any RBC. However, once a
national deployment is complete, the process of adding additional keys is both costly and lo-
gistically complex. This can be overcome with the KMC having the ability to ‘pre-compute’
the keys required for the train in preparation for a switchover, where the RBC would now be
expected to carry out the appropriate derivations.
For existing lines and deployed entities, for example the Cambrian Line in Wales, which
pre-dates Network Rail’s national deployment of ERTMS, the keys in use can remain valid
until the validity period expires, when a replacement key would be issued based on the TRAKS
specication.
In summary, the identied changes to the EuroRadio protocol (in software) and underlying
key management infrastructure proposed in TRAKS are:
• Modications to the way that a RBC looks up keys: the RBC will not perform a lookup,
rather, it will carry out the appropriate key generation computation (from Algorithm 2)
to derive the key that will allow it to communicate with the train. Trains will remain
statically-keyed, with no internal changes required.
• Establishment of ‘line secrets’ that correspond to a particular NID_C, and appropriately
generating kmrid,oid keys for RBCs and trains based on the TRAKS principle.
6.9 Key Distribution under TRAKS
As previously highlighted, in the current oine ERTMS scheme for distributing keys to trains
and RBCs, the transport key is issued by the KMC in the clear, with the requirement on the
transport medium to be ‘trusted’, ranging from USB storage devices to CDs [142]. During a
large-scale provisioning of keys, for example, a national deployment of ERTMS, there will be
a signicant number of transport keys being issued, with the risk that multiple transport keys
could be stored on the same media as other transport keys 1. Given that the transport keys are
1In SUBSET-114, the RBC and OBU will select a specic le from the media for its keying payloads, typically
bound using their ETCS ID [142].
147 6.9. Key Distribution under TRAKS
stored on the media in the clear, there is a potential that an attacker could simply intercept
the transport keys during installation on the entities.
If the attacker was able to intercept the transport keys, they would have access to all future
(encrypted) keys that are issued by the KMC when they are installed on the train or RBC.
When considering a train, this would mean that the attacker could establish the session key,
with relative ease, by observing the EuroRadio handshake between the train and RBC. For a
RBC, however, an attacker could ‘spoof’ arbitrary EuroRadio sessions with valid MACs. The
impact is that it would create a state of confusion for the RBC or, even worse, send arbitrary
messages to a train with a valid MAC, as the attacker has access to the nonces exchanged.
Consequently, the MAC would be valid and accepted. Given this threat, the current scheme is,
therefore, insecure. In the following section, we will consider a new way of distributing keys
for ERTMS as a set of steps.
6.9.1 Point of Manufacture/Commissioning
Instead of requiring the KMC to generate the transport keys for trains and RBCs, the train/RBC
will create its own pair of transport keys kt1 and kt2, using a hardware security module and
exported using a pair of symmetric keys, kv1 and kv2, burnt into the module by the vendor or
operator to encrypt and MAC the payload containing the transport keys and the ERTMS iden-
tity of the train/RBC. Here, a requirement is placed on the vendor that they have an attestable
secure supply chain and the keys are securely generated and handled in transit. If the vendor
keys were to become compromised, it would be the responsibility of the vendor to provide a
mechanism to update all trains/RBCs built by them with new, trusted keys.
6.9.2 Key Requisition from National Infrastructure Managers
Upon receipt of the transport keys, the vendor/operator will generate a request to the Key
Management Centre Operator (typically the Infrastructure Manager) for the appropriate keys
to be provisioned and installed. The transport keys generated by the train or RBC would be
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provided as part of this request. The request itself is encrypted and also authenticated using a
MAC with a symmetric pair of keys issued by the KMC to ‘approved’ vendors and operators,
kv,kmc1 and kv,kmc2 (similar to the existing scheme shown in Figure 6.1). Given that a vendor
may be responsible for manufacturing trains and building systems that are used in dierent
countries, it is their responsibility to determine the appropriate countries for which keys are
required (based on the operator’s needs) and submit the keys to those identied Infrastructure
Managers.
6.9.3 KMC Processing of Key Management Request
When a request for keys has been received by the KMC from the vendor, it will verify the
nature of the request, based on nationally-agreed procedures. If valid, it will generate the nec-
essary kmrid,oid keys based on the request, encrypted and accompanied by a MAC, keyed using
the transport keys provided, and stored as part of the request. The KMC would then retain
the transport keys for all future communications if the request was from the commissioning
of an entity. This part of the scheme accounts for two possible cases. One, where keys can be
dynamically generated (e.g. for RBCs) and another, where keys are statically used.
• Ability to Dynamically Generate Keys. The Key Management Centre computes the
‘RBC derivation key’, i.e. kmrid,null from Algorithm 2, with no identity parameter pro-
vided. It will then encrypt and MAC this key using the transport keys, before issuing
the resultant payload to the vendor/operator.
• Static Key Usage. The Key Management Centre will identify the keys required, gen-
erating the set of keys based on the NID_Cs provided in the request. This is achieved
through repeated runs of Algorithm 2 for each RBC identied in that given NID_C with
the appropriate kmrid,null key. These keys are encrypted and accompanied by a MAC
over the payload using the transport keys held by the KMC, before being issued to the
vendor/operator.
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6.9.4 Key Installation
The vendor/operator installs the payload of km keys received from the KMC directly onto the
train/RBC, which will then verify the MAC and encrypt the keys before installing/performing
the key maintenance instruction as directed by the KMC. Within this process, the train/RBC
will generate a response to the KMC conrming that the key management action has been
completed (i.e. the keys are installed ‘KEYS_INSTALLED’). Additionally, this includes a hash
of the key database installed on that entity, which is encrypted and then accompanied with
a MAC using the transport keys, which are then provided to the KMC. We add a hash of the
entity’s database to ensure that its expected state matches that which the KMC expects, to
ensure that no keys have been omitted/included which were not part of the request.
6.9.5 Vendor Commissioning Conrmation
The response generated by the train/RBC is provided to the KMC via the vendor/operator who
will verify the payload using its own transport keys held for that ETCS entity and compares
the local key database hash corresponding to that entity. If there is a mismatch between the
hashes, the protocol will require the issuance of keys to be carried out again.
An example issuance protocol is given in Figure 6.5 for a new train, highlighting the keys
in circulation, how they are used and the responsibilities of each entity.
6.9.6 Considerations for the TRAKS Distribution Scheme
Under TRAKS, the process of revoking keys is considered to be an extremely rare event, com-
pared to the regular revocation of public keys as we see for online website certicates. In the
event that a train key was compromised, the Infrastructure Manager would be required to al-
locate a new ETCS ID to the specic train and provision new keys. A similar process would
also be followed for the RBC. The rare intervention by an engineer at this stage with the af-
fected entity is considered to be an acceptable overhead. One further issue with the current
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Train Vendor KMC
kt1,kt2 ← SGen(1λ)
enc(oidt | |kt1 | |kt2,kv1) | | MAC(enc(oidt | |kt1 | |kt2,kv1),kv2)
Generate KMAC-REQ request for oidt
enc(KMAC-REQoidt | |kt1 | |kt2),kv,kmc1) | |
MAC(enc(KMAC-REQoidt | |kt1 | |kt2),kv,kmc2))
Process KMAC-REQ from Vendor.
kmr idi,oidt ← GEN.KMAC(oidt ,kmr idi,null ),
for every relevant RBC i
enc(((rid1,kmr id1,oidt ), … , (ridn,kmr idn,oidt )),kt1) | |
MAC(enc(((rid1,kmr id1,oidt ), … , (ridn,kmr idn,oidt )),kt1),kt2)
enc(((rid1,kmr id1,oidt ), … , (ridn,kmr idn,oidt )),kt1) | |
MAC(enc(((rid1,kmr id1,oidt ), … , (ridn,kmr idn,oidt )),kt1),kt2)
enc(“KEYS INSTALLED”| |Key DB HASH,kt1) | |
MAC(enc(“KEYS INSTALLED”| |Key DB HASH),kt1),kt2)
enc(“KEYS INSTALLED”| |Key DB HASH,kt1) | |
MAC(enc(“KEYS INSTALLED”| |Key DB HASH),kt1),kt2)
Figure 6.5: TRAKS Key Issuance Protocol for a new train t . The train generates its own trans-
port keys prior to encrypting and computing a MAC using keys kv1 and kv2 respectively.
These two keys are supplied to the vendor as part of the keying request to the KMC. Upon
receipt, the KMC will process the request, generating the necessary keys for the train, return-
ing them, encrypted, to the vendor for installation on the train. After installation, the train
submits a checksum of the key database to ensure that the keys held by the train/RBC match
what the KMC believes should be installed. For new RBCs, a similar process is carried out,
as outlined in this section. An online version may be used, meaning that the vendor is only
involved during commissioning.
ERTMS specications and National Standards Authorities is that, for example, in Great Britain,
recommendations by the Rail Safety Standards Board [123] do not quantitatively recommend
the validity of ERTMS keys, beyond “the most time the key is required". TRAKS, therefore,
includes regular rekeying intervals to prevent attacks, such as those presented in Chapter 5.
Rekeying should be performed during maintenance periods, where trains can have keys safely
installed at the depot. When rekeying or revocation takes place, the KMC updates the black-
list as required. The introduction of a blacklist, maintained and distributed by the KMC is not
considered to impose a burden on the Infrastructure Managers and train owners.
Already connected to a xed network for the purpose of RBC-RBC handovers, RBCs can
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move to online communication with the KMC, where the keys can be managed online at reg-
ular intervals. However, due to the restrictions imposed by GSM-R and the need for safe key
maintenance as discussed in this chapter, it is recommended that train key maintenance should
take place oine at the depot.
6.10 Applying TRAKS in a Secure Architecture
In this section, we will review applications where TRAKS can be used and the considerations
when implementing the scheme. For EuroRadio, we will discuss how TRAKS may be used,
before describing in detail how EuroBalises, trusted for location reports and speed/track pro-
le data, can be protected using a cryptographic MAC supplied by TRAKS. Finally, we will
consider a wider application of TRAKS in an Industrial Control System (ICS) setting.
6.10.1 EuroRadio MAC Keying
For use within the EuroRadio handshake protocol, there are some implementation considera-
tions that must be taken into account.
Core to the TRAKS framework is the use of a PRF. For a National Infrastructure Manager,
this could be a HMAC function, for example HMAC-SHA-256, which is believed to be post-
quantum secure. For key management operations, when keys are in transit, a similar keying
mechanism to the current ERTMS scheme would be used between the KMC and approved or-
ganisations. As an example, for TRAKS, this should be limited to train operators and vendors,
to ensure that the security of keying material is never compromised. As the current scheme
relies on 3DES keys, the rst 168 bits can be used in place of the 3DES keys, until support for
the full 256-bit key length is implemented.
The blacklist should be cryptographically signed or accompanied with a MAC, which,
when retrieved on a regular basis can ensure that, in the event of revocation, RBCs and trains
do not interact with otherwise possibly compromised infrastructure.
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6.10.2 EuroBalise Payload Security
As previously identied, EuroBalise data is protected with a simple CRC [139]. This would
allow an attacker, with relative ease, to dene their own balise payload, potentially increas-
ing line speeds or creating ‘phantom’ blocks, which overlays two sets of balise groups. The
importance of the balise in this architecture is that it is the sole source of data for location
and track speed/prole information, trusted by the train to be accurate and used for position
reports to the RBC. This data is then used by the RBC for safe supervision of the network and
safety-critical decision making.
Generally, ‘read-o’ components are secure in providing broadcast information in plain-
text when used in conjunction with some veried component, or if there is external validation
of their data. However, when used as part of a trusted architecture in making safety decisions,
it is not acceptable to supply only a checksum to assure the integrity of the data presented.
The only protection oered through this method is error detection which would not defend
against an attacker who is capable of manipulating the data presented by a balise, or emulating
a balise, such that these payloads can be arbitrarily forged. It is essential, therefore, that the
payloads presented by balises should be authenticated. With the exception of ETCS Level 1,
balise payloads are static and can be signed or accompanied with a MAC. In ETCS Level 1, the
balise is connected to a Lineside Electronic Unit (LEU) and uses EuroRadio payloads to relay
dynamic signalling information to the OBU. The TRAKS framework can, therefore, be used to
dene a key management scheme for ‘per-balise’ MAC keys in ETCS Levels 2 and 3, ensuring
that the compromise of one balise-specic key does not allow an attacker to impersonate other
balises in the rail network.
At the core of TRAKS, the KMC would generate a national balise secret, e.g. for Great
Britain, the key kmGB would be used to generate all subkeys which are linked to the NID_C
for a given line. The output of this process is kmNID_C,bдid , which would be installed on all
OBUs allowed to operate within a given NID_C, where bдid is the identity of the balise group.
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As a train passes over the balise, it reads the telegrams presented to it, derives the MAC key
using the broadcast balise group ID, and veries the MAC. Should the MAC fail verication, an
internal ‘violation’ is recorded, so that the Infrastructure Manager can attend to the potentially
faulty balise. In the event that it was, in fact, the train at fault, where erroneous ‘violations’
were recorded, this issue would be expected to be referred back to the vendor for reactive
maintenance.
Under TRAKS, a further requirement is added to ensure that all OBU units must have some
trusted execution environment installed, for example, Intel SGX or ARM TrustZone. This is
necessary to prevent the set of kmNID_C,bдid keys from being extracted from the OBU and to
ensure that only authorised cryptographic operations are performed using the installed keys.
Balises, however, do not have the kmNID_C,bдid installed on them at any time – this specic
key is only made available to the balise programming/encoding units during installation and
maintenance periods. The only data made available to the balise during programming is the
(plaintext, MAC) payload. As a result, no engineering changes are required to be made to the
balise, as it is not required to carry out any computations.
As balise keys are always derived and never stored on any system, the balise-specic keys
provide defence-in-depth, ensuring that the compromise of one balise MAC key does not com-
promise other balises, as the MAC key is specic only to that particular balise. It is worth not-
ing, however, that other possible forms of attack against a balise (e.g. shuing and removal)
are not prevented through this change. We will explore this further in Chapter 8.
An alternative solution to appending a MAC to the payload presented in a balise telegram
is to implement a protocol where trains and balises may communicate with each other and
a MAC is generated in real-time. In SUBSET-085 [145], there is a requirement for the balise
group to be read and provide three telegrams to a train travelling at 500km/h. If an interactive
authentication protocol between the train and the balise group was to be implemented, this
would no longer be possible, due to the time constraints for a balise to be read.
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Providing a static payload appended with a MAC is, therefore, a more appropriate and
sustainable proposal which is more ecient and less prone to errors in transmission. Assum-
ing that the time taken to read and process an ‘unauthenticated’/CRC-encoded 1023-bit balise
telegram is t milliseconds (i.e. 1.81ms for a train running at 500km/h, assuming no read fail-
ures, average conditions and data rates), the impact of adding TRAKS authentication would
increase this time by only 6%. This eectively means that the impact is only 1.92ms or 26.6cm
of travel for the train to read, derive the balise MAC key and validate the balise payload. This
could be further reduced with hardware developments, although this would have marginal
benets for, perhaps, signicant cost.
One possible caveat of moving to a MAC is that the current CRC and other data used as part
of the integrity verication process accounts for 110-bits of the total balise payload. Replacing
this with a 128-bit MAC would reduce the available balise data payload by only 18-bits. For
the majority of balises deployed, this should not pose a problem, given that Packet 44, used to
send non-ERTMS specic messages to the train from a balise, as dened by the Infrastructure
Manager, typically would not ll all of the 1023 bits available for the balise payload.
6.10.3 Wider Applications of TRAKS in ICS PLC Environments
As a framework, TRAKS can also be applied to wider ICS environments, where there are a
number of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) in ICS/SCADA settings which may com-
municate with one another, and the communication protocols may not be protected. As an
example, MODBUS and PROFIBUS, two widely-deployed protocols in industrial control sys-
tems, due to age, do not oer any cryptographic protection of their payloads [77], exposing
them to an attacker who can ‘sni’ or arbitrarily inject their own packets. Allowing an at-
tacker to carry out this man-in-the-middle attack would aect the overall operation of the
system, with the potential to create an unsafe situation.
A simple solution to this type of attack would be to send messages with a MAC attached
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between PLCs where there is some attestation that the message is authentic and has not been
tampered with in-ight. For an ICS owner, however, using a single key for all devices across
the operational network achieves little security as the keys could be extracted by alternative
means. Partitioning the system would allow specic Operational Technology (OT) ‘zones’
to be dened, analogous to the NID_C variable used in ERTMS to identify regions and lines.
Here, a centralised key per zone could be dened and installed on the appropriate hardware
responsible for that zone. A derivation step would then be included in the PLC logic to allow
a per-device key to be used in the actual communications. This would also allow the owner
to identify the source of other attacks taking place on their network, where an attacker could
leverage a vulnerability on that PLC to coerce it into a specic state.
6.11 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have dened and detailed a new key management solution which can be
applied to a number of ICS environments. By leveraging proven cryptographic techniques, we
are able to create and achieve an interoperable, backwards-compatible solution which can be
deployed for ERTMS. This scheme reduces the National Infrastructure Manager’s overheads,
whilst considering future threats that would eect the current ERTMS scheme by delivering
post-quantum security. Whilst this chapter has primarily focussed on the EuroRadio protocol,
we have also demonstrated its ability to work as a framework to include EuroBalises in the
secure architecture of ERTMS, ensuring safety through security, where both function cooper-
atively and not independently. Through the application of a partitioning principle to ERTMS
with TRAKS, we are able to establish a key distribution scheme which maintains the same
level of security oered by the current set of standards, whilst delivering signicant benets
to ICS owners and operators.
It is important to note from this chapter that, as the current scheme dates back to 1997,
the key management burden is only now being experienced by Infrastructure Managers, as
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the number of ERTMS deployments increases. New proposals are being introduced, but they
only consider partial solutions to an existing problem. These solutions do not take into ac-
count future threats or the potential exposures that are being introduced, for example, a lack
of post-quantum security, allowing an attacker to capture trac now and break the cryptog-
raphy when the capability arrives – something well within the lifespan of ERTMS. As a result,
within TRAKS, we considered this particular problem and designed a solution whilst provid-
ing formal security guarantees, an assurance which is not addressed in the proposed online
ERTMS scheme.
From this and previous chapters, the analyses carried out have highlighted how the stan-
dards require regular review. However, for many operators and system owners, this is not a
simple process. Many may lack the necessary expertise and understanding and the physical
deployments may also be vulnerable, whether it is due to outdated software, or unappreci-
ated interconnectivity. Using the processes developed in this thesis, we will consider the ‘big
picture’ of system architectures and identify a process to enable asset owners to assess the
security of their architectures.
Chapter 7
Modelling Threats to Rail
This thesis has assessed the ERTMS standards in detail, rstly diving down the stack of proto-
cols used to deliver in-cab signalling. As part of this analysis, whilst we were able to provide
some levels of assurance for those protocols, we also found aws which, when chained to-
gether, provide a valid attack vector and the opportunity for a malicious adversary to exploit.
We then proceeded to return up the stack, considering what the future threats could be for
ERTMS, dening a solution which provides future security to current systems and a exible
framework which can be used in other Industrial Control System (ICS) environments outside
of train-to-trackside signalling. We evaluated, as an example, the EuroBalise and, through our
notion of what a secure architecture should be for an ICS, closed the gap which now allows
balises to be trusted and secured.
System architectures, however, vary and, until this point, we have focused primarily on a
reference ERTMS architecture, abstracted the ERTMS interfaces and also the components in-
cluded onboard a train. This, however, does not take into account the diverse nature of deploy-
ments and the interconnected nature of systems. In this chapter, we will explore a method-
ology which allows operators to consider the overall security of their system architectures,
through the use of a new modelling tool which abstracts notions of security for engineers.
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This abstracts the methodology applied in this thesis of taking a starting node and following
the various specication documents to understand the security relationship between compo-
nents to provide a ‘rst steps’ tool for asset owners to understand the security dynamics of
their architecture.
7.1 Motivation
With the introduction of the EU Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive in 2018, ICS
system owners are required to be able to rationalise and assure the security of their systems,
so that they are compliant with the Directive and have made eorts to minimise risk as far as
possible. One issue that exists for many asset owners is that when the standards and products
were designed and built, the primary emphasis was to provide functionality and safety, whilst
security was considered less of a priority. As these systems have a much longer lifespan (in
the range of decades) compared to commodity systems, ICS deployments may conform to
older standards. For example in ERTMS, the GSM-R A5/1 cipher dates back to 1987 [85] and
EuroRadio, proposed in 1997 [22] no longer provide sucient security today. Vulnerabilities
in these ciphers are now being realised, where the capabilities of adversaries have signicantly
improved, at lower cost and eort.
Modelling tools are commonly used by engineers when they are validating their safety
cases for new systems and to rationalise assumptions made within the design of the systems.
The same technique can be applied to consider the security of a given architecture. Tools are
available today which model the security of a system but they do not allow the asset owner
to visualise how an attack could propagate through their system. Moreover, they require the
asset owner to formulate the risk prole for their systems which can be prone to error, due to
a misunderstanding or domain and subject-relevant knowledge not being captured as part of
proling the system, e.g. using the Altran ‘REVEAL’ methodology [76].
A minimal security assessment of assets should aim to address the following questions:
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• What is the set of assets we want to protect?
• Who are our attackers and what are the threats to our assets?
• How likely is an attack against this asset which has been identied as requiring protec-
tion?
• What would be the consequences if this asset was compromised?
• What is the cost of preventing this asset from being compromised/minimising the risk
of compromise?
Risk analysis is a prime focus in this chapter. However, this is very subjective, as an intri-
cate understanding of individual components in a system is required, especially when these
components are interconnected into a network. Asset owners, when presented with the po-
tential risk of a threat to safety-critical components, may deem the risk to be unacceptable,
regardless of the level of risk – the mere presence of any threat to the safe operation of a sys-
tem could, for example, endanger human lives. The evaluation of risk, probability and impact
needs to be carefully balanced, given that a high risk may have a negligible consequence. As
an example, let us consider a national infrastructure which has a vulnerable communications
protocol running between nodes. An attacker who is able to compromise this protocol could
potentially have unrestricted access to the nodes. From the perspective of a train using GSM-R,
there would be the potential for a disruptive eect by an attacker overloading the EuroRadio
layer with messages that cannot be processed, either due to poor formatting or an incorrect
MAC, which could trigger the session to be terminated. Conversely, an air-gapped interface
between the train control systems and, say, a passenger seat reservation system would have
little impact on the safe operation of the train but would have a disruptive eect on the passen-
gers. These risks should be reliably modelled and captured to ensure that they are understood
and their interface with the specied NIS thresholds are identied.
In the United Kingdom, for the transport sector and its Operator of Essential Services
(OESs), the Department for Transport [52] thresholds set for rail-related incidents only con-
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sider how many services were aected or delays imposed, rather than take account of the root
cause. In the case of a train being targeted at Clapham Junction, an attacker could jam the
GSM-R reception, which could paralyse part of the network for an indenite amount of time.
Under the dened thresholds, this would be considered as a NIS-reportable incident. Con-
versely, a power failure which causes 20% of services to be cancelled would also need to be
reported under these thresholds, irrespective of the root cause. In addition to the NIS Directive,
some rail asset owners are implementing the ISO/IEC 62443 Standard [32], an organisational-
based security standard. However, the implementation of both ISO/IEC 62443 and the NIS
Directive present a large knowledge, experience and skills gap. One risk that may arise dur-
ing implementation is that the operator simply does not understand the risks that exist in
their systems, nor may they understand the level of connectivity in those architectures. As
an example, the Stuxnet malware leveraged the fact that ‘air-gapped’ systems, in reality, had
data transferred between them using USB media, allowing the malware to propagate and have
such a destabilising eect on the system [35, 92]. More recently, the BlackEnergy [88] variant
achieved a similar outcome by using the interconnected nature of operational systems to IT
management networks, aecting the Ukraine power grid in 2015 [54, 94]. Spearphishing has
now become the attack vector of choice for many adversaries [86], allowing them to gain ac-
cess to the management system and use it as a ‘pivot point’ to gain access and tamper with
ICS components, for example, Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs).
These are a few examples of threats which were identied in ICS deployments or where
the interconnectivity of systems could have the potential of introducing risk to the overall
operation of the system. Methodologies such as that presented in [60] provide a high-level
means of considering the threats to rail networks by dening a manual process to identify
the security risks to infrastructure. Given the architecture of a system, it does not, however,




In this chapter, we will explore a new tool that allows asset owners and engineers who are
not security experts to assess the security of their systems. This is achieved by modelling
components of a system as a graph of connected systems. Here, the dataows between these
components are also captured and the transformation of this data from input to output (e.g. a
balise’s location payload being converted into authenticated data by the European Vital Com-
puter (EVC) for submission to the RBC) is used in its analysis. The tool allows the asset owners
to nd paths across the model between the assets and judge the compositional security, in ad-
dition to enabling them to simulate possible attackers, their capabilities and the entry points
they may use.
As previously identied, leaving the calculation of a risk metric to the asset owner can
sometimes be dicult, with the potential for errors to arise. Furthermore, if the metric is not
standardised, there is no way to compare systems and their risk proles. Thus, the SCEPTICS
tool presented in this chapter leverages the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)
metric to dene the security prole for a given component or link and, based on this, derive
the likelihood of an attack on that asset being successful. To determine the security of a group
of elements, the inclusion-exclusion principle is used to compute the probability for a given
path. Given that the asset owner is now able to quantify the security of their systems, they
can compare the security of similar systems, especially from a regulatory perspective.
What this tool provides is the ability to conduct assessments that convey contextual mean-
ing to the asset owner, allowing them to visualise the improvements being made. For non-
security experts, they are able to rationalise the security of their architectures without a de-
tailed knowledge of the vulnerabilities that exist and better understand the implications to
the security of the system when modications are made or, for example, if rmware updates
are not promptly applied. This, though, does not remove the need for expert security assess-
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ments, as these may highlight details which cannot be captured through the asset owner’s lack
of detailed security knowledge.
As part of the analysis, ‘interesting’ components or those which have a critical function
are highlighted to the asset owner which, if compromised, may have a higher impact on the
overall security of the system under assessment. This allows them to identify and prioritise
improvements which would reduce their overall exposure. Aside from allowing asset owners
to assess the current security posterity of their systems, the tool also allows them to exper-
iment and assess the impact of the dierent strategies and changes that could be made to
improve the overall security of the architecture before any nancial investments or modica-
tions to the system have been made. Using this approach allows the asset owner to identify the
strategies which are the most cost eective, whilst delivering the most appropriate security
improvements to the overall system.
7.3 The SCEPTICS Modelling Tool
In this section, we will appraise the SCEPTICS tool in detail, starting with the formal gram-
mar the tool uses to reason with its input, followed by the probabilistic computations made
by the tool. We will then discuss how the input values for the probabilistic calculations are
determined, prior to an overview of the specic implementation and design details for the tool.
7.3.1 Input Grammar
Three specic inputs to the tool are required: a system graph which describes the individual
components, their linking between each other and the respective data ows between compo-
nents, an adversarial model, which describes the capabilities of an attacker and, nally, a list
of assets which the attacker may target or use to enter the system. From these three inputs,
the tool is able to identify the paths which are most likely to be taken by the attacker and
determine the most vulnerable components in the system. Looking forward, the tool then al-
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lows the asset owner to make changes to their model and re-run the tool to assess the eect of
their proposed mitigations. The type of analysis and level of detail is controlled through the
adversarial model and the list of assets given to the tool. More formally, the grammar of the
inputs to the tool can be presented as:
〈system graph〉 |= List 〈node〉 List 〈edge〉
〈assets〉 |= List 〈asset〉
〈adversarial model〉 |= List 〈adversary〉
For each of these inputs, let us consider them individually:
7.3.1.1 The System Graph
The system graph is a directed graph which describes the architecture of the system under
assessment, where individual components are modelled as nodes and connections between
them are given as edges in the graph. As an example, from Figure 7.1, GSM, WiFi and GPS can
be expressed as nodes in the model with Car BUS additionally being modelled as a node. The
Car BUS is shown dierently to the other nodes as it shows how the asset owner can dene
components in their system as granular or generic, as required, where, for example, the Car
BUS is exploded into its constituent components as shown later in Figure 7.2. Here, they can








Figure 7.1: Reference Example Model based on Figure 7.2.
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detail is known about that component which could aect the overall security of the model.
For each node, a node identier is given with a descriptive name and a list of labels which
describe the supported data types for that particular component. Specically, the data types
can refer to standardised types of data, whether it is a protocol (e.g. MODBUS/TCP/UDP) or
some custom-dened type (e.g. geographical positioning data, unauthenticated data). Nodes
also include bridges entries which describe the capabilities of that node to convert data from
one type to another. Finally, each node has a data prole, DP, which has a data type, link
type (similar to data type but describes the physical transmission method, e.g. electrical or
Ethernet) and a corresponding CVSS prole, CP, which describes the security characteristics
of that node. Further details of this prole are discussed later in this chapter. Formally, the
grammar to describe a node can be given as:
〈node〉 |= id:〈node id〉 name:〈name〉 data_types:List 〈data type〉
bridges:List 〈bridge〉 data_profile:〈DP〉
〈bridge〉 |= 〈data type〉 : 〈data type〉
〈DP〉 |= data_type:〈data type〉 link_type:〈link type〉 CP:List 〈CP〉
| data_type:〈data type〉 CP:〈CP〉
| link_type:〈link type〉 CP:〈CP〉
| CP:〈CP〉
Edges in the graph, i.e. connections between nodes in the graph, have a similar grammar to
nodes. Specically, they can have one or more DP associated data proles, where an edge is
uniquely dened on a ‘per-link’ basis:
〈edge〉 |= id:〈node id〉 id:〈node id〉data_profile:〈DP〉
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Using Figure 7.1, we can derive an example input grammar as:
node1 |= id:nGSM name:GSM data_types:[LAN net. con., WAN net. con.]
bridge:[bridge1] data_profile:dpn1
bridge1 |= LAN net. con.:WAN net. con.
dpn1 |= CP:0.381
node2 |= id:nCB name:Car BUS data_types:[LAN net. con.]
data_profile:dpn2
dpn2 |= CP:0.972
edge1 |= id:nGSM id:nCB data_profile:dpe1
dpe1 |= data_type:LAN net. con. data_link:Ethernet CP:0.200
7.3.1.2 Adversarial Model
The second input to the tool is the adversarial model, which captures the capabilities of an
adversary to the system. This component is important as it means that the tool will only
consider attackers who genuinely present a threat and should be evaluated. Each adversary
has a set of entry nodes from which they may start, with the optional inclusion of being able
to exploit specic data types and link types. The supporting grammar to describe an adversary
is expressed as:
〈adversary〉 |= entry_nodes:List 〈entry nodes〉 data_types:List 〈data types〉
link_types:List 〈link types〉
An example of such an adversarial model as input to the tool is given below:
adversary1 |= entry_nodes:[ε] data_types:[RF connection]
link_types:[Wireless]
The adversary dened above is able to compromise any connections that use RF connections
or Wireless link types. Referring to Figure 7.1, this would allow the adversary to use the WiFi
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and GSM Nodes as both possess a wireless interface and may be used as entry points to the
system. Thus, an equivalent notation for the adversary can be given as:
adversary1 |= entry_nodes:[WiFi, GSM] data_types:[ε] link_types:[ε]
7.3.1.3 Asset List
The nal input to the tool is the list of assets which are under assessment in the context of
the entire model, specically those assets which might be targeted by an adversary. A rail
asset owner, for example, may want to understand the ways in which the Car BUS onboard a
train may be compromised, where the corresponding asset would be the Car BUS. The attack
space can also be constrained by the inclusion of specic data types handled by that node. This
results in the following grammar to describe an asset:
〈asset〉 |= id:〈node id〉 data_types:List 〈data types〉
From Figure 7.1, a concrete example of two assets, one unrestricted and another restricted,
are respectively given below:
asset1 |= id:nCB
asset2 |= id:nCB data_types:[LAN net. con.]
7.3.2 CVSS Security Proles
Dening the interplay, especially the security of system components, can have signicant
implications on how attack vectors (i.e. the attack paths found by the tool) are ranked and
the relationships between them are found. Requiring asset owners and modellers to specify
the security characteristics of their systems (especially when it must be expressed as a single
value) is unreasonable, as a lack of security expertise can lead to an under/overestimation
of the reality of the security of their assets. Existing tools allow a targeted analysis of these
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systems but, as described in Chapter 3, still require the asset owner to determine these values,
involving a high degree of manual eort.
To overcome this problem, we can integrate the CVSS framework 1 into the SCEPTICS
tool and use it to uniformly generate and assign security (CP) proles to nodes and edges.
The CVSS metric is suitable for this task as it represents a standard way of determining a
score that expresses the severity of a Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure (CVE). The CVSS
framework also allows the inclusion of information related to the severity of a vulnerability
and other contextual information. For example, it can include the ‘environmental impact’,
i.e. how does a vulnerability for this given node aect neighbours directly connected to it?
An alternative metric that can be included is the ‘temporal impact’ which assesses whether
a remedy is available for the vulnerability and how close it is to be successfully exploited,
allowing for a more consistent granularity of the proles.
A CVSS vector is formed of three parts: the base score, temporal score and environmental
score, each of which are independent but, together, form the nal, overall, score. The base score
is dened by the vector used to attack the component, e.g. via a network connection or phys-
ical access, the complexity of the attack, the privileges required and whether the user has to
perform any actions which would otherwise render the attack unsuccessful or force another
path to be taken. The Condentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) ‘triad’ is taken into ac-
count as part of this score, as is the case when the attacker is in a position of elevated privileges
through the compromise of that component. The temporal score concerns itself with the ‘here
and now’ security of the component, i.e. if there are any exploits ‘in the wild’ against that
component, or if there are theoretical but not yet practical attacks. The score also factors how
these exploits may be remediated, if a solution exists, and how condent we, as the assessor
are, in the reports and literature about the specic exploitability of that component. Finally,
the environmental score looks beyond the component and evaluates how the compromise of
1https://www.first.org/cvss
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that component could aect the neighbouring, interconnected, components, what reliance
and guarantees are expected of the component and the impact on these guarantees if it was
compromised.
Generally, CVSS vectors are expressed as numerical values, i ∈ 0, . . . , 10, using the equa-
tions dened in the CVSS standard [65] (included for reference in Appendix D). However, the
tool uses probabilistic computations on the model to rank and compute the security values for
groups of components, where the CVSS values, CP must be expressed in terms of CP ∈ [0, 1].
The tool itself only requires the probability of an attack being successful (i.e. its exploitability),
so the base score of the CVSS value is transformed as follows:
(7.1)CP = ESC − 0.1213.887
ESC is the exploitability sub-score component of the CVSS base value which, itself, is dened
as:
(7.2)ESC = 8.22 ×AttackVector ×AttackComplexity ×
× PrivileдeRequired ×UserInteraction
For the purposes of our calculations, we do not need to consider the impact on the CIA
requirements on the component as we only use the ESC component of the base score. As
explained earlier, this value alone does not accurately reect the likelihood of a successful
attempt to exploit a component. The ESC value is therefore scaled using Equation 7.1 to derive
the nal probabilistic value, which is then used by the tool in its calculations.
CVSS Prole Example. Let us use the GSM component, as shown in Figure 7.1, as a con-
crete example of how we may determine the CVSS prole for a node or link in the model.
GSM-R, as we recall from previous chapters, is used to provide train to trackside communica-
tions and, for ERTMS, a data link for in-cab signalling. As the weak A5/1 encryption scheme
is used, this aects some of its guarantees for the condentiality and integrity of messages.
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We can dene the CVSS vector in the model for GSM nodes as:
CVSSGSM=AV :A/AC:H/PR:N /U I :N /S :C/C:H/I :H/A:H/E:F/RL:U /RC:C/CR:L/
IR:H/AR:H/MAV :N /MAC:H/MPR:N /MUI :N /MS :X/MC:L/MI :H/MA:H
This vector describes the parameters of the CVSS metric, for example, the requirement
that the attacker has ‘adjacent access’ (AV:A), using a component of the stack (radio) to gain
access to the endpoints. That said, whilst gaining access to the downlink (from base station
to mobile station) is relatively simple, aecting the uplink (mobile station to base station) is
complex due to the time-sensitive nature of GSM timeslots (AC:H), coupled with the need to
determine the exact timeslot and frequency used by the train.
For the remaining parts of the vector, let us consider highlights; for the temporal score, we
acknowledged that a functional means to compromise the downlink exists (E:F) as rainbow
tables for the A5/1 cipher are available. It is currently unclear what the remedial action would
be (RL:U) as the cipher is used worldwide for GSM-R and may require signicant reimplemen-
tation and cost. We also place condence in this vector (RC:C) based on tutorials and the attack
roadmap given in Chapter 5, demonstrating how easy it is to capture data from the downlink.
A full list of these parameters are available in Appendix D.1.
By applying Equation 7.2 and the mappings from Appendix D.1, we can compute the ex-
ploitability subscore ESC = 1.6. Using Equation 7.1, we can compute the corresponding CVSS
prole (CP ) for the GSM component (CVSSGSM ) as CPGSM = 0.3805. What this value indi-
cates is the probability that an attacker can compromise and aect the GSM link which, when
factoring in the environmental impact, would have a propagative eect on dependent, inter-
connected, systems.
During the computation over the model, the tool’s attack paths consider all of these de-
pendent systems, demonstrating how an attacker can leverage one, possibly weak, component
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to have maximal impact. An example attack path (with nodes included from Figure 7.2) could
take the attacker from the GSM system (antennae, modem and equipment) to the EVC, where
a denial of service attack would lead to the train entering a fail-safe condition and stopping.
Similarly, injecting into the GSM stream would allow the attacker to go from the GSM node,
through the GSM trackside infrastructure to the RBC, where the RBC could be given a false
report or have messages replayed, placing it in an unpredictable state.
Allowing Asset Owners to Custom-Dene Security Proles Whilst using CVSS as a
framework to determine input values assists asset owners and reduces the likelihood of errors
and inconsistent security proles being applied to components within the model, it is not a
replacement for an expert security analysis. The scores may not always match what can be
discovered through an assessment of domain and subject-specic knowledge [76], where some
small, but critical detail, cannot be simply captured in the CVSS vector. To overcome this, the
asset owner can override the security proles with correctly-formatted values provided by
them, i.e. CP ∈ [0, 1].
A benecial side eect of this specic tool feature also allows the modeller to run simula-
tions to determine those options which provide the most eective security solution. This will
be discussed later in this chapter.
7.3.3 Requisite Denitions and Formal Computational Model
We will now consider how the attack vectors are modelled and the method used to compute
the values which determine the security of these vectors.
Firstly, we need to dene the system graph input more formally as a directed graph,
G(N ,E), with N as the set of all nodes (the components contained within the model) and E,
the set of edges (connections) contained within the model (the directed Graph G). The proba-
bility space, (Ω,F , P ), is used where the sample space, Ω, is the powerset of edges in G(N ,E),
i.e. Ω = P(E). The event space, F , is the powerset of the sample space F = P(Ω), where P
171 7.3. The SCEPTICS Modelling Tool
is a probability function P : F → [0, 1], which tells us the probability of a given edge being
exploitable by an adversary (i.e. it exists in the graph). From this formalism, we can state that
an attack vector, starting from a given component in the graph, ns , targeting a specic asset ne
through the graph G(N ,E), can be dened as:
Denition 7.3 (Graph Path) A path (ρ(ns ,ne )) in the graph G(N ,E) is a sequence of unique
edges ei ∈ E, i = 0 . . .n, where the start node, ns is e0, the end of the path is given by the end node
ne as en and, for each pair of consecutive edges (ei , ei+1), the end node of ei is equal to the starting
node of ei+1.
A path from the node es to en represents an attack which starts at es , following links and
passing through intermediary nodes, reaching en. The end of the path (en) is an asset that an
attack may take place, where the start of the path (es ) is the entry node that an adversary uses
to launch their attack, where multiple paths may exist between es and en.
In order to verify that the paths in a graph are valid (i.e. that they exist), we can dene an
event that the path exists from the event space as follows:
Denition 7.4 (Event that Path ρ Exists) For a given path, ρ, the Event that the Path exists
is ερ = {o | o ∈ Ω ∧ ρ ⊆ o}.
Now, let us establish the probability for a given path in the Graph.





Proof. The probability of an event ερ occurring can be given by the probability of all the edges
of ερ , i.e. those that are part of the path ρ and those that do not exist in ρ, i.e. P (ερ) =
∏
ei∈ρ P (ei )·∏
e j /∈ρ P (e j), where ei , e j ∈ ερ are the edges that form part of ερ , and not of ερ respectively.
7.3. The SCEPTICS Modelling Tool 172
ερ , however, contains all possible combinations of edges e j that are not part of ρ, i.e.∏
e j /∈ρ P (e j) = 1. Therefore, P (ερ) =
∏
ei∈ρ P (ei ). 
We nally need to introduce the notion of the inclusion-exclusion principle whereby:
Lemma 7.6 The probability of a set of events P can be described by the existence of n paths ρi ,
computed as:













Proof. Lemma 7.6 can be observed as a probabilistic application of the inclusion-exclusion
principle [28]. 
7.3.4 Tool Design and Implementation
We will now review how the SCEPTICS tool was implemented, highlighting some of the key
design decisions and optimisations.
Discovery of Attack Vectors As previously highlighted, the input to the tool is a directed
graph such that, for a given system transformed into a GraphG(N ,E), the possible probabilistic
attack vectors of this graph will be the paths fromG(N ,E). Searching for the paths is achieved
through the breadth-rst search algorithm [44], a fairly simple, but ecient, search algorithm
with a worst-case complexity of O|N |, where the cardinality of N represents the number of
nodes that are present in the graph.
Transforming the Graph and Route Discovery System architectures, especially those in
IT/ICS environments are typically complex, highly-connected graphs, which contain multiple
layers of information (e.g. the protocols used, the physical medium and contextual information
about the data), where it is sometimes dicult to conduct accurate and meaningful security
assessments. As an example, considering Figure 7.1, we would have to decompose the model






































































Figure 7.2: Model of an example reference ERTMS implementation, with the train systems
exploded into constituent components.
into twelve independent graphs (comprised of the two medium types: wired and wireless and
the six connections) and apply the security computations for each of these graphs to obtain
an accurate analysis. Whilst this method could be used to establish the state of security for
a system, it would not capture the highly-connected nature of the system and its interdepen-
dencies, whereas the SCEPTICS tool would capture this eectively in a single model. We will
see how it achieves this in Section 7.5.3.
The SCEPTICS tool uses a layer-aware breadth-rst search, supporting routing-like func-
tionality, where nodes are appended to a path if, and only if, they both support a specic data
type and are connected by an edge that also supports that data type. To capture the interplay
between these layers, the bridge elements of the nodes are used, which essentially describe the
capabilities of that node to convert data from one layer (i.e. the data type) to another. A path,
therefore, can be formed of several shorter paths, all belonging to dierent layers, provided
that they share a common bridging node that allows them to traverse these layers. In Fig-
ure 7.2, we can see this more clearly. Here, the path [GSM-R]->[GSM-R base]->[MSC] uses a
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combination of wireless (dotted line) and wired (solid line) connections and is valid only if the
intermediary node, [GSM-R base], bridges the two connection types. Similarly, we can use
the connection type to determine whether the path is valid (i.e. the WAN network connection
(yellow, dotted line) and the LAN network connection (green, solid line) has the [GSM-R base]
node dened as a bridge between those two connection types).
7.4 Analysis Proles
The SCEPTICS tool enables asset owners to carry out a number of tasks and analyses to assure
the security of their architectures. The principal type of analysis that the tool executes is the
discovery of all paths to key assets that have been dened by the asset owner. In addition, the
tool enables alternative analyses including:
‘All Roads Lead to’ Analysis. Given that some assets in the graph are considered ‘bastions’
which must be protected from an adversary, the tool will rst search for, and assess, paths
which terminate at those assets. A list of those paths, where the likelihood of an attack being
successful exceeds the owner-dened threshold, is then ranked and returned. In Figure 7.2, we
observe that the RBC is directly connected to a number of data sources which are used in its
safety-critical decision-making process. In addition to nding these paths, the tool would also
nd the paths from indirectly-connected systems which may have a more pronounced impact
if the RBC was compromised, than the eect of the compromise of a directly-connected system.
Patient-Zero Analysis. As an asset owner, we may also want to consider the environmen-
tal impact to neighbouring systems should a particular node become compromised. Given a
specic starting node, the tool will search for paths which again exceed some given threshold.
What an asset owner can learn through this particular analysis is how attacks can propagate
through their systems, especially in ways that had not previously identied or appreciated.
Testing New Strategies. As previously identied, by allowing the asset owner to dene
their own security values to nodes and edges, instead of using the CVSS framework, a further
175 7.5. Applying the SCEPTICS Tool to ERTMS
benet of the tool is that it enables asset owners to model and assess new strategies which
better inform them of the way that they can review the security of their system architectures.
Asset owners can then either amend the CVSS vectors or the probability values directly, to
determine the most eective areas to implement changes and develop future priorities for
investment.
The intrinsic value of the tool is in the way in which it discovers the paths and carries
out probabilistic analyses, using the inclusion-exclusion principle, to assess the propagation
of attacks in a given model. This path discovery enables the asset owner, in particular, to
understand all the ‘via’ steps an attacker might take to circumvent the security of the most
direct routes to gain a foothold into a critical asset.
7.5 Applying the SCEPTICS Tool to ERTMS
In this section, we will apply the SCEPTICS tool to the ERTMS architecture shown in Figure 7.2.
ERTMS is one example of an ICS which is highly interconnected with a range of protocols and
standards to maintain its safe operation at all times. The model in this gure is based on the
reference ERTMS standard and a train architecture which has been developed from vendor
technical reports [114, 108]. Here, a range of nodes have been exploded to demonstrate the
level of granularity that the asset owner can assess. ERTMS was chosen instead of, for example,
an onboard train network, as the standards are public, not closed and not proprietary, allowing
a more thorough proling of the security of the architecture.
To demonstrate the level of granularity, a number of assets were specied as input to the
model that are available to the adversary, including the Balise, Workstation1, Workstation2 and
GPS assets. To determine the exploitability of some of these assets, the targets for the attacks
by the adversary were set to be the EVC, RBC, Car BUS, DAS Display and Passenger Display.
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7.5.1 Selection of Adversary Entry Points
The attacker entry points were specically selected due to the range of diering interdepen-
dencies that exist in the rail network. As an example, the EuroBalise is implicitly trusted by the
train for accurate location and track prole data, where the data is passed to the RBC to make
safety-critical decisions that ultimately determine the train movements. In the event that the
data presented to the RBC was incorrect, without an independent source to verify it, it would
be possible for it to issue an overlapping Movement Authority, potentially placing the train
in the same space as another. Similarly, for other parameters provided by the balise, such as
speed limits and, in the UK, tilting constraints, if any of these parameters were compromised,
the train could be placed in an unsafe situation due to the limited validation of the data.
Remote Condition Monitoring (RCM) is a diagnostic tool used by train vendors to carry
out real-time monitoring of trains within a eet. The data that the train produces is sent via
the RCM system to the vendor, enabling preventative and predictive maintenance to be pre-
planned when the train returns to the depot, whilst also allowing the remote triage of vehicle
faults whilst the train is in service. If compromised by an attacker, the train may be prema-
turely removed from service. If the vendor is additionally capable of making remote changes to
a vehicle, the attacker could compromise the safe operation of the train. With access to the ven-
dor’s systems, the adversary could easily carry out reconnaissance of the onboard proprietary
and Commercial o-the-shelf (COTS) equipment and search for vulnerabilities to exploit. In
the model, we consider two engineer workstations located at the vendor’s site as possible en-
try points for the attacker, where Workstation1 has been inltrated and compromised, whereas
Workstation2 has not been aected.
Finally, we assess the security of the on-board GPS which is only used for supplementary
services, e.g. transferring location information to the passenger information displays and for
automated announcements. If the GPS was aected, say, through spoong, this could result in
passenger disruption (e.g. swapping seat reservations or convincing passengers to disembark
177 7.5. Applying the SCEPTICS Tool to ERTMS
at a station which is not their ultimate destination). Whilst GPS does not form part of any
safety-critical process in ERTMS, it has applications in the driver’s cab, for example the Driver
Advisory System (DAS). This is used by train operators to manage train and driver perfor-
mance. This component, represented in the model as the DAS Display, can be used by the
train driver to determine if the train is running to schedule. If the GPS was aected, it might
inuence the driver to undertake an alternative driving style which could have a knock-on
eect on following trains and route (track path) planning.
7.5.2 Dening the Target Assets
For the analysis of the model to be meaningful, target assets were chosen as systems which
either have high safety requirements or systems that, if compromised, have the potential for
signicant disruption. A prime example of a target asset is the EVC which supervises the train
operations. If a balise provided inaccurate information, the EVC would relay this to the RBC,
which could return an unsafe decision. As the EVC is responsible for train safety supervision,
the malicious data from the balise could, for example, lead to an exaggerated permissible line
speed being presented to the driver, with potentially serious consequences.
The Car BUS is another target of interest to an adversary. This runs along the length of
the train and, in modern rolling stock, carries a range of data (e.g. power, braking and door
operation commands). If an adversary was able to insert arbitrary data into the bus, they
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Figure 7.3: Train Car BUS based on [83].
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Whilst the DAS and passenger information displays have no safety-requirement and are
considered SIL0 systems, used only as aids for drivers and passengers, they still have the ability
to cause disruption to passengers and the rail network. The RBC, however, denes the safety-
critical decisions through Movement Authorities. Compromising this would seriously impact
the safe operation of the railway.
7.5.3 Results
Running the SCEPTICS tool using the model shown in Figure 7.2, with the assets and entry
points available to the adversary as discussed in this section, we obtain the following results:
Adversary a1:
[Balise]->[Balise transmission module]->[EVC]:0.32736
[Balise]->[Balise transmission module]->[EVC]->[GSM-R]->[GSM-R base]->[MSC]->[RBC]:0.00016
[Balise]->[Balise transmission module]->[EVC]->[GSM-R]->[GSM-R base]->[MSC]->[RBC]->[MSC]->
->[GSM-R base]->[GSM-R]->[EVC]:0.32747
[SecureBalise]->[Balise transmission module]->[EVC]:0.06591
[SecureBalise]->[Balise transmission module]->[EVC]->[GSM-R]->[GSM-R base]->[MSC]->
->[RBC]:0.00006
[SecureBalise]->[Balise transmission module]->[EVC]->[GSM-R]->[GSM-R base]->[MSC]->
->[RBC]->[MSC]->[GSM-R base]->[GSM-R]->[EVC]:0.06597
Adversary a2:
[Workstation1]->[Train vendor]->[Internet Gateway]->[WiFi]->[Car BUS]:0.13456
[Workstation1]->[Train vendor]->[Internet Gateway]->[GSM]->[Car BUS]:0.03275
[Workstation2]->[Train vendor]->[Internet Gateway]->[WiFi]->[Car BUS]:0.0313
[Workstation2]->[Train vendor]->[Internet Gateway]->[GSM]->[Car BUS]:0.00762
Adversary a3:
[GPS]->[DAS Display]:0.97222
[GPS]->[Car BUS]->[Passenger display]: 0.9452
[GPS]->[Car BUS]->[EVC]->[GSM-R]->[GSM-R base]->[MSC]->[RBC]:0.00085
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As a reminder, the probabilities shown in these results represent the likelihood that the
chain may be successfully exploited, i.e. the adversary may successfully breach the starting
node all the way through the system to the ‘critical asset’. A high probability returned by the
tool would indicate that an attack is more likely to succeed than not and, as a result, should
be considered a priority for improvement by asset owners.
From this run we observe that, for Adversary a1, an adversary who uses the balise as their
entry point, has a probability of 0.32736 of being successful in aecting the EVC, potentially
accepting invalid line speeds or train location data. It should be noted, however, that the RBC
will receive this data with a probability of 0.00016, but the return path from the RBC, where
decisions are made, have a much higher probability. This is because the balise data is read into
the EVC and reported to the RBC where it will convert (i.e. bridge) the location into command
data, returning it to the EVC. Existing tools would terminate their analysis at the RBC as they
are unable to support nodes with multiple datatypes and conversions, whereas this tool is able
to nd this path by following bridges.
Adversary a2, however, provides some interesting results for review. In the case of the
compromised workstation, Workstation1, it predictably has a higher probability of aecting
the Car BUS than the ‘secure’ workstation, Workstation2. What is not captured here is a
malicious employee usingWorkstation2, who could remotely manage the train, highlighting
the need for the implementation of appropriate security practices to minimise exposure.
Finally, Adversary a3 demonstrates how systems which have high reliance on the data
oered by GPS, a system which has known, successful exploits [127], are aected more than
systems which do not have any reliance on GPS, such as the RBC. The on-board systems may
be aected (e.g. the passenger information displays) but, as the RBC does not rely on GPS data,
we note that the likelihood of the RBC being aected is negligible. This can be likened to an
attack which uses the Car BUS to exploit some other vulnerability to reach the RBC.
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7.5.4 Allowing Asset Owners to Test Security Strategies
As we identied in the previous section in this chapter, the balise has a high likelihood of
coercing the RBC to carry out some form of action. A probability of 10−6 in the space of a
year is generally considered to be the safety limit, where safety-critical systems should not
exceed this likelihood [147]. The value of preventing a fatality (VPF) in the rail sector is de-
ned as £1,946,0001, which could motivate decisions to improve safety and, in this context of
this chapter, security. The use of this tool allows asset owners to simulate and prototype im-
provements to component security, prior to carrying out potentially costly proof-of-concept
exercises. As an example, if we were to replace the Balise from Figure 7.2 with a new type of
balise, SecureBalise , capable of adding a keyed MAC to its payload, we observe the improve-
ments delivered through the simple addition of a MAC to the balise payload. What this MAC
achieves is that it prevents an attacker from creating their own malicious payload as they do
not know the balise-derived MAC key (as outlined in Chapter 6), which reduces the overall
path likelihood of success from 0.32736 (reaching the EVC only) to 0.06591. This demonstrates
how an asset owner can improve the overall system security and reduce their exposure through
minor changes. It should be noted, however, that alternative changes, for example modifying
balises to communicate in a similar way to ETCS Level 1 (where the balise is essentially con-
nected to the RBC) could be tested in this model, but in reality, would be impractical and incur
signicant expense to deploy.
7.6 Tool Discussion
The SCEPTICS tool leverages the CVSS framework to provide a contextual and, more im-
portantly, a veriable and repeatable means to calculate the probability of an asset becoming
compromised. However, it is important to note that the results it provides are a ‘snapshot-
1https://www.rssb.co.uk/risk-analysis-and-safety-reporting/risk-analysis/taking-safe-
decisions/taking-safe-decisions-safety-related-cba
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in-time’ view of the system under assessment from the time the model has been created. The
model should be developed as part of an iterative process where as many insights, subject and
domain-specic knowledge and information as possible, are captured over time. It is essential
that the model is constantly updated and revised when assets are changed and introduced to
the architecture, or where modications/mitigations have been made which may aect the
exposure of the identied high-risk assets.
From the perspective of NIS compliance, the SCEPTICS tool provides a new capability to
asset owners that allows them to assess the security of their infrastructure, whilst being able to
reason, with relative ease, its posterity from an adversary. One further benet the tool delivers
is its ability to nd intrinsic links which may not have been clear to the asset owner, or simply
not appreciated, which would be of value to the adversary.
The tool does, however, rely on the competency and skillset of the asset owner to be able to
derive accurate and correct CVSS values and maintain its currency. As a ‘rst-steps’ practice
to understand the security of a given architecture, the tool allows the asset owner to carry
out assessments of their infrastructure, which can, in future applications, validate identied
improvements.
7.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have explored a means for asset owners to assess the security of their in-
frastructures and carry out a ‘rst-steps’ remediation through the SCEPTICS tool and method-
ology. This is achieved through a probabilistic analysis, path discovery and application of the
CVSS framework, to provide insights that are not easy to extract from complex ICS architec-
tures. Whilst this chapter has primarily focused on applying the tool to ERTMS, its generic
view of components and interconnectivity means that it can be applied to other sectors (e.g.
pure-IT infrastructures) where asset owners can condently reason about the security of their
systems, whilst delivering assurances. The analyses oered by the tool are, therefore, non-
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exhaustive and allow asset owners to set the level of granularity within the model to more
precise detail, which is benecial for systems built with high levels of interconnectivity and
dependency.
Future work and enhancements to the tool are reviewed in Chapter 8, where we will con-
sider the benets of the tool and how other considerations, which might factor in decision
making by the asset owner, can be implemented in the tool. We also need to understand some
of the barriers to improvements, due to the need for intercompatibility, and how these barriers
may be overcome to provide future security assurances for ERTMS.
Part III




Balancing Safety and Security
The value of carrying out security analysis on the ERTMS standard has been demonstrated
throughout this thesis and how the notion of a ‘secure architecture’ can be developed to iden-
tify components in the architecture which can impact its security. From Denition 1.1 given in
Chapter 1, we have now established that, with minor changes to the standards, future devel-
opments can be assured for both safety and security, whilst also considering threats that may
become possible. In this chapter, we will discuss how this is specically achieved, in addition
to other challenges that exist, which may become future work.
8.1 Assessing and Assuring the Secure Architecture for
ERTMS
As identied in this thesis, an analysis of the standards from both a safety and security per-
spective should provide the appropriate assurances that there are no weaknesses which may
present a threat to the safe operation of the system. As we recall from Denition 1.1, we set
out a number of criteria to which components in an architecture must conform. Let us now
consider how each chapter in this thesis has contributed towards a secure architecture for
ERTMS.
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In Chapter 4, we assessed the security of two protocols used in ERTMS, EuroRadio and
the Application Layer, which carry out safety-critical functions and identied some potential
exploit vectors which could undermine the integrity of ERTMS.
The analysis of the EuroRadio MAC algorithm in Chapter 5 highlighted how previous jus-
tications for choosing a 3DES-based scheme no longer hold. In the future, it would therefore
be possible to compromise the security of the MAC, allowing an adversary to aect the safe op-
eration of the railway. Finally, in Chapter 6, we used this Denition to consider future threats
that may apply to any system, specically from a post-quantum attacker who could have un-
dermined the proposed ERTMS online key management scheme, an issue that is addressed by
introducing TRAKS. Through TRAKS, weaknesses were identied in the integrity of ERTMS
where the balise, which is currently unprotected, can have signicant consequences on the
safe operation of the railway should it be compromised.
Focusing on specic aspects of the standards, in the wider context of ERTMS, through
modelling, we were able to assess the entire architecture as part of a ‘bigger picture’, where it
was possible to identify potential risks that would aect its compliance to the Denition. By
modelling the system, as outlined in Chapter 7, we can consider this ‘big picture’ and analyse,
at a high-level, the security of the overall architecture of any system.
What is evident from this analysis is that, in its development, there was a primary focus on
ensuring the safety of ERTMS and that its introduction did not present any risk that had not
already been addressed in the systems it replaced. Security had been considered, but not to
the same extent as safety. As the security landscape is constantly evolving, it is essential that
regular reviews are carried out to assure the continued security of the platform, compared to
safety case assurances which are generally not reviewed as regularly. However, it is impor-
tant to state that safety and security are intrinsically linked where, through guarantees of the
security of a system, we can provide an assurance towards its safety.
Furthermore, this thesis has primarily considered a reference architecture of ERTMS. As
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real-world deployments may not necessarily follow the reference architecture, it is essential
that all deployments are assured to prevent exploitation through implementation errors.
8.2 Future Threats to ERTMS
The ERTMS standards include safety-critical and interoperability requirements, but are not
regularly updated to address any changes in the security landscape.
Any changes to the standards may require signicant eort to retest and to ensure that
they continue to provide safety assurances. A frequent review of the standards from both a
safety and security perspective should, therefore, be considered a necessity and assessments
should be carried out as part of the introduction of new baseline standards.
Looking to the future, the gap between the standards and current security practices presents
an even greater concern, given that the evolving deployment of ERTMS also increases the at-
tack surface available to an adversary. When we consider the NIS Directive, it is ambiguous
where responsibility lies should an attack be leveraged against the standards. As a result, any
breaches to the thresholds, irrespective of the root cause, currently become the responsibil-
ity of the operators. If an attack was successfully carried out, the operators must report and
manage the incident. Using the example of a denial of service attack by replaying messages,
causing a train to stop, for example, at Clapham Junction, it would be the responsibility of the
train operator to report and manage the incident, even if it was a consequence of a aw in the
underlying standards.
This also raises concerns for the wider ICS sector who, believing in the security provided
by compliance to their industry standards, may be similarly exposed due to inherent aws
in the underlying standards. This is particularly an issue for older protocols which, when
developed, could not have forseen the future security landscape.
Other forms of exposure may be introduced to ERTMS deployments through the specic
implementations used, e.g. where additional or vendor-specic functionality has been im-
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plemented outside of the standard. Vendor assurances must, therefore, be provided which
additionally benets compliance to the NIS Directive.
In these implementations and in the development of future standards, one attractive cost-
eective solution available to system designers may be to reuse components which have al-
ready been assured, but applying them in subtly dierent areas which may introduce an un-
appraised risk. One example may be the reuse of the EuroRadio MAC algorithm to validate
messages sent between the RBC and Rail Operation Centre (ROC), where a higher volume of
messages might allow an adversary to recover the key in a smaller timeframe, as shown in
Figure 5.6 in Chapter 5. By reusing an algorithm shown, in Chapter 5, to have aws, there is
an increased risk of an exploit being successful.
8.3 The Need for Interoperability and Intercompatibility
Throughout this thesis, where issues were found in the standards, a number of solutions were
proposed. In Chapter 5, we could have suggested a merger of the EuroRadio and Application
Layers as a primary recommendation. This, however, would have aected intercompatibility
with the existing standards, where we must consider existing deployments and the disruptive
eect of any changes to the standards. As a result, whilst we could aim to merge these two
layers, an alternative and more cost-eective solution, e.g. adding alternative Safety Features,
could be applied which maintains compatibility with the current standards, or requires minor
changes which ensure backwards compatibility. This is a more appropriate proposal as it can
be implemented without any conict with the existing standards.
During the development of TRAKS discussed in Chapter 6, we could, again, have proposed
a completely new key management architecture for ERTMS. However, as large-scale deploy-
ment is already in progress and, given the timescale to certify and ratify any proposed changes
to the standards, its applicability would be signicantly reduced. From informal discussions
with asset owners who have active ERTMS deployments, the introduction of major changes to
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the standards should be kept to a minimum, due to the inherent cost of upgrading and replac-
ing equipment which conforms to the existing versions of the standard. In any event, there is
also limited ability to deviate from the standards, as Bloomeld et al. note [19].
ERTMS, as a collection of standards, recognises that, as changes are made, they will require
potentially signicant re-engineering for each incremental version. These versions could,
however, include changes which signicantly improve the security of the deployment. The
current standards require the past two versions (versions n − 2 and n − 1) relative to the cur-
rent version to be supported [57]. The standard, SUBSET-104, however, does not specify the
timeframes on the National Infrastructure Managers to upgrade to a newer version (e.g. ver-
sion n − 2 to n − 1). If we consider commodity systems, this approach would be unacceptable,
where patching is carried out on a regular basis. ERTMS, however, is not a commodity sys-
tem. It requires rigorous safety validation which, due to its dynamic nature, can delay the
implementation and upgrade to conform to the latest standards [136].
8.4 Limitations and Methodology Review
One issue which has not been addressed in this thesis are any limitations of the analyses
conducted. Whilst the standards may be assured for security and safety, the implementation
can be the source of weaknesses. These weaknesses can be introduced at any point in the
supply chain or through lack of maintenance. For example, a coding error when dening
the EuroRadio protocol may introduce unintended state transitions which the standard does
not support, or malware similar to that of Stuxnet and BlackEnergy may remain unpatched.
Similarly, a system which conformed exactly to the specication when built, but uses a library
(e.g. OpenSSL), could introduce a newly-discovered vulnerability which, if not patched, would
provide another, potentially easier, vector which the adversary could use as a pivot point.
Assuring the security of these systems and identifying ways to prevent stagnation is, there-
fore, also critical. Considering the NIS Directive, there is now a requirement for both vendors
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and operators to ensure compliance and that their systems do not have any potential expo-
sures. Failure to meet the requirements of the Directive could subsequently result in a nan-
cial penalty. Assuring these implementations means that we must have condence in what
can otherwise be considered as ‘black boxes’, which have the potential to be exploited with
possibly serious consequences.
8.4.1 Limitations of the Research
From Chapter 4, we assured the EuroRadio protocol but not the implementation of the RBC-
RBC handover protocol. This protocol is not dened in as much detail as EuroRadio, but has
been analysed from a liveness perspective [39]. Under ERTMS, there should be an intercom-
patible protocol between vendors but its lack of detail means that further analysis is required.
The modelling captured in this chapter only considers three messages of a specic priority
being sent between the train and RBC. Further work could assess a more realistic model and
consider an arbitrary number of messages between the train and trackside, some normal-
priority, others high-priority. This modelling also does not consider denial of service attacks,
where alternative assurance methods could be applied. In Chapter 5, a cryptography-focused
variant of ProVerif, CryptoVerif [15] could have been applied to complement the model of the
EuroRadio and Application Protocols as an alternative.
As previously identied in Chapter 6, we can provide authentication of the payloads pre-
sented by balises to a train. What this does not protect against, however, is a physical attacker
who either removes a group of balises (which might cause a train to become stranded if its
Movement Authority depends on passing over that group), or ‘shues’ a set of balises. The
adversary could also use the tolerances in distance measurements between groups of balises
to potentially, on a large scale, create their own overlapping block. The RBC (in ETCS Level 3)
would believe that no safety margins are being violated but, by creating a ‘ghost’ block, two
trains could be made to occupy the same piece of track. A further consequence is that the
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RBC could be convinced that a set of points is now clear, which could either cause derailment
or, even worse, a collision. Currently, the standards specify the inclusion of the ‘last relevant
balise group’ in a balise telegram. However, it is not clear how these identities are specied,
e.g. when crossing a set of points. By chaining the balises together, it is possible to anticipate
the identities of the next balises, preventing an adversary from switching in a balise which has
a dierent ID.
In Denition 1.1, we noted that protocols should be veried for security. In Chapter 6,
the proposed TRAKS Key Distribution Protocol could be modelled using ProVerif and other
tools to assure the security of the keys exchanged between the train, vendor and KMC. One
issue here is that the without an understanding of the internal vendor processes for how such
cryptographic keys are handled, abstractions of the vendor processes would need to be made.
This, however, means that full assurance cannot be given as the vendor could have poor key
handling practices which would undermine the scheme.
Another part of the standard that has not yet been explored is the management of Packet
44 and what trust boundaries can be crossed if this was compromised. As previously stated,
in Great Britain, Packet 44 is currently used for Tilting Authorisation and Speed Supervi-
sion (TASS) telegrams, authorising the train to tilt on the West Coast Main Line. In 2014, Net-
work Rail [20] proposed using Packet 44 for other applications, for example, Automatic Train
Operation (ATO) on the Thameslink route. Thameslink’s ‘core’ is tted with ERTMS Level 2,
with ATO, enabling an increase in line capacity. In November 2017, it was conrmed that the
scope of Packet 44 was extended for ATO operations on the Siemens Class 700 rolling stock for
Thameslink [78]. However, the mismanagement or incorrect implementation of Packet 44, for
example, invalid calculations of variables, could have potentially serious consequences. For
tilting authorities, RSSB provides the requisite calculations for ‘Enhanced Permissible Speed’,
higher line speeds at which a tilting train can travel [124], but with limited verication onboard
the train, this may be an aspect that warrants further research.
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Asset owners may have varying priorities about where investment and improvements are
made to their systems. The SCEPTICS tool from Chapter 7 provides a ‘rst steps’ approach
to reasoning the security of architectures, but there are further enhancements which could be
made to increase its eectiveness. Some asset owners who are implementing ISO/IEC 62443
are using Security Levels to determine those sensitive components of their systems. Here, the
tool could highlight where possible thresholds could be breached. Another consideration is
that, when a given path has a high likelihood of being successfully exploited, it may be costly
to mitigate or resolve. If we consider the econometrics of implementing changes, we may nd
that a cheaper solution, applied on a dierent node, may have a greater impact at lower cost.
Denition 1.1 is also not exhaustive and further case studies by applying it to alternative
ICS environments would further benet its ecacy. By taking the ‘lessons learnt’ from this
thesis and applying them to other sectors, we can provide a framework which can be used
by ICS asset owners. This is particularly relevant when we consider the impact that the NIS
Directive has already had in forcing asset owners to consider new approaches to implement
its requirements.
8.4.2 Methodology Review
The approach of reviewing the set of standards that form ERTMS and mapping them out as
a system architecture proved key to the analyses conducted in this thesis, where a detailed
understanding of the subtle links between systems is critical. There is, however, the risk of be-
coming too focused on specic aspects of the standards without considering the wider impact
on neighbouring systems. By mapping out these systems, this risk is reduced as all analyses
can be carried out in context of the overall system and understanding the wider consequences
of any issues found. Through the detailed understanding of the standards, conicts and subtle
dierences between standards documents can be identied and further investigated from a
security perspective.
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As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, a number of dierent analysis techniques exist to
analyse various aspects of the standards. As an example in Chapter 4, an alternative toolset,
e.g. TAMARIN, could have been used to provide similar results.
One of the issues that arose during the development of the ProVerif model in Chapter 4 was
non-termination due to the initial modelling of timestamps and innite messages between the
train and RBC. This was resolved through the creation of the lightweight notion of time and
modelling only three messages exchanged between the train and RBC. This proved sucient
to provide security assurances of the EuroRadio and Application Layer protocols.
8.5 Future Research Directions
Whilst this thesis has primarily focused on the standards and system architectures, there is a
reliance on the supply chain to correctly implement the standards. Under the NIS Directive,
the responsibility for compliance lies with the asset owner, who may typically consider these
components to be black boxes. It is often dicult for asset owners to verify the security of
these systems, as the source code and system designs are not typically available. Therefore,
an approach similar to that developed in this thesis with a more practical emphasis can be
undertaken to consider the security of industrial (and rail) components. This would allow
asset owners to ease the challenge of assurance to achieve NIS compliance.
A number of analysis techniques can be surveyed and compared, allowing ICS owners to
review potential threats that their systems could face and provide guidance on the most ap-
propriate and eective methods that can be applied. As highlighted in Chapter 7, a knowledge
and skills gap exists when considering the security of systems. For most asset owners who lack
this understanding, we can look at how existing vulnerabilities to ICS systems arose, whether
it was through implementation or lack of clarity in the standards. By applying the methodol-
ogy developed in this thesis and reviewing methods to assure the security of these black boxes,
we can obtain an understanding of the link between standards and implementation.
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Whilst this thesis has primarily considered ERTMS, further analyses on Communication
Based Train Control (CBTC)-based systems is also warranted. Where ERTMS is specied as
a set of open standards for implementation by vendors, CBTC-based systems can be wholly
proprietary, particularly due to their target market for metro and light-rail operators, such as
Transport for London. In ERTMS, only vendor-supplied systems, for example the RBC and
Key Management Centre may contain proprietary software. Only the external interfaces (e.g.
train to RBC and RBC handover protocols) must conform to a common specication. As an
example, a programming interface for a balise can be proprietary, provided the balise transmits
a valid telegram to a train passing over it.
Another area which should be further explored is the security of onboard systems, par-
ticularly at the threshold between the ERTMS systems and the proprietary, on-train, systems.
Here, there is an explicit trust boundary placed between two sets of hardware. Investigation
into the adversary’s capabilities, should one side of the trust boundary become compromised,
would be of further interest.
Exploring the link between safety and security is also an area that should be researched
further. Striking the right balance is essential, where further analysis can identify and dene
solutions to maintain safe and secure systems for the future.
Finally, modelling and considering vendor inuences on standards is also of interest, as the
rail supply chain can have a large inuence on the development of standards. Modelling the
process for the creation of, and changes to, a standard would also be valuable in understanding
the inuence a vendor may have on the full set of standards.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
At the start of this thesis, we established a denition of a secure architecture to which an
industrial control system should conform. Taking the ERTMS standards as a primary focus
of this thesis, we nd that this denition does not hold when the standards are presented
with a malicious adversary. However, using the recommendations proposed in this thesis, it
is possible to ensure that the ERTMS architecture is secure.
When we consider the EuroRadio and Application Layers, other assurance work to date
has revolved around the safety oered by these protocols and very little in the way of security
analysis. This ultimately led to the accepted approach of ‘when in doubt, stop the train’, where
the network fails safe. Through the formal analysis of the EuroRadio and Application Layers,
we nd that, by applying the denition of a secure architecture, these protocols do not hold.
Specically, due to the way that the EuroRadio layer allows unauthenticated emergency stop
messages to be sent, an adversary who is able to inject into the GSM-R data stream would have
the potential for mass disruption on the network. When evaluating the possible methods of
addressing these issues, it is essential that the safety of the railway is not compromised, whilst
considering a balance of proposed security improvements to the existing standard.
From the analysis above, we were introduced to the MAC scheme used by EuroRadio to
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authenticate messages between the train and trackside, a custom 3DES-based scheme which
was rst proposed in 1997. As it was not previously subject to detailed security assurance, in
the analysis of the scheme, we identied a collision-based attack such that, if an attacker could
capture sucient data, it would be possible to forge valid train control messages. The design
limitations of 1997 are no longer a barrier with the advances in technology and cryptography
available today. Alternative schemes could, therefore, be employed which do not introduce
the weaknesses identied in this thesis.
We then considered how key management takes place in ERTMS, introducing a new post-
quantum key management scheme, TRAKS, which allowed other components, for example
the EuroBalise, to be introduced into the secure architecture. As previously highlighted, the
operational burden that the current scheme places on National Infrastructure Managers and
operators is signicant, leading to poor practices which undermine the security of the plat-
form. Whilst there are improvements in its proposed, online, successor, it is still not capable
of resisting a post-quantum adversary.
Finally, in light of the challenges faced by asset owners through the implementation of
the NIS Directive, where limited resource may be available to assess system security, we de-
veloped a graph-based modelling approach to carry out initial security assessments of system
architectures. The value of these assessments allows the asset owner to understand the in-
terconnectivity of their systems and the true security of their architectures without requiring
expert security knowledge.
By applying these various analysis and assurance methods, a number of recommendations
were made to improve the future security of ERTMS, which are summarised in Appendix F.
Whilst all the analyses presented in this thesis provides a level of assurance from the per-
spective of the standards, vulnerabilities may still exist in their implementations. Complemen-
tary, alternative assessments (e.g. penetration testing and fuzzing) should, therefore, also be
conducted to provide an end-to-end (from standard to operational use) assurance.
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A recurring theme of this thesis are the barriers to change that exist in ICS deployments.
When security issues are identied, their risk would be assessed and any solutions would
have to be compatible with the existing standards to provide backwards compatibility and not
impact the safe operation of the railway. We also had to consider that any proposed solutions
must remain viable for the lifespan of ERTMS. We have also observed how the standards can
lack currency. This will ultimately impact implementations – if the standard is not secure, how
can the implementations be secure? Since 2007, when SUBSET-026, which dened the system
specication of ERTMS was rst released, very little appears to have changed to improve the
security of the platform.
We have previously established that safety and security are intrinsically linked. They are
no longer considered independent – security inuences safety and, without sucient security
assessments, safety cannot be assured.
It is, therefore, imperative that whilst safety is core to the design process of safety-critical
standards, security must be given equal priority.





Formal Verication of the High-Priority EuroRadio Message
A.1 High-Priority Message Model (Train)
1 let Train =
2 new session;
3 (∗ Receive an RBC id to communicate with ∗)
4 in(id, rbc_etcs_id);
5 (∗ TCONN.request Au1 SaPDU ∗)
6 new trainNonce;
7 event trainStartSession(rbc_etcs_id, train_etcs_id, trainNonce, SAF);
8 out(c, (TRAIN_ETCS_ID_TYPE, AU1, DF_SEND, train_etcs_id, SAF, trainNonce));
9 (∗ TCONN.conrmation Au2 SaPDU ∗)
10 in(c, (=RBC_ETCS_ID_TYPE, =AU2, =DF_RESP, in_rbc_etcs_id, rbcSaF, rbcNonce, inMAC));
11 (∗ Generate the session key ∗)
12 let trainKS = genSessionKey(trainNonce, rbcNonce, getKey(in_rbc_etcs_id, train_etcs_id)) in
13 (∗ Output encrypted secret to check secrecy of keys ∗)
14 out(c, encrypt(SECRET, trainKS));
15 out(c, encrypt(SECRET, getKey(in_rbc_etcs_id, train_etcs_id)));
16 if inMAC = mac(trainKS, ((PAYLOAD_LENGTH, train_etcs_id, RBC_ETCS_ID_TYPE, AU2,
DF_RESP, in_rbc_etcs_id, rbcSaF), rbcNonce, trainNonce, train_etcs_id)) then
17 (∗ TDATA.request Au3 SaPDU ∗)
18 event trainFinishSession(in_rbc_etcs_id, train_etcs_id, trainNonce, rbcSaF, rbcNonce, trainKS);
19 out(c,(ZEROS, AU3, DF_SEND, mac(trainKS, (PAYLOAD_LENGTH, train_etcs_id, ZEROS, AU3,
DF_SEND, trainNonce, rbcNonce))));
20
Figure A.1: The ProVerif model of High-Priority Messages in EuroRadio from the perspective
of a train.
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A.2 High-Priority Message Model (RBC)
1 let RBC =
2 (∗ Get an RBC identiy ∗)
3 in(id, rbc_etcs_id);
4 (∗ TCONN.indication Au1 SaPDU ∗)
5 new rbcNonce;
6 in(c, (sent_ETCS_ID_TYPE, =AU1, =DF_SEND, in_train_etcs_id, trainSaF, trainNonce));
7 event rbcStartSession(rbc_etcs_id, in_train_etcs_id, rbcNonce, trainSaF, trainNonce);
8 (∗ Generate the session key ∗)
9 let rbcKS = genSessionKey(trainNonce, rbcNonce, getKey(rbc_etcs_id, in_train_etcs_id)) in
10 (∗ Output encrypted secret to check secrecy of keys ∗)
11 out(c, encrypt(SECRET, rbcKS));
12 out(c, encrypt(SECRET, getKey(rbc_etcs_id, in_train_etcs_id)));
13 (∗ TCONN.response Au2 SaPDU ∗)
14 out(c, (RBC_ETCS_ID_TYPE, AU2, DF_RESP, rbc_etcs_id, trainSaF, rbcNonce, mac(rbcKS, ((
PAYLOAD_LENGTH, in_train_etcs_id, RBC_ETCS_ID_TYPE, AU2, DF_RESP, rbc_etcs_id,
trainSaF), rbcNonce, trainNonce, in_train_etcs_id))));
15 (∗ AU3 SaPDU ∗)
16 in(c,(=ZEROS, =AU3, =DF_SEND, inMAC));
17 if inMAC = mac(rbcKS, (PAYLOAD_LENGTH, in_train_etcs_id, ZEROS, AU3, DF_SEND ,
trainNonce, rbcNonce)) then
18 event rbcFinishSession(rbc_etcs_id, in_train_etcs_id, rbcNonce, trainSaF, trainNonce, rbcKS);
19




Following the analysis of the EuroRadio MAC and its susceptibility to collisions, 8 separate
collisions were found in the Acknowledgement Message (Message 146) that is sent by a train
in response to a message sent by the RBC. This collision analysis only took into account the
intermediate MAC value (i.e. Hn), which is sucient for collision detection, given the deter-
ministic nature of the 3DES transformation in the nal block. The MAC and corresponding




















Table B.1: Pairs of messages which result in the same MAC under key k1 = 01020407080B0D0E
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Appendix C
MAC Collision Benchmarking
To understand the real-world and current capabilities of an adversary, an Amazon EC2 in-
stance was used to perform the hashcat benchmarking, using a p2.16xlarge instance. As
mentioned in Chapter 5, these instances are now deprecated in favour of more powerful in-
stances, which may reduce the time, eort and cost required to carry out the attack. These
instances are designed for high-performance Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) computation 2,
costing $14.40 per hour to use. Each instance comes with 64 vCPUs, 734GB of local RAM, and,
for the purposes of this experiment, a 8GB SSD-backed storage facility, available on the same
network as the instance to reduce latency.
Each p2 EC2 instance, at the time, was tted with an NVIDIA Tesla K80 GPU, which has
5,000 CUDA cores, 24GB of GDDR5 RAM, and, for the p2.16xlarge instance used for this
experiment, 16 K80 GPUs were available. At the time of benchmarking, the latest NVIDIA
GPU drivers, the Amazon Linux image and hashcat source code was compiled and installed,
optimised for this system.
hashcat is optimised for OpenCL, a framework that allows GPUs to be leveraged for
computation-heavy processes where, using the system GPUs, we obtain the following results.
hashcat Benchmarking Results
hashcat oers a benchmarking mode, allowing it to state the number of hashes, or values it
is able to produce per second. The argument set and results are broken down:
• -m 1500 : Message Type: descrypt, DES(Unix), Traditional DES
• -b : Benchmark Mode
• -w 4 : Workload Prole 4 – Extreme
• --powertune-enable : Enable automatic power tuning option on GPU
The EuroRadio MAC algorithm is not available to hashcat, where the closest family to
the simple DES algorithm available is the descrypt message type. This message type, in real-
ity, takes a 56-bit key as a password and a 64-bit zeroed data input block and encrypts this
block 25 times, where the hash is the output of the process. For the output speed stated from
the p2.16xlarge instance, we gain a 25x factor improvement, due to the descrypt function
carrying out 25 rounds of DES encryptions.
2https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/details/
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$ hashcat -m 1500 -b -w 4 --powertune-enable
hashcat (v3.10) starting in benchmark-mode...
OpenCL Platform #1: NVIDIA Corporation
======================================
- Device #1: Tesla K80, 2859/11439 MB allocatable, 13MCU
- Device #2: Tesla K80, 2859/11439 MB allocatable, 13MCU
- Device #3: Tesla K80, 2859/11439 MB allocatable, 13MCU
- Device #4: Tesla K80, 2859/11439 MB allocatable, 13MCU
- Device #5: Tesla K80, 2859/11439 MB allocatable, 13MCU
- Device #6: Tesla K80, 2859/11439 MB allocatable, 13MCU
- Device #7: Tesla K80, 2859/11439 MB allocatable, 13MCU
- Device #8: Tesla K80, 2859/11439 MB allocatable, 13MCU
- Device #9: Tesla K80, 2859/11439 MB allocatable, 13MCU
- Device #10: Tesla K80, 2859/11439 MB allocatable, 13MCU
- Device #11: Tesla K80, 2859/11439 MB allocatable, 13MCU
- Device #12: Tesla K80, 2859/11439 MB allocatable, 13MCU
- Device #13: Tesla K80, 2859/11439 MB allocatable, 13MCU
- Device #14: Tesla K80, 2859/11439 MB allocatable, 13MCU
- Device #15: Tesla K80, 2859/11439 MB allocatable, 13MCU
- Device #16: Tesla K80, 2859/11439 MB allocatable, 13MCU
Hashtype: descrypt, DES(Unix), Traditional DES
Speed.Dev.#1: 176.5 MH/s (482.39ms)
Speed.Dev.#2: 174.6 MH/s (482.68ms)
Speed.Dev.#3: 176.2 MH/s (483.11ms)
Speed.Dev.#4: 175.4 MH/s (485.09ms)
Speed.Dev.#5: 174.4 MH/s (483.27ms)
Speed.Dev.#6: 175.3 MH/s (480.53ms)
Speed.Dev.#7: 175.9 MH/s (483.79ms)
Speed.Dev.#8: 175.9 MH/s (483.84ms)
Speed.Dev.#9: 175.1 MH/s (481.23ms)
Speed.Dev.#10: 177.5 MH/s (479.46ms)
Speed.Dev.#11: 177.4 MH/s (479.99ms)
Speed.Dev.#12: 174.8 MH/s (486.82ms)
Speed.Dev.#13: 177.6 MH/s (484.14ms)
Speed.Dev.#14: 175.8 MH/s (484.19ms)
Speed.Dev.#15: 176.8 MH/s (481.54ms)
Speed.Dev.#16: 175.0 MH/s (481.54ms)
Speed.Dev.#*.: 2814.1 MH/s
Finally, we can estimate the cost of breaking the EuroRadio MAC using these instances.
Each p2.16xlarge instance is capable of producing 2,814,100,000 ‘outputs’ per second. As
identied earlier, this involves 25 DES rounds, where the per-DES round speed is actually
70,352,500,000 ‘outputs’ per second. The time taken to break DES using a single instance can
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be calculated using the below equation:
256
(70, 352, 500, 000 ∗ 60 ∗ 60) ≈ 284 hours
If we were to use, say, 400 p2.16xlarge instances, the time required would reduce to ∼ 42
hours.
For EuroRadio, where at least 6 DES encryptions are used for a 32 byte message (where
3 DES encryptions are used, totalling 6 to test the key), the equation shown below gives us a
time of 30 minutes, using 3,400 EC2 instances in parallel.
6 · 256
(70, 352, 500, 000 ∗ 60 ∗ 3400) ≈ 30mins
As a p2.16xlarge instance, at the time, cost $14.40 per hour to rent, using 3,400 instances
for 30 minutes to break the EuroRadio MAC would be as little as $48,960.
Appendix C. MAC Collision Benchmarking 208
Appendix D
CVSS Framework Equations
The expressiveness of the CVSS framework allows us to dene the security of systems in
a meaningful way. In the SCEPTICS tool, it is applied to describe the security of a given
component or link. The vector dened by CVSS is transformed into an overall score. We will
describe how its function and values may be determined.
The base score is derived as a function of two sub-score equations, which relate to the
impact of compromise and the exploitability of the system under assessment. The impact
subscore (known as ISC) has two denitions – the denition applied depends on whether the
scope of the exploit changes as it progresses through the system or, alternatively, where the
scope does not place the adversary in a more ‘privileged’ position. In the former case, the
score is dened as ISC = 6.42 · ISCBase , where ISCBase is the impact base subscore, dened by
Equation D.2. In the latter case, if scope changes, the score is derived in a dierent way, i.e.
(D.1)ISC = 7.52 × (ISCBase − 0.029) − 3.25 × (ISCBase − 0.02)15
(D.2)ISCBase = 1 − ((1 − ImpactConf identiality) × (1 − ImpactInteдrity) × (1 − ImpactAvailability))
The exploitability sub-score (ESC) is more straightforward to compute, as dened in Equa-
tion D.3. The variables used in this equation and their numeric mappings are given in [65].
(D.3)ESC = 8.22×AttackVector ×AttackComplexity×PrivileдeRequired ×UserInteraction
In the event that the ISC metric is 0, then the base score is 0, otherwise, it is determined
through Equation D.4. In this Equation, the function rup(x ) rounds its input x up by one
decimal place. As an example, rup(2.42) = 2.5, rup(2.9) = 2.9.
(D.4)BaseScore=

rup(min(1.08×(ISC+ESC),10)), IF scope changed
rup(min((ISC+ESC),10)), IF scope unchanged
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D.1 CVSS Value Conversion






(Modied) Attack Complexity Low 0.77High 0.44
(Modied) Privilege Required
None 0.85
Low 0.62 (0.68 if Scope/
Modied Scope is changed)
High 0.27 (0.50 if Scope/
Modied Scope is changed)
(Modied) User Interaction None 0.85Required 0.62
Table D.1: CVSS Metric Values used by the SCEPTICS Tool
Appendix E


















Figure E.1: Input XML Denition for an Adversary, who has as their entry point, a component
in the model named SecureBalise, and can use their capabilities on specic edge types.
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Figure E.2: Input XML Denition for an Asset (RBC) which is a target node, and subject to
patient-zero and reachability analysis, with specic proles and datatypes of interest.
Appendix F
Thesis Recommendations
In this Appendix, a summary list of recommendations made in this thesis are included below
for ease of reference.
F.1 Chapter 4: Modelling of the EuroRadio andApplication
Layer Protocols
Inclusion of a MAC in EuroRadio High-Priority Messages The previous justications
for omitting a MAC on high-priority messages, specically where speed of computation was
of the essence, is no longer valid. Advances in computational power mean that the speed now
taken to compute a MAC is no longer a barrier. The inclusion of a MAC would prevent an
adversary who is able to inject into the GSM-R data stream from sending arbitrary emergency
stop messages without knowing the shared MAC session key.
Addition of a Counter to Messages As the Application Layer relies on timestamps to
ensure timely receipt of messages and to honour the latest message received, it is possible for
messages to be blocked from reception. By moving towards a sequence counter-like scheme
where each message to and from the train and RBC are sequentially numbered, it is possible
to determine if a message has not been successfully received, in a TCP-like manner and then
appropriately handled.
Verication of the Safety Feature (SaF) in the EuroRadio Handshake As the rst mes-
sage from the train is sent in the clear, it is possible for an adversary to intercept and modify
the proposed Safety Feature to one that is considered less secure. By ranking Safety Feature
security, if the train, upon receipt of the AU2 message from the RBC, is instructed to use a
dierent Safety Feature to that sent by the train in the initial message (AU1), the train can de-
termine whether or not to proceed with the handshake if a weaker cipher is proposed by the
RBC.
F.2 Chapter 5: EuroRadio MAC Cipher
Replacement of the EuroRadio MAC with a Modern and Secure Alternative The ex-
isting MAC for EuroRadio was proposed in 1997 [22] with the requirement that a determined
adversary would need ‘sucient technical, nancial and human resources’ to compromise the
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scheme. As highlighted in Chapter 5, 3DES is only recommended for use up to 2030. Al-
ternatives should, therefore, be considered which oer sucient security throughout the an-
ticipated operational lifespan of ERTMS systems. Alternative MAC ciphers, specically those
understood to be quantum-resistant should be considered and made available for use as Safety
Features prior to this date. Where train and RBC keys do not have the sucient length for
new ciphers, new keys should be issued that meet the required length, where a portion of the
new key can be used for backwards compatibility.
F.3 Chapter 6: ERTMS Key Management
Replacement of theOline andOnline ERTMSKeyManagement SchemeswithTRAKS
One critical issue with the existing ERTMS oine key management scheme is its lack of scala-
bility and the signicant burden on National Infrastructure Managers during and after national
deployments of ERTMS. Whilst the online scheme attempts to alleviate this burden, its reliance
on RSA certicates makes the scheme insecure against a post-quantum adversary, where we
have to consider the possibility of such adversarial capabilities in the next 10-15 years. The
TRAKS Key Management Scheme, whilst being designed to be backwards-compatible with the
existing oine scheme, reducing the operational burden on Infrastructure Managers to intro-
duce new trains into their geographic domain, also achieves post-quantum security through
its use of post-quantum secure Pseudo-random Functions (PRFs).
Replacement of theKey IssuanceProtocol used by InfrastructureManagers Presently,
for a new train or RBC, transport keys are issued in plaintext and installed on the train and
RBC. An internal adversary could therefore intercept these keys and be able to decrypt all fu-
ture key management directives issued by the KMC to the train and RBC. Using technologies
available today, e.g. the TPM, ARM TrustZone and Intel SGX, the trains and RBCs can securely
generate and store their own keys with the vendor simply acting as a communication link to
the KMC, thus removing this exposure.
Include Authentication for Trusted Devices EuroBalises (as shown in Chapter 7) can
inuence decisions made by the RBC. The addition of a MAC, which is veried by a train,
would prevent an adversary from attempting to impersonate a balise or reprogramming one
without the necessary keys. Such keys can be issued using the TRAKS scheme through the
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